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ARTICLES
STORIES OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
DISRESPECT: FROM ELIAN TO THE
INTERNMENT
Andrew E. Taslitz*
I. RESPECT: THE MISSING PIECE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
PUZZLE
A. Broader Fourth Amendment Lessons to Be Learned from the Racial
Profiling Controversy
In early April 2001, an unarmed black teenager, Timothy Thomas,
was shot to death by Cincinnati police officers.1 The officers were
pursuing Thomas on outstanding arrest warrants for two alleged
misdemeanors and numerous traffic offenses.2 The shooting sparked
protests in Cincinnati's African-American community, as protesters
alleged that the officers used excessive force because of Thomas's
race Thomas was the fourth black male killed by the Cincinnati
police since 1995, the police having killed not one white suspect
during that time.4 Feelings ran so high that the protests turned
violent, with newspapers describing the reaction as a riot.5
* Visiting Professor, Duke University Law School, 2000-01; Professor of Law,
Howard University School of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law,
1981, former Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. I thank my
wife, Patricia V. Sun, Esq., Professors Robert Mosteller, Sara Sun-Beale, Girardeau
Spann, Joseph Kennedy, Eric Muller, Ronald Wright, and many other members of
the Triangle Criminal Law Working Group, for their comments on early drafts of this
Article. I also thank my research assistants, Nicole Crawford, Eli Mazur, and Amy
Pope, and my secretary, Ann McCloskey. Appreciation also goes to the Howard
University School of Law for funding this project, and to the Duke University Law
School for helping me see this effort through to its completion.
1. Amy DePaul & Peter Slevin, Cincinnati Officials Impose Curfew; Mayor
Acknowledges Race Woes as City Acts to Quell Violence, Wash. Post, Apr. 13,2001, at
Al.
2- See id.
3. See Francis X. Clines, In Aftershock of Unrest, Cincinnati Seeks Answers, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 23, 2001, at All [hereinafter Clines, Aftershock of Unrest] (suggesting
protests partly sparked by concerns that the Thomas shooting was the latest in a long
line of excessive force cases).
4. See Cincinnati Calm After 2 Days of Violence" Riots Had Followed Shooting by
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But, the protests and resulting violence were about far more than
the excessive use of force. Protesters were also angered at, in their
view, years of degrading racial profiling by the local police.6 A
teenager interviewed by the Washington Post seemed to capture the
sense of the community:
"The riots are not just a reaction to the killing of an African
American male, but to the injustice to our people for so long," said
Christopher Johnson, 16, as he stood on the church steps. "Just
walking down the street I get asked [by police], 'What are you
doing?' I pay taxes like they do. I should be able to walk down a
public street.",
7
Indeed, shortly before the Thomas shooting, the Cincinnati Black
United Front and the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio filed a
lawsuit accusing the city's police force of a thirty-year pattern of racial
profiling, including unduly frequent traffic and jaywalking stops, often
involving unnecessary humiliation and use of force.8 Cincinnati was,
of course, an infamous site of riots breaking out in the violent summer
of 1968, after African-Americans charged that they were harassed by
local police abusing their discretion under loitering laws.9 That
allegation was supported the next year by the Kerner Commission's
Report examining the causes of those riots and of similar violence in
seven other cities." The recent ACLU suit essentially alleges that
little has changed since 1968.11
The Cincinnati protests were a particularly dramatic reaction to the
perception that the police were engaging in racial profiling. But
nationwide concerns about racial profiling have been in national
headlines for the past several years.1 2 Extreme incidents ending in
Police, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12,2001, at Al [hereinafter Cincinnati Calm].
5. See id.
6. See Clines, Aftershock of Unrest, supra note 3; Cincinnati Calm, supra note 4;
DePaul & Slevin, supra note 1.
7. DePaul & Slevin, supra note 1.
8. See id.; see also Clines, Aftershock of Unrest, supra note 3; Cincinnati Calm,
supra note 4.
9. See DePaul & Slevin, supra note 1; see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Mob
Violence and Vigilantism, in The Oxford Companion to American Law (Kermit L.
Hall et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Taslitz, Mob Violence and Vigilantism] (discussing
social forces causing the 1968 urban race riots in Cincinnati and other major cities).
10. See DePaul & Slevin, supra note 1; see also Taslitz, Mob Violence and
Vigilantism, supra note 9.
11. See DePaul & Slevin, supra note 1 ("We have not a few isolated incidents ....
We have a pattern perceived by the Kerner Commission in 1968 and perceived
continuously to this day. It's difficult for the city to credibly deny that this problem
exists." (quoting Raymond Vasvari, Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union of Ohio)).
12. See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why
"Driving While Black" Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 265-75 nn. 1-56 (1999)
[hereinafter Harris, Statistics] (collecting selected interviews and news stories on racial
profiling); Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1999, § 6
2258 [Vol. 70
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shooting deaths like Thomas's have drawn particular attention, 3 as
have particularly invasive searches like that of Patricia Appleton, a
black woman travel agent returning from Jamaica via Chicago's
O'Hare Airport. 4 The American Bar Association's Journal described
the February 1997 search by United States Customs officials:
[T]hey directed her to a small room, barely the size of a jail cell,
where Appleton assumed that she would be patted down. After
about 20 minutes, two female customs inspectors entered.
"They told me they were going to strip-search me," Appleton
recalls. "They didn't give me a reason." The next thing Appleton
knew, she was naked and spread-eagled against the wall. The
inspector told her to back up two steps, bend over and grab her
ankles.
"I think I see something," she remembers one inspector saying.
"They made me bend over farther. By then, I'm hysterical and
crying. I said, 'I can't do this anymore."'
Finally, they let her go. They eventually told her they suspected
she'd swallowed drugs. Appleton says only one other event in her
life approached the humiliation and vulnerability she felt at O'Hare:
"I had been brutally raped when I was 15, and this was close to it.""5
Any strip search is, of course, extremely emotionally disturbing, but
this search was made worse by Appleton's belief that her race
prompted the Customs Service's extreme action." Indeed, in August
of that same year, she was strip-searched at O'Hare again. She
ultimately joined eighty-four other African-American women in a
lawsuit against the Customs Service, alleging that the women were
strip-searched because they were black. 7
What is especially interesting about extreme cases like Thomas's
killing and Appleton's strip search, however, is that far more
mundane cases of alleged racial profiling-such as brief investigative
(Magazine), at 51 (providing a lengthy expose about racial profiling and officers'
views on the subject); accord Katheryn K. Russell, The Color of Crime: Racial
Hoaxes, White Fear, Black Protectionism, Police Harassment, and Other
Macroaggressions 33-46 (1998) (summarizing empirical, historical, and anecdotal data
on racial profiling).
13. See Jill Nelson, Police Brutality: An Anthology 9-11 (Jill Nelson ed., 2000)
(portraying the police shooting and killing of twenty-two year-old Guinea immigrant,
Amadou Diallo, as the quintessential modem example of race-based police
decisionmaking).
14. See John Gibeaut, Marked for Humiliation, 85 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 46.
15. Id
16. See id
17. See id. In apparent reaction to these sorts of lawsuits and to critical media
coverage, the Customs Service seems to have significantly reduced racial profiling by
its inspectors. See Lori Montgomery, New Police Policies Aim to Discourage Racial
Profiling, Wash. Post, June 28, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Montgomery, Discourage
Racial Profiling].
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stops of pedestrians for questioning or automobile stops for traffic
violations- elicit similar rage in victims and their communities.18 One
black social worker arrested after being stopped for speeding
thereafter
felt a wave of fear wash over her every time she saw a police car in
her rearview mirror. In that one brief encounter, her entire sense of
herself-her job, the fact that she is a mother and an educated, law-
abiding person working on a master's degree-was stripped away.' 9
A forty-one year-old, African-American male, a top executive in a
major public institution, who had been repeatedly stopped even when
he drove with extra caution, felt angry and frustrated, and explained
his deeper sense of powerlessness: "They have the power and they
can do whatever they want to do to you for that period of time ....
You're never beyond this, because of the color of your skin."20 These
experiences are sufficiently common among African-Americans to
have prompted an organized nationwide campaign against racial
profiling.2 Those efforts have begun to bear fruit, with both federal
and state legislative efforts under way at least to collect data on racial
profiling and with some police departments experimenting with ways
to document and address the problem.22 The United States Supreme
Court and many state courts have instead washed their hands of the
problem.'
In Whren v. United States,24 for example, the Supreme Court held
that an officer's subjective motivation for stopping drivers is irrelevant
under the Fourth Amendment. Civil suit is possible under the Equal
Protection Clause, said the Court, but, in another case, United States v.
Armstrong,' the Court set the standard of proof so high even to
18. See Kenneth Meeks, Driving While Black: Highways, Shopping Malls,
Taxicabs, Sidewalks: How to Fight Back if You Are a Victim of Racial Profiling 3-20,
63-157 (2000) [hereinafter Meeks, Driving While Black] (reviewing the different types
of racial profiling and recounting the emotional reactions of numerous victims); John
L. Burris, Blue vs. Black: Let's End the Conflict Between Cops and Minorities 81-106
(1999) (summarizing stories of the humiliation and anger felt by persons stopped by
the police for "walking while black").
19. Harris, Statistics, supra note 12, at 273 (describing the experience of Karen
Brank, a mother in her early thirties with no record of being in trouble with the
police) (footnote omitted).
20. See id. at 272-73 (quoting Interview by David Harris with Michael in Toledo,
Ohio (Oct. 1, 1998)).
21. See David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of
the "New Federalism" in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 367,
377-97 (2001) [hereinafter Harris, New Federalism] (summarizing the results of the
movement).
22. See id.; see also Montgomery, Discourage Racial Profiling, supra note 17.
23. See Harris, New Federalism, supra note 21, at 374-85 (summarizing state and
federal judicial responses to profiling).
24. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
25. 517 U.S. 456 (1996); see also Andrew E. Taslitz & Margaret L. Paris,
Constitutional Criminal Procedure 393-95, 410-12 (1997) [hereinafter Taslitz & Paris,
2260 [Vol. 70
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obtain discovery as to render the equal protection remedy
meaningless. Moreover, many police simply deny that profiling
happens in their department,2 6 while public debates rage over what
"profiling" is: What if an officer's reliance on race is subconscious?
Merely one factor among others? Justified by the proportion of
people of a particular race who commit certain crimes? Many police
and commentators would not consider these situations-all of which
fall short of intentional racial discrimination-to involve profiling?21
All these points about racial profiling have been thoroughly
addressed by numerous scholars, each offering their own solutions to
the problem 8  Other scholars have not discussed, however, what
broader lessons the justice system's experience with racial profiling
may have to teach about Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more
generally.
What was particularly arresting to me in the individual interviews
with victims of racial profiling recounted above was their repeated
sense of insult and humiliation. Merely being briefly stopped led the
forty-one-year-old executive to complain of a sense of being at
another's mercy, expecting repeatedly to be so again. The social
worker arrested for speeding suffered depression and lost much of her
sense of self-worth. And, in the more extreme cases, the strip-
searched women felt raped and the Cincinnati survivors felt fearful of
police assaults. These emotional wounds were shared by the many
African-Americans who heard or read about these incidents, as if the
Constitutional Criminal Procedure] (explaining the implications for search and
seizure analysis when Whren-a Fourth Amendment case-is read in conjunction
with Armstrong-an Equal Protection claim involving alleged selective prosecution in
a federal crack cocaine case motion to compel discovery).
26. See Goldberg, supra note 12 ("When asked, most cops will declare themselves
color blind.").
27. See John Cloud, What's Race Got to Do with It?, Time, July 30,2001, at 45-47.
But how much racial profiling actually occurs? Criminologists are still
debating how to answer that question. Should we take the percentage of
traffic stops for a certain racial group and hold it against that group's
percentage in the population? Or should it be the percentage of stops vs. the
actual driving presence of that group in the area where the arrests were
made? If we are talking about the percentage of people arrested for a certain
crime, can we consider the rate at which others of their race have been
picked up for that crime in the past, or is that data always tainted by the
racism of the cops who arrested them?
....No one worth hearing argues that race should be the only factor in
decisionmaking, but should race never be part of a criminal profile?
... Perhaps police are more likely to search minorities because they
commit a disproportionate number of crimes.
Id; see also Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and tile Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 956, 983-87 (1999) (reviewing social science research
on the often subconscious impact of categorization, schemas, and stereotyping on
police work).
28. See Harris, Statistics, supra note 12; Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333 (1998); Thompson, supra note 27.
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community as a whole had been attacked by the officers involved in
the individual cases.29 The individuals' insult, of course, stemmed in
part from their sense that unjustified stops, searches, or arrests are
humiliating in themselves." But, they were also independently
wounded by their sense that their individuality had been ignored, their
racial group membership being enough to subject them to suspicion.31
Correspondingly, the insult to the part of themselves identifying with
their racial group amplified their pain.32 For similar reasons, other
blacks saw the incidents as insults directed to the entire African-
American community.3 3 In short, the rage inspired by racial profiling
29. See Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 151 (1997) ("[One] reason
for more tightly circumscribing police use of race-dependent criteria is that the
current permissive regime nourishes powerful feelings of racial grievance against law
enforcement that are prevalent in every strata of black communities."). Professor
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., summarizes:
Blacks-in particular, black men-swap their experiences of police
encounters like war stories, and there are few who don't have more than one
story to tell. Erroll McDonald, one of the few prominent blacks in
publishing, tells of renting a Jaguar in New Orleans and being stopped by
the police-simply "to show cause why I shouldn't be deemed a problematic
Negro in a possibly stolen car." Wynton Marsalis says, "Shit, the police
slapped me upside the head when I was in high school. I wasn't Wynton
Marsalis then. I was just another nigger standing out somewhere on the
street whose head could be slapped and did get slapped." The crime novelist
Walter Mosley recalls, "When I was a kid in Los Angeles, they used to spot
me all the time, beat on me, follow me around, tell me that I was stealing
things. Nor does William Julius Wilson wonder why he was stopped near a
small New England town by a policeman who wanted to know what he was
doing in those parts.
Id. at 151-52 (citation omitted).
30. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and Justice: The Fourth Amendment from the
Bottom Up (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter
Taslitz, Bottom Up] (describing social science and political theory on why interference
with Fourth Amendment freedoms is humiliating); Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the
Fourth Amendment (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter
Taslitz, Respect] (linking philosophical notions of respect and humiliation to police
conduct).
31. See Kennedy, supra note 29, at 157:
By too easily permitting the police to use race as an indicia of suspiciousness,
courts also derogate from the idea that individuals should be judged on the
basis of their own, particular conduct and not on the basis-not even partly
on the basis of racial generalizations. Race-dependent policing erodes the
difficult-to-maintain habit of individualizing persons and strengthens the
reflex of lumping people together according to gross racial categories.
Id; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of
Hate Crimes Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 739, 746-58 (1999) [hereinafter
Taslitz, Racist Personality] (arguing that social science and philosophy support human
need for individualized assessments of character and wrongdoing).
32. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 31, at 746-58 (stating that our sense
of individual uniqueness is partly constituted by our sense of identification with our
own particular combination of personally salient social groups).
33. See id. at 758-65 (explaining why racial groups may perceive injuries to
individual group members as group injuries and vice-versa).
[Vol. 702262
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stems from the sense of state-sanctioned disrespect for the individual
victims and their racial community.-'
Curiously, words like "insult," "respect," and "humiliation" very
rarely make their way into Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case
law.35 Even more rarely do these concepts play any role in the Court's
conclusions. As early as 1968-the same year of the race riots in
Cincinnati and other major cities-the Court held, in Terry v. Ohio,"
that the police could engage in investigatory stops on less than
probable cause, reasonable suspicion being sufficient. The Court
recognized in passing that stops amounting to perceived wholesale
harassment were "a major source of friction between the police and
minority groups."37 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that these
tensions could be exacerbated by actions "motivated by the officers'
perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an
aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to
undermine police control of the streets."' Nevertheless, the Court
considered the exclusionary rule a "futile protest" against such
practices that might "exact a high toll in human injury and frustration
of efforts to prevent crime."39 The Court moved quickly on to refining
and defending its new stop and frisk rule, a rule crafted as a result of
the Court's balancing the beat officer's needs for safety and "sift
action predicated upon.., on-the-spot observations" against the
"brief' intrusions of a stop or frisk.'
The patterns established in Terry have continued to guide the
Court's attitude toward respect as a Fourth Amendment value. The
Court crafts constitutional search-and-seizure rules based on
balancing the state's need for the evidence against the degree of
intrusion into the individual's interests in privacy, property, and free
movement.41 But, as so stated, this is a lopsided process: society's
need for crime control is weighed only against the injury to an
individual.4  It is true that the Court does consider how other
34. For elaboration on the meaning of respect, see infra text accompanying notes
112-72. For a more in-depth analysis, see Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30.
35. But see Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (mentioning, with
little explanation of its significance, the importance of considering the degree of
intrusiveness upon "personal privacy and indeed even personal dignity" (emphasis
added)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (a frisk is a "serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment."
(emphasis added)).
36. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
37. Id. at 14 n.11 (quotation and citation omitted).
3& Id. at 15 n.11 (quotations and citations omitted).
39. Id. at 15.
40. See id. at 20-22. For a more detailed analysis of Terr', see Taslitz, Respect,
supra note 30, and for a summary of Terry's progeny, see Taslitz & Paris,
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 334-49.
41. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 150-
58 (describing the Court's "categorical reasonableness balancing" analytical method).
42. See id. at 150, 350 (showing that the Court weighs governmental need against
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similarly situated future suspects might be treated.43 But the Court
generally either does not consider, or only summarily addresses, the
more broadly defined social costs of a search or seizure, such as the
impact on racial or ethnic communities.44 Nor does the Court, outside
of searches of the home, generally give individuals' interests much
weight in the balance, there being a few important exceptions.45
Notably, the Court's privileging of interests in the home means that
an individual's interests).
43. For example, in considering the constitutionality of a suspicion-less, random
drug-testing program for high school athletes, the Court looked to what it deemed to
be the likely experiences of most high school athletes, not only the experiences of the
athletes in the case then at hand. "School sports are not for the bashful. They require
'suiting up' before each practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards.
Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the
privacy they afford." Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995). Just
as the Court drew on the supposed experiences of other similarly-situated high school
athletes, its approval of the Vernonia School District program suggests that
reasonably similar programs affecting athletes at other high schools will also be
constitutional.
Conversely, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), discussed
below, the Court concluded that the impact of police conduct on the individual
arrested was significant, but found the conduct constitutional because it believed that
there would be few others so victimized and that the political process would prevent a
rise in victimizations. See infra text accompanying notes 50-61 (analyzing Atwater).
This reasoning does not involve considering the impact on an individual at all.
Rather, the Atwater Court considered only the cumulative impact on similarly
situated individuals, clearly weighing the needs of the majority (who benefit from
generally discretionary and active law enforcement but do not pay its costs) against
the harms to the minority (the few who suffered in ways similar to Ms. Atwater). This
analytical style differs from that in Vernonia, where the Court at least considered the
impact of random searches on both the individuals before it and similary-situated
individuals. In neither reasoning style, however, does the Court seriously consider the
impact on those not similarly-situated, for example, on whether high school students
not in athletics will lose trust in their teachers or decide not to pursue athletics; on the
athletes' parents who may see the distrust of their children as insulting; or on children
generally becoming so accustomed to such invasions that we raise a populace with
ever-declining expectations of privacy.
The Court will soon have another opportunity to consider these issues. See Earls ex
rel. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. Of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001),
cert. granted 122 S. Ct. 509 (Nov. 8, 2001) (raising question of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness of public high school's policy of suspicionless urinalysis drug testing in
competitive extracurricular activities).
44. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-19 (1996) (dismissing inquiry
into racial pretext under the Fourth Amendment); infra text accompanying notes 259-
75 (examining Court's limited notion of social costs in its recent decision in Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)).
45. See Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 Duke L.J. 787, 829-31 (1999)
[hereinafter Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion] (making analogous point); Tracey
Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the
Streets, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1328-30 (1990) [hereinafter Maclin, Right of
Locomotion] (stating that search and seizure protections generally plummet outside
the home); see also David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments:
Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 St.
John's L. Rev. 975 (1998) [hereinafter Harris, Categorical Judgments]; Taslitz,
Respect, supra note 30.
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the interest in freedom of movement-which definitionally happens
outside the home-rarely gets significant weight, unless the intrusion
effectively rises to the level of an arrest, just as the Terry Court
viewed a stop of a pedestrian as a relatively minimal interference,
despite its brief protestations to the contrary. This assessment
undervalues the critical role that free movement plays in human
autonomy, the sense of making your own informed life choices as part
of human dignity.47
Correspondingly, the Court usually gives little weight to human
emotion in general, either ignoring it, adopting a mode of reasoning
rendering it irrelevant, or minimizing its importance. s Humiliation, of
course, need not be based on disparate racial treatment, though that
has a special emotional power 9.4  For example, in Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista,' the Court expressly considered the importance of the
emotion of humiliation where race discrimination was not an issue.
There, a police officer arrested a woman who drove without having
fastened her seat belt or those of her two children who were riding
with her.51 She was handcuffed, booked, and held in a jail cell, her
terrified children rescued from further participation in the ordeal by a
nearby friend who heard what was happening and came to care for the
kids.52 The Court agreed that "the physical incidents of arrest were
merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was
(at best) exercising extremely poor judgment." 3 Moreover, agreed
the Court, "Atwater's claim to live free of pointless indignity and
confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it
specific to her case."' Nevertheless, the Court found Atwater's arrest
"no more 'harmful to ... privacy or ... physical interests' than the
46. See Maclin, Right of Locomotion, supra note 45, at 1328-30 (describing the
connection between home and minimal weight given to freedom of movement); see
also Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 334-40
(detailing circumstances in which an interference with free movement rises to the
level of an effective arrest, requiring probable cause).
47. See Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30 (free movement and autonomy); Taslitz,
Respect, supra note 30 (discussing the respect-autonomy connection and meaning).
48. See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354-55 (finding arrested seat-belt violator's
humiliation ultimately irrelevant to the Court's decision); Mich. Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1990) (describing the fear and annoyance of motorists
stopped at police sobriety checkpoints as minimal); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 &
n.5, 17 & n.13 (1968) (noting community resentment over stops and frisks). See
generally Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. _
(forthcoming 2002) [herinafter Taslitz, Twenty-First Century] (discussing Court's
failure to understand the emotions underlying privacy concerns and their
implications).
49. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30.
50. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
51. Id. at 322-24.
52. Id. at 324.
53. Id. at 346-47.
54. Id. at 347.
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normal custodial arrest."55 The arrest and booking were "inconvenient
and embarrassing to Atwater, but not so extraordinary as to violate
the Fourth Amendment. '56 In any event, the Court suggested, the
invasions of Atwater's person were justified by probable cause and
thus almost definitionally reasonable. Moreover, the Court assumed
that if arrests became common for fine-only offenses, the political
process would correct the problem. Perhaps more importantly, in the
Court's view, the history leading up to the 1791 ratification of the
Fourth Amendment did not reveal any prohibition of warrantless
misdemeanor arrests not involving a breach of the peace. 7
Atwater revealed the extent to which the Court minimizes harmful
emotions, especially humiliation, suffered by those who are searched
and seized. Yet the Court's greater tone-deafness to issues of insult,
humiliation, and disrespect is its failure to examine the ways in which
the interests in privacy, property, and locomotion that the Fourth
Amendment protects are worthy of such protection partly because
they safeguard against humiliating emotional abuses. Privacy is
essential to the flourishing of human relationships and free thought.58
Property adds to the independence and security that give us a measure
of freedom from state and private coercion.5 9 Free movement-the
55. Id. at 354.
56. Id. at 355.
57. For a thorough analysis of the Court's "new originalist" approach to the
Fourth Amendment and its flaws, see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment
and Common Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1739 (2000). For critiques of the claim that
the electoral process can readily be trusted to protect Fourth Amendment freedoms,
see generally most of the essays other than those by Tracey L. Meares and Dan M.
Kahan in Urgent Times: Policing and Rights in Inner-City Communities (Joshua
Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) [hereinafter Urgent Times]. Ssee generally Luna,
Sovereignty and Suspicion, supra note 45.
58. See Judith Wagner DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of
Technology 61-80 (1997) (explaining that without privacy, we feel weak and
vulnerable; with privacy, we feel the independence and strength to resist conformity
and exercise the autonomy to forge our own unique lifestyle); Julie C. Inness, Privacy,
Intimacy, and Isolation 107-08 (1992) (stating that privacy promotes intimacy and the
capacities for love, care, and like); Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy and Social
Freedom (1992) (arguing that privacy enables us to express our innermost selves to
selected others); Andrew E. Taslitz, Race and Two Concepts of the Emotions in Date
Rape, 15 Wis. Women's L.J. 3, 66 (2000) (claiming privacy allows for the creation and
expression of our unique individual identity).
59. See Joseph William Singer, The Edges of the Field: Lessons on the Obligations
of Ownership 17 (2000) ("Property promotes liberty by giving individuals the
resources they need to create a home, engage in work, develop relationships with
others, and live their lives on their own terms."). Singer argues that "[flailing to
respect the property of another wrongs that person because it fails to treat the other
person as one created in the image of God." Id. at 53; see also Joseph William Singer,
Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property 11, 23, 31-32, 131 (2000) (arguing that
property rights help to promote human relationships that comprise a defensible form
of social life, providing a setting in which other liberties-such as free speech,
religious activity, and a private family life-can be exercised without undue
government interference, thus also promoting autonomy, and allowing social relations
among interdependent and free individuals to flourish).
2266 [Vol. 70
2002] STORIES OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DISRESPECT 2267
right of locomotion-allows us to travel, work, visit friends, and
participate in community and educational activities unmolested, in
ways essential to human autonomy and diversity.' The inviolability of
these interests is central to our sense that we are being treated wvith
dignity.61
The Court's failure to explore the underlying value of dignity
connecting various Fourth Amendment interests has led to
constitutional rules that leave a wide range of activities and areas with
little, if any, protection. Law enforcement may ignore no trespassing
signs, snoop into buildings adjacent to residences, rummage through
garbage bags, and obtain the telephone numbers dialed from homes. 2
They may fly over homes in planes or helicopters to spy on barbecues
or romantic interludes.63 They may do all this without judicial
60. James Jasper has argued that an obsession with free movement has defined
the American character:
Americans move in order to do better economically, to get in touch with the
higher things in life, including their own souls, to adjust or flee their family
ties, to pursue physical health, to escape what constrains them. This
restlessness is especially characteristic of American men, who believe in a
true inner self untouched by civilization, other people, or organized social
life-a self they can move intact to a new location.
James M. Jasper, Restless Nation: Starting Over in America, at ix (2000); see also
Houston A. Baker Jr., Turning South Again: Re-thinking Modernism/Re-reading
Booker T. 79-98 (2001) (arguing black oppression in the United States has largely
been defined by an effective incarceration, denying African-Americans free
movement in many walks of life); John Harmon McElroy, American Beliefs: What
Keeps a Big Country and a Diverse People United 86 (1999) ("[T]hese processes of
freedom of movement and self-determination were dynamically related [in the United
States]: self-determination presupposes a freedom to move about without government
control."); Maclin, Right of Locomotion, supra note 45 (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment doctrine unduly limits the right to locomotion); Taslitz, Bottom Up,
supra note 30 (arguing that the freedom of movement is central to the Fourth
Amendment yet undervalued by the courts). Robin Blackburn amplifies the role of
denying locomotion as central to social exclusion, specifically under slavery:
Any personal autonomy allowed to-or won-by the slaves was restricted
by the ferocious labour demands of the plantation, by detailed rules of
conduct and by the ever-present fear of savage sanctions in the case of any
real or imagined transgression. Offenders would be mercilessly flogged and
deprived of all petty privileges or extra rations. Slaves could not set foot
outside the plantation without express permission; however, some of the
slave 'elite' might regularly be able to obtain chits permitting them to go to
neighbouring plantations or the local township, either to visit relatives or to
buy or sell provisions.
Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the
Modem 1492-1800, at 418 (1997). The history summarized by Blackburn is explored
in greater detail as relevant to modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in Andrew
E. Taslitz & Margaret L. Paris, Law on the Street: Search and Seizure, Race and
Respect in American Life (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Taslitz & Paris, Law on the
Street].
61. The ways in which the values protected by the Fourth Amendment are under-
weighted and misunderstood are discussed in Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30;
Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30.
62 See Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, supra note 45, at 827.
63. See id. at 827-28.
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oversight and without probable cause.64 In a post-Terry world, they
can stop you for "voluntary encounters" with no cause at all, or for far
more intrusive stops on "reasonable suspicion,"'65 a term meant to
suggest individualized suspicion but in fact routinely interpreted by
lower courts as established by categorical and stereotyped
judgments.' The police can also seize cars when arrests are made, for
example, during traffic stops, subsequently searching the car and any
containers within it without any evidence that contraband or evidence
of a crime will thereby be found.67 Yet these decisions are likely
radically inconsistent with the values and social practices of most
Americans.68
Another anomaly concerning the Court's blindness toward issues of
disrespect and humiliation arises in the Court's use of history. After
years of largely ignoring history in its Fourth Amendment cases, the
Court has begun a "new originalism," looking for what the common
law prohibited or permitted in 1791,69 much as it did in the Atwater
case. But the Fourth Amendment has been incorporated against the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and search and seizure
concerns in the 1860s were far different from those of the 1790s.70
64. See id. at 828.
65. Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 334-40.
66. Harris, Categorical Judgments, supra note 45, at 987-1012.
67. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 370-
75 (summarizing the law on inventory searches, especially as to automobiles).
68. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of
Law Enforcement Searches and Seizures, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 183 (1993)
(describing an empirical study finding significant differences between the public's
privacy expectations and those recognized by the Court); Christopher Slobogin &
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted
by Society," 42 Duke L.J. 727 (1993) (expanded explanation of their study); see also
Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law 96-111 (1995)
(arguing that commonsense notions of privacy differ from the Court's); John Gilliom,
Surveillance, Privacy, and the Law: Employee Drug Testing and the Politics of Social
Control 61-84 (1996) (arguing that workers' estimation of the intrusiveness of drug-
testing differs from the Court's); Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Psychological Research on the
Fourth Amendment, 1 Psychol. Sci. 197 (1990) (finding college students' conceptions
about when there is "consent" to search differ from the Court's).
69. See generally Sklansky, supra note 57.
70. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 24-
25, 396-404 (reviewing incorporation and its significance for determining the Fourth
Amendment's meaning today). See generally, Milton R. Konvitz, Fundamental
Rights: History of a Constitutional Doctrine (2001) (reviewing history of how certain
rights-including those recited in the Fourth Amendment-came to be recognized as
so fundamental as to be incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Taslitz & Paris, Law on the Street, supra note 60 (reviewing in depth
the history of antebellum and Reconstruction search and seizure practices and their
implications for modem Fourth Amendment decisionmaking); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before
Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 709 (1999)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Slaves No More.] (summarizing history of search and seizure
practices under slavery and Reconstruction leading up to the Fourteenth
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Slavery in particular was defined by the humiliation involved in the
complete denial of slaves' freedoms of movement, privacy, and
property.71 A slave who could leave a plantation to find paying work
elsewhere would, after all, be no slave at all.' Similarly, slave cabins
were subject to promiscuous searches by whites,' and slaves were, but
did not own, property.74 The humiliation that this denial of Fourth
Amendment-like rights imposed on slaves was central to the Southern
white sense of honor and of black dishonor that defined and sustained
America's "peculiar institution."75 Abolitionist whites, who sought to
end slavery by distributing literature and preaching, also found their
mail seized, their homes and businesses searched, and their persons
assaulted or banished for trying to end slaves' subjection to their
masters. 76  Racially motivated searches and seizures, and the
humiliation caused by them, thus become critical to understanding
what the Fourth Amendment means today.' This insight is one that is
entirely missing from the Court's opinions."'
Nor does the Court generally use history in another way: as a
source of experience helpful in understanding modern problems. 9
Amendment's ratification and illustrating some selected implications of that history
for modem Fourth Amendment doctrine).
71. See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 70. at 738-56 (defending this point);
see also Taslitz & Paris. Law on the Street. supra note 60 (providing a similar but
more extended defense).
72. See Taslitz, Slaves No More, supra note 70. at 714-15,74041.
73. See Michael Wayne, Death of an Overseer Reopening a Murder Investigation
from the Plantation South 96 (2001) ("Servants ... warned other slaves when their
cabins were to be searched...."): accord John W. Blassingame, The Slave
Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South 154 (rev. ed. 1979) (-The black
autobiographers testified that many white men considered every slave cabin as a
house of ill fame."); James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old
South 145 (1990) ("Slave cabins were not simply built to the master's specifications,
they were open to periodic inspections.").
74. See Thomas D. Morris. Southern Slavery and the Law 1619-1860, at 61-80
(1996) (slaves as property); Jenny Bourne Wahl, The Bondman's Burden: An
Economic Analysis of the Common Law of Southern Slavery 157-58. 256 n.133 (1998)
(noting that slaves could not own property, but could sometimes control it at the
master's sufferance).
75. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual
Indifference, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1283, 1316-22 (2000) [hereinafter Taslitz, Mutual
Indifference] (honor, dishonor, and black slavery).
76. See id. at 1343-51, 1368-74 (mob violence and speech suppression); Taslitz,
Slaves No More, supra note 70, at 738-39 (mail seizures, business and home searches.
and banishments).
77. Taslitz, Slaves No More supra note 70, at 771-76.
78. See id. at 761-76 (illustrating the Court's treatment of three modern search and
seizure problems-police "testilying," police lies or indifference to truth in warrant
applications, and racial pretext).
79. See Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory 159-60 (2001).
There is a big difference between relying on the past either because we lack
good information about how to cope with the present and future or because
legal innovation involves heavy transitional costs... and treating the past as
normative [simply because it is past]....
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This function can be served by examining more recent history in
addition to that of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.8" Racial
profiling, for example, we will soon see, had been a mid-twentieth-
century problem for many Asian Americans in ways that shed
important light on the current manifestations of the problem.81
[E]vents in the past can [also] create commitments for the future ....
Constitutions and statutes can be thought of as kinds of contract .... But
these are at best analogies ....
A look into history will often bring to light information relevant to
dealing with the present and the future. But when this happens, it is the
information itself that should shape our response to current problems, rather
than the past as such; the past is just a data source.
Id.
I am generally, sympathetic with Posner's views on the role of history in
constitutional interpretation, but think that he goes too far in suggesting that the past
has no normative authority simply because it is the past. The past does not dictate
constitutional outcomes, nor should we be bound by some supposed narrow,
subjective intentions of the framers. See also Robin West, Progressive
Constitutionalism: Reconstructing the Fourteenth Amendment 30-31 (1994)
(critiquing these positions). But, when the past culminates in an authoritative
document such as a constitutional amendment, the past has special force precisely
because it helps to reveal our continuing commitments as a people to certain
principles. See id. at 30-31, 71, 208 (viewing the "Fourteenth Amendment as a moral
and political guide for reconstructive legislation aimed at eradicating illegitimate
social subordination"); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of
Constitutional Self-Government 45-48, 91-102 (2001) (defining "peoplehood" and a
"commitmentarian" approach to constitutional interpretation); Taslitz, Respect, supra
note 30 (describing the implications for a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of
respect). In this Article, however, my differences with Posner are less important,
because the four historical episodes I recount here did not result in authoritative
documents and thus fit in the category of a relevant and helpful "data source."
80. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 23-44 (defending the use of history that
does not result in an authoritative document relevant to modern constitutional
interpretation and explaining the respective roles of social practices, principles, and
history).
81. See infra Part II.B. Other scholars have noted the instructive connection
between the Japanese-American internment and modern racial profiling, but none
has done so in more than a few paragraphs, as a catchy analogy to draw the reader
into the authors' discussions of other matters. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 29 at 138
("Blacks are not the only racial minority to confront racially selective policing. The
most dramatic and extensive single episode in which authorities used race as an
indicia of potential criminality involved the wholesale detention of persons of
Japanese ancestry during World War II.").
In 1942, over 120,000 Americans were stripped of their businesses and
their homes and incarcerated for the duration of World War II. They had
committed no offense. They were convicted of no crime. They were
suspected, subjected to curfews, arrested, had their property confiscated, and
finally imprisoned because of the color of their skin and their national origin
or the national origin of their parents.
The internment of Japanese Americans in 1942 was an egregious example
of what can happen when skin color and national origin are substituted for
evidence and become, by themselves, a basis for suspicion and punishment.
But it was not the only egregious example.
Meeks, Driving While Black, supra note 18, at xi; see also Frank Wu, Civil Liberties,
National Security, and the Precedent of the Japanese-American Internment, - Crim.
Just - (forthcoming summer 2002) (brief essay directed toward criminal law
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Correspondingly, that history helps in better understanding why the
modem Court often gives too little weight to the values protected by
the Fourth Amendment in contexts unconnected to race.
The Court's undervaluing of Fourth Amendment interests leads it
to abandon its role of setting "a constitutional floor protecting
individuals and constraining government."' Rather than recognizing
"zones of sovereignty" essential to honoring the minimum equal
worth of all human beings, and thereby subjecting them to invasions
only for ample reasons based on highly trustworthy evidence,' the
Court creates "zones of contingency," easily invaded for reasons of
administrative convenience or a speculative connection to crime
control.' In so doing, the Court makes explicit or implicit judgments
of institutional competency, routinely deferring to the experience and
wisdom of the Executive Branch (most often the police) or the
Legislative Branch,s as in Atvater, where the Court assumed that
practitioners and discerning the application of lessons learned from the internment
cases to modem racial profiling, albeit not doing so through the lens of the Forth
Amendment).
In this Article, I not only tell the internment story in more detail, but I try to
do so by concentrating on the sorts of interests that the Fourth Amendment is
designed to protect-free movement, privacy, and property-to illustrate the
advantages of viewing the story through that Amendment's eyes. Moreover, I
examine the ways in which the internment and modern racial profiling violate the
principles of a jurisprudence of respect, hoping thereby more clearly to review the
similarities between the two phenomena. Finally, the chronological distance but
emotional power of the internment helps build empathy for others' suffering, which is
too often lacking from the current Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
82. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, supra note 45, at 787.
83. See id. at 832 ("[Z]ones of individual sovereignty ... proclaims to the state
that it may freely govern to the point where individual sovereignty begins ... but it
may then go no further."). Luna believes that his idea of "zones of sovereignty" is an
alternative to privacy theory. See id. at 826-32. But I see the term more as a reminder
of the limits created by privacy theory, properly understood. See Taslitz, Twenty-First
Century, supra note 48 (discussing human emotion and the wisdom but
incompleteness of privacy theory): Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30 (describing the
social functions served by privacy, property, and free movement in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence).
84. The term "zones of contingency" is mine, See Luna, Sovereignty and
Suspicion, supra note 45, at 825-26 ("The Court has interpreted privacy to be a
question of fact rather than a constitutional value. As such, privacy becomes a mere
interest which is weighed against and can be defeated by other interests, even rather
pedantic policy considerations.").
85. See Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn From
Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 398 (2001) (arguing that the Court's Fourth
Amendment doctrine too easily defers to police discretion); accord Taslitz & Paris,
Law on the Street, supra note 60 (discussing the appropriate role of the legislature in
search and seizure law); Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. Crim. L &
Criminology 1125 (2000) [hereinafter Luna, Constitutional Roadinaps] (noting that
the Court must do a better job in constitutional criminal procedure of encouraging
inter-branch dialogue and assessing the respective competencies of the three branches
of government); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 Iowa L Rev. 1107 (2000)
[hereinafter Luna, Transparent] (arguing that creativity is necessary in creating
institutions that will involve an active citizenry in the decisionmaking and monitoring
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political forces would prod the legislature into correcting any
widespread problem of arrests for fine-only offenses. There is an
important insight in this deference: all three branches of government
are bound by the Fourth Amendment, and one branch may be better-
equipped than another to offer protection in a particular way.87 But if
the Fourth Amendment protects at least certain aspects of treatment
necessary to accord each person his or her equal worth as a human
being,' then subjecting Atwater to the "pointless indignity" of arrest
was an unjustified invasion of her constitutional rights even if no one
else suffered such an indignity.89 Furthermore, whether one branch is
better equipped than another to make certain judgments is a complex
and contextual question.' Yet, the Court routinely defers to the
executive and legislative branches without careful analysis."
Bromides replace reason.
The Court's refusal to examine in any depth why black communities
feel humiliated by police stops, how slavery became defined by denials
of Fourth-Amendment-style freedoms, and how minority
communities have modernly been plagued by significant restrictions
on privacy and locomotion reflects a general unwillingness of the
of the executive branch concerning searches and seizures)
86. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353-55 (2001).
87. See Luna, Constitutional Roadmaps, supra note 85, at 1196-1206 (discussing
the respective competencies of the judiciary and the legislature); Luna, Sovereignty
and Suspicion, supra note 45 (discussing the relative competence of the citizenry and
the executive branch); infra notes 276-378 and accompanying text (describing the
failures of the executive branch to safeguard Fourth Amendment freedoms during
World War II); infra notes 521-635 and accompanying text (noting wise judicial
deference to the executive branch in the Elian Gonzales case).
88. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 20-28.
89. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347; Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, supra note 45,
at 832 ("Sovereignty theory articulates an inviolate baseline of rights for all citizens,
prohibiting both blunt intrusions and stealthy encroachments, and creat[ing] an
embankment on the slippery slope... shar[ing] this commitment to... individual
rights." (emphasis added)). That the individual's rights must remain inviolate does
not mean, however, that the costs and benefits of state action imposed on salient sub-
groups and society generally should not be considered in deciding what rights the
individual should hold. See generally Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30 (articulating a
theory of how to go about creating respect-recognizing rights). Indeed, part of the
point of this Article is to illustrate how the impact of search and seizure policies on
certain social sub-groups and on the inseparable connection between the individual
and his salient social groups needs greater attention in crafting individual rights.
Moreover. a group can gain a voice via the rights granted to its individual members,
See id. But, that does not mean that an individual suffering an acknowledged injury
to her dignity can be ignored or readily scarified to the greater good. See Luna,
Sovereignty and Suspicion, supra note 45, at 832-37 (arguing that minimizing such
sacrifice is the whole point of "zones of sovereignty" and a "moral reading" of the
Constitution).
90. See Luna, Constitutional Roadmaps, supra note 85, at 1196-1206 (reviewing
some of these contextual complexities); infra text accompanying notes 276-380, 444-
635 (demonstrating such complexities in the Japanese-American internment and
Elian Gonzales cases).
91. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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Court to listen. A strategy of listening to those most vulnerable to
police abuses can inform the Court's judgments about how best to
protect us all.' There is reason to believe, for example, that many
African-Americans may perceive certain evidence as raising different
inferences, and meriting different weight, than might most whitesY3
Many African-Americans also might perceive certain police conduct
as more invasive than do most whites.' Understanding why this is so
may lead a Court to decide at times to privilege the black
perspective.95 This need not involve the Court in a divisive enterprise,
for if that perspective is more protective of Fourth Amendment rights
than the "white perspective," then applying the former perspective to
all searches or seizures regardless of the suspect's race protects all
persons equally.9 6 That does not mean that the "black perspective" (I
leave aside essentialism objections for the moment) 7 always prevails,
but it is an important source of information. Moreover, often there is
little reason to believe that racial or ethnic group perspectives will
significantly vary from that of the white majority." Thus, most
Americans probably assign greater weight than does the Court to the
privacy interest in cars." Yet, the Court fails to listen in these
92. See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 5 (1990)
(articulating the strategy of listening): Melissa S. Williams. Voice, Trust. and Memory:
Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation 12 (1998) (refining
this strategy); Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 23-44 (adapting this strategy for
Fourth Amendment analysis).
93. See infra Part II.A; cf Andrew E. Taslitz, An African-American Sense of Fact:
The O.J. Trial and Black Judges on Justice, 7 B.U. Pub. Int. L.. 219 (1998)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Black Judges on Justice] (discussing the nature of such differences
and how they may have played a role in the O.J. Simpson case); see also Tracey L
Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreward: Transparent Adjudication and Social
Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
733, 775-93 (2000). This work reviews recent social science research suggesting that,
at least in New York City, "in high-crime urban communities where the population is
disproportionately minority, flight from an identifiable police officer is a very poor
indicator that crime is afoot." Id. at 792. This is a finding consistent with the idea that
low income minority group members who are entirely innocent of any crime are more
likely than others to regard contact with the police as dangerous. The problem of
flight from the police is addressed inhfra Part II.A.
94. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure. supra note 25, at 406-
10 (summarizing the scholarly literature on this point).
95. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 23-44 (explaining when, why, and how a
court may decide which perspective to privilege).
96. Cf. Caroline A. Forell & Donna M. Matthews. A Law of Her 0%m: The
Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man, at xvii-19 (2000) (defending application of
a uniform reasonable woman standard to men and women alike in all areas of law in
which gender is salient); Taslitz & Paris, Law on the Street. supra note 6U (considering
the wisdom of applying a uniform "African-American perspective" to suspects of all
races in making decisions in certain classes of search and seizure cases).
97. I treat those objections elsewhere. See Taslitz. Respect, supra note 30. at 80
n.324.
98. See Taslitz & Paris, Law on the Street. supra note 60 (examining evidence and
implications of this observation).
99. See generally David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendinent's Death on
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instances, too rarely exploring social science or other forms of data on
current community attitudes, values, and expectations seriously. 00
That sub-communities may have different perspectives, of course
raises the problem of how we determine whose perspective should
prevail. Similarly, even if most Americans agree on an issue, their
perhaps transient and uninformed views should not necessarily
prevail.01  Making these choices requires exploring not merely
disrespect as an emotion, but also as a form of treatment-a way of
acting that can be understood as insulting to human dignity, even if
particular suspects do not actually feel insulted."w  Likewise,
treatment can be respectful even if irrational suspects and observers
feel abused. 3 The mere emotion of feeling disrespected is a cost
always to be considered, but it is sometimes a cost that, for reasons of
political morality, is worth sinking."4 I will return shortly to how we
can craft such an "objective" component to a respect-based
jurisprudence. For now, I simply note that it too requires starting by
listening to the Reconstruction history, as well as the modern
experiences, of the disempowered to inform our judgments of what
political morality requires. 10 5
Attending carefully to the national conversation about racial
profiling thus prods a line of thinking that suggests a new Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence of respect. Such a jurisprudence would be
attentive to the framers of the nineteenth century as well as the
eighteenth; to modern search and seizure history as a source of
enlightening experience; to social science and other sources of
the Highway, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 556 (1998) [hereinafter Harris, Car Wars]
(arguing that the Court offers little privacy protection against car searches, contrary
to popular ideas of justice).
100. See infra Part II.A (illustrating this point in a recent United States Supreme
Court case). The availability of social science, how to use it, and the definitions and
uses of "other forms of data" on community attitudes are examined in Taslitz,
Respect, supra note 30, at 80 n.324. See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 93, at 735-36
(making similar point).
101. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 12,
34, 42 (1996) (arguing that deliberation is "integral to the ideal of republican
government as the Founders understood it" and requires an informed citizenry
interacting in appropriately designed public fora protective of minority rights and
conducive to the "self-correcting character of deliberation-its capacity to encourage
citizens and officials to change their minds"); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on
Representative Government in 19 Collected Writings of John Stuart Mill 68, 72 (1977)
(noting that in political discussion, a citizen is "called upon ... to weigh interests not
his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private
partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason
of existence the general good").
102. Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 18-22; see infra text accompanying notes 112-
56.
103. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 19-20 (addressing the problem of hyper-
sensitive individuals and groups).
104. See infra Part II.D.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 112-56.
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majority and minority attitudes toward privacy, property, and free
movement; to the binding nature of the Fourth Amendment on all
three branches of government and the relative competence of each
branch; to the wider social costs of searches and seizures; and to the
central value of human dignity.' Moreover, a respect-based
jurisprudence embraces the relevance of human emotion and the
importance to individual worth of group identity. 7 Additionally,
such a jurisprudence starts by listening to the voices of marginalized
groups who are likely to offer special insights on how to promote
respectful treatment. But, majority voices must be heard as well, the
goal being to protect the equal worth of all human beings.'"
Promoting respect is not the only concern of the Fourth
Amendment. Balancing will still be necessary."° Nor is it always
clear what best promotes respect.' I make no claims that a respect-
based jurisprudence will lead to mechanical clarity. But, it will
promote more informed conversations, and should alter outcomes by
putting human dignity and the realities of historical and modern day
experience at center stage."' I seek to start that process here by
recounting four stories of Fourth Amendment disrespect-that of
Judge Harold Baer, the Japanese-American internment, a racial
roundup in Oneonta, New York, and Elian Gonzales and Miami's
Cuban-American community.
B. Defining Terms
Up until now, I have used the words "insult," "humiliation," and
"disrespect" interchangeably. For my purposes, they are equivalent,
though endless quibbles about their respective meanings are
possible 1 2 In this section, I define my terms, encapsulating concepts
that I have more fully developed elsewhere.
106. See generally Taslitz. Respect, supra note 30 (describing the philosophical
defense of these principles); Taslitz, Botton Up, supra note 30 (social science
defense); Taslitz & Paris, Law on the Street, supra note 60 (noting the defense rooted
in American history).
107. See Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note 48; see also Andrew E. Taslitz,
Revitalizing Freedom of Movement. The Fourth Amendment and the American
Passions (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter American
Passions].
108. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 34-44.
109. See id. at 58.
110. Cf Andrew E. Taslitz, The Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law's
Complementary Role in Regulating Harnmfil Speech, 1 Margins 305, 330-39 (2001)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Inadequacies of Civil Society] (positing a hypothetical in which, at
first blush, any choice seems to make some racial or ethnic group understandably feel
insulted).
111. See Guttman & Thompson, supra note 101. at 12, 34, 42.97-101 (discussing the
importance of conversational, deliberative exchange): Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30,
at 52-58 (discussing the practical differences in process and outcomes made by a
jurisprudence of respect).
112. On such quibbles, see Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 20-22, 70-71 nn. 158-
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"Respect," as I define the term, means "fitting treatment."113 To
treat someone fittingly is to treat them in accordance with his or her
status concerning some specified attribute."4 "Any lesser treatment is
insulting," humiliating, or disrespectful. ' '5 In one sense, respect is an
objective question: the status either exists or it does not apart from
the feelings of the participants." 6  Thus, a trustworthy worker is
treated unfittingly if his co-workers act as if he is in fact not
trustworthy. The treatment is ill-fitting even if both they and he
subjectively but incorrectly believe that he is untrustworthy, for
example, wrongly believing that he will be tardy or inattentive on his
job.'17
Human rights theorists generally agree that in some respect all
humans are alike, thus all sharing the same status and therefore
requiring treatment befitting that status."8 Theorists debate what
attributes of sameness all humans share, but most often it is some
variation on the idea that we are all capable of rationality and
autonomy."'9 These qualities, theorists also largely agree, entail certain
rights or entitlements, without which our status as humans is
ignored.'20 The case is easily made that these entitlements include the
Fourth Amendment-style rights to privacy, property, and
locomotion.' 2' Moreover, many fittingness theorists agree that
78, Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 31, at 780-85, and Taslitz, Inadequacies of
Civil Society, supra note 110, at 40-45.
113. See Geoffrey Cupit, Justice as Fittingness 1-2, 15-28 (1996). The ideas
reviewed in the definitional section of this Article are defended in more depth in
Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30.
114. See Cupit,supra note 113, at 1-2, 15-28.
115. Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 20-21.
116. See Cupit,supra note 113, at 15.
117. See id.
118. See John E. Coons & Patrick M. Brennan, By Nature Equal: The Anatomy of
a Western Insight 3-15 (1999) (arguing that all rights in Western political thought are
justified by an appeal to an idea of a "distinctive existent" quality shared in equal
measure by all humans); Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society 57-112 (Naomi
Goldblum trans., 1996) (reviewing and critiquing the major theories concerning the
shared traits that justify respect for all humans).
119. See Coons & Brennan, supra note 118, at 13, 116-22 (summarizing and
contrasting Kantian theory and an alternative theory of capacity to achieve moral
goodness); Michael J. Perry, The Idea Of Human Rights: Four Inquiries 11-41 (1998)
(arguing that the idea of human rights is "ineliminably religious"); William F. Schultz,
In Our Own Best Interest: How Defending Human Rights Benefits Us All 17-37
(2001) (offering pragmatic arguments for accepting the idea of human rights and
equality).
120. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1659, 1665-70 (1992).
121. See, e.g., Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Origins, Drafting and Intent 73-75, 134-39 (1999) (noting that privacy, property, and
freedom of movement are recognized as universal rights); Martha Minow, Equality
and the Bill of Rights, in The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American
Values 118-28 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (human dignity and
equality). I need not address whether the rights that I identify are better thought of
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because these rights act partly in service to human autonomy, they
will result in diversity in life choices." An embrace of the differences
among us that are central to each individual's identity is thus also
implied by concern for human respect.' Furthermore, because
individual identity is so often rooted in group identity, respect
requires fitting treatment for both the individual and his salient social
groups.124 Finally, the status of being human requires, in addition to
honoring our uniqueness, honoring our right to belong as well."z
Specifically, every human being has a right to belong to some political
society."2 6 Those living under the rule of such a society, but treated as
less than full members-as second-class citizens-are therefore also
denied respect.
Respect or its denial, disrespect, must be distinguished from the
emotion of feeling disrespected, insulted, or humiliated, a feeling that
dominated much of my discussion in Part I.A., which relied only
implicitly on the feeling/actuality of disrespect distinction that I now
make explicit."z As the trustworthy employer example demonstrated,
as "American" than "universal" human rights because, in this instance, 1 believe that
they are both the same. See Taslitz & Paris. Law on the Street. supra note 60
(reviewing relevant aspects of American history), though their particular
manifestation in our political culture may have an American "spin." See generally
Taslitz, American Passions. supra note 107 (tracing what is distinctive about the
American conception of the right to freedom of movement).
122. See R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community 37 (2001)
(arguing that liberal states should "leave individuals free to determine and pursue
their own diverse conceptions of the good"). Duff recognizes the many legitimate
criticisms of liberalism by communitarians. among others, and seeks to address those
criticisms by the crafting of a "liberal legal community." Id at 35-73.
123. See Taslitz. Racist Personalit,, supra note 31, at 746-52.
124. See id. at 758-65 (making a similar point in the context of hate crimes): see also
Margalit, supra note 118, at 135-38, 140-42, 153. 158-61, 167-69 (arguing that the most
common and concrete form of humiliation-a form that therefore effectively defines
the term-is the rejection of the "encompassing groups" that shape each of our lives
as human beings). Political scientist Iris Marion Young expresses a similar sentiment:
Oppression happens to social groups .... While groups do not exist apart
from individuals, they are socially prior to individuals, because people's
identities are partly constituted by their group affinities. Social groups
reflect ways that people identify themselves and others, which lead them to
associate with some people more than others, and to treat others as
different. Groups are identified in relation to one another. Their existence
is fluid and often shifting, but nevertheless real.
Young, supra note 92, at 9.
125. See Margalit, supra note 118, at 135-38. 14042, 153. 158-61 (making analogous
point). See generally Kenneth L. Karst. Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and
the Constitution (1989) (arguing that equal citizenship turns on being treated as if you
belong).
126. See Margalit.supra note 118, at 137-38.14042,153. 158-61,167-69.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 9.
Humiliation is any sort of behavior or condition that constitutes a sound
reason for a person to consider his or her self-respect injured. This is a
normative rather than a psychological sense of humiliation. On the one
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one can be insulted without feeling so. 29 Correspondingly, one can
feel insulted though there is no justification for that feeling. 130 For
example, had the worker believed himself to be trustworthy when he
was not, his co-workers' treatment of him as untrustworthy would
have been justified.
Nevertheless, individuals' and groups' subjective sense of insult
matters-even when those feelings are unjustified-for several
reasons. First, conduct demonstrating some minimal degree of
empathy and concern for our fellows' well being is also necessary to
honoring their status as full and equal human beings.' 3' Indeed,
history shows that eliminating empathy for certain others is essential
to subjugating them, the antebellum slave South's treatment of
African-American slaves and Nazi Germany's treatment of the Jews
being two obvious examples. 13 2
hand, the normative sense does not entail that the person who has been
provided with a sound reason for feeling humiliated actually feels that way.
On the other hand, the psychological sense of humiliation does not entail
that the person who feels humiliated has a sound reason for this feeling.
Id.
129. See id at 9, 120-25. Margalit does initially draw a distinction between "insult"
and "humiliation." "Insult," he explains, is an injury to "social honor," to what others
in the society think of your worth, whether their judgments are fair or not. Id. at 41-
44, 121. "Humiliation" is an injury to "self-respect," the individual's assessment of his
own worth. Id. at 44-48, 121. But, Margalit next explains why in practice this
distinction collapses:
The skeptical justification for respecting human beings is rooted in the fact
that we all recognize one another as part of humanity and for this reason and
this reason alone we deserve respect. As mentioned, the skeptical
justification is based from the outset on an attitude rather than a trait. Any
traits that might be used to justify respect are parasitic on our attitude
toward human beings as human. Thus any attempt to reject a person from
the human commonwealth erodes the base on which respect is founded.
Even if the humiliated person has no doubt that she has incurred an
appalling injustice, whereas she is just as human as anyone else, she cannot
ignore how others treat her in shaping the way she regards herself. This is
because the attitudes of others, however base they may be, is required for
determining what defines the commonwealth of mankind-a commonwealth
that there is value in belonging to. The attitude of others is built into the
very concept of the value of humans which the bearer of self-respect is
supposed to adopt toward herself.
Id. at 124-25. The "skeptical justification" for respect, of which Margalit writes and
seemingly embraces, says that we need not identify what common trait, if any, all
humans equally share; it is enough that in our society people believe that humans
deserve respect. But skepticism is not necessary to believing that "insult" (as he uses
the term) necessarily implies "humiliation." All that is necessary is the belief that
treating someone as not belonging-as outside the family of man-is insulting, an
observation that is true regardless of our proffered justification for the idea that all
humans deserve respect. See Cupit, supra note 113, at 66-70, 80-92. For these reasons,
I see no need to further address the awkward distinctions among the terms
"disrespect," "insult," and "humiliation."
130. See infra Part II.D (arguing that the Elian Gonzales case is a perfect example).
131. See Taslitz, Mutual Indifference, supra note 75, at 1284-1303.
132. See id.
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Second, the feelings of others, especially subordinated groups
whose life experiences and history may importantly differ from the
majority's, can alert us to aspects of reality that we otherwise might
ignore.133 They can thus help to better inform society's crafting of
legal rules that promote respect. Consideration of the experiences of
the subordinated prods majorities to question whether the minorities'
feelings are in fact justified and promotes the empathy necessary to
fairly consider the minorities' plea.'- A growing Northern
understanding of the experience of slaves and growing Northern
empathy for their plight notably led to some minimal recognition of
former slaves' humanity, as embodied in the Reconstruction
amendments that ended slavery, embraced equal protection, made
African-Americans citizens, and granted them the right to vote.,35
That does not mean that insulted minorities' perspectives always
prevail, for their sense of insult might directly contradict the principles
of equal respect for others.3 6 Thus, a white supremacist group might
be insulted by the end of Jim Crow segregation. But, that is an
emotion that a state committed to human equality must not
validate.'37
This discussion still begs the question, "When is a sense of insult
justified, that is, when, as an 'objective' matter, has the state treated
someone as less than fully human?" Answering this question requires
defining what it means to "treat" another unfittingly. Unfitting
treatment turns on the meaning given to human action." Where both
the doer of an action and its recipient consciously agree on an action's
meaning, there is no problem. "9 Again, white defenders of Jim Crow
segregation in the 1950s and their African-American opponents
arguably both understood that the whole point of these laws was the
expression of an insult: the idea that black children, for example, are
simply not worthy of sitting next to white children in public schools
and sharing in their education. 4'
133. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 23-28.
134. See id. at 22-28, 31-44; see also Mark Tunick, Practices and Principles:
Approaches to Ethical and Legal Judgment 9, 11, 159, 165 (1998) (studying social
practices helps to inform moral and legal judgments); Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse
Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1054-57
(1998) (noting empathy as a central element to informed decisionmaking).
135. See Taslitz, Mutual Indifference, supra note 75, at 1338-87.
136. See Taslitz. Respect, supra note 30: cf. Taslitz, Inadequacies of Civil Society,
supra note 110, at 330-38 (illustrating one group's sense of insult contradicting the
moral justification for feeling such insult).
137. See Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and mercy 49 (1988)
(offering similar example); see also Karst, supra note 125. at 15-27 (noting that Jim
Crow legislation was, more than anything else, about status and exclusion).
138. See Cupit, supra note 113, at 15-16.
139. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 36-37 (suggesting this as one reading of
Brown v. Board of Education).
140. See generally What "Brown v. Board of Education" Should Have Said: The
Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Landmark Civil Rights Decision
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Other times, the sense of insult may be widely shared among
members of both a privileged and an oppressed group but at a
subconscious level for one or both groups. 4' Indeed, recent research
demonstrates that much unjustifiably disparate treatment based on
race, gender, or ethnicity stems from such unconscious processes of
group devaluation and stereotyping. 42 In many areas, there is ample
and undisputed evidence that these forces are at work, so the mere
fact that they are subconscious does not raise difficult problems of
proof.43 This is especially the case because the law's quest should be
for identifying broadly held social meanings-not the views of the
individuals involved in a particular case-because it is the shared
views that ultimately determine an individual's or group's status as an
equal member of the American polity.'4 It is for similar reasons that
Charles Lawrence advocated some years ago a "cultural meaning" test
for whether state action unfairly stigmatized a group as central to
equal protection analysis. 145 The search for unconscious meanings is
still controversial, but is also still necessary.
Yet, unconscious meanings among groups may differ, or clash with
contrary conscious meanings, or with informed intuitions about
respectful treatment.1 46 Alternatively, there may be many instances
where unconscious meanings are hard to prove or are in genuine
dispute.'47 Where that is so, what cultural meaning prevails is
necessarily in part a value-laden exercise. At a minimum, it requires
looking to the history of the mutated Fourth Amendment-the
Amendment as altered in the post-Civil War Reconstruction process
of incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the states.48 That
inquiry enables us to make the best sense of what conduct the Fourth
Amendment would today condemn as insulting, that is, what
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter What "Brown v. Board of Education" Should
Have Said] (consisting of essays which at least impliedly recognize this mutual
understanding of public school segregation).
141. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 37-38 (suggesting this alternative reading
of Brown).
142. See, e.g., Jody David Armour, Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism: The
Hidden Cost of Being Black in America (1997); Aaron T. Beck, M.D., Prisoners Of
Hate: The Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility, and Violence (1999); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Rape and the Culture of the Courtroom (1999) [hereinafter Taslitz, Rape and
Culture]; Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 747 (2001).
143. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 142 (surveying numerous such areas, primarily
in the broad context of gender discrimination); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317
(1987) (discussing similar points in the context of race discrimination).
144. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 38-44.
145. See Lawrence, supra note 143, at 355-81; Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 38-
44 (defending application of an analogous sort of cultural meaning test in the context
of search and seizure law).
146. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 38-44.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 16-18, 23-44.
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meanings the American people saw over time that they sought to
challenge." 9 Similarly, exploration of more modern history and of
current practices of the American people would reveal plausible
changing understandings and attempt to fit them into the
understandings embodied in the Reconstruction Amendments.'" The
quest for uncovering insulting meanings thus becomes an act of
historical and social interpretation-something that the Court already
does anyway, but for different purposes and with a narrower focus. 51
These suggestions are, of course, quite general and vague.'5- There
are several strategies for defending the idea of a jurisprudence of
respect and for crafting concrete guidelines to operationalize the
concept. First, Southern antebellum and Reconstruction search and
seizure practices and the Northern reaction against them can be
explored.153 Second, social science can be examined to search for both
majority and subgroups' variations on what prompts the emotion of
disrespect."s Third, political philosophy can be consulted to clarify
respect's meaning.15 Fourth, modern history, including significant
events culminating in judicial precedent, can be explored for insight.
The first three of these strategies I have employed in companion
articles and in a forthcoming book.'56 The fourth strategy is the one
followed in this Article, the historical tales told here simultaneously
helping to illustrate both the need for a Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence of respect and the consequences of doing so.
Importantly, however, all four strategies converge in suggesting six
principles necessary to operationalizing a respect-centered
jurisprudence. These six principles are also implicit in the discussion
thus far and may, therefore, have a familiar ring.
149. See id at 23-44.
150. See id.
151. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 6-17
(reviewing the multiple data sources that the Court relies on in constitutional
interpretation).
152. They are no more vague, however, than other scholars' suggestions that the
guiding Fourth Amendment principle be "trust," "personal sovereignty," or
"security." See Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman's" Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751. 1777-1802 (1994)
(trust); Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, supra note 45: Thomas K. Clancy, What
Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, PrivacY, or Security?, 33 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 307 (1998) (security).
153. See Taslitz & Paris, Law on the Street, supra note 60 (employing this strategy
in articulating a new vision of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence), see also Taslitz,
Slaves No More!, supra note 70 (employing this strategy in resolving the specific
question of the proper scope of discovery on search and seizure issues).
154. A task undertaken in Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30, and in Taslitz.
American Passions, supra note 107.
155. See generally Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30 (political philosophy and respect).
156. See supra notes 153-55.
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C. Six Principles of Respect
The six, sometimes overlapping principles, of a respect-based
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are as follows:
1. Individualizing Justice: stressing that a suspect's particular
qualities, circumstances, and actions must more often take
precedence over the stereotyping implicitly at work in much of the
high Court's modem jurisprudence. For example, sometimes the
Court too easily views conduct as suspect because it takes place in a
"high crime neighborhood." That attitude replaces close study of an
individual's behavior with generalizations about the "sorts of
people" who live in lower income areas. 157
2. Racial-and-Ethnic Consciousness: must be central to articulating
Fourth Amendment principles. In particular, rules must be crafted
that protect the most vulnerable racial and ethnic groups among us.
Thus, courts may readily find "consent" to search without a warrant
or probable cause. But if the police disproportionately seek consent
from minority group members, the "colorblind" power to search
upon consent unfairly imposes costs on minorities that are not
imposed on majorities. 5 ' Rules also must consider police officers'
subjective racial motivations as relevant to gauging the
reasonableness of state actions. A police officer who searches
suspects of a certain race because he assumes that they are for that
reason more likely guilty breaches fundamental constitutional
equality norms.' 59
157. On the need for individualized justice in the criminal law, see Taslitz, Racist
Personality, supra note 31, at 746-58. On its role in evidentiary procedure, see
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The
Liberals' Dilemma, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1114-18 (1996) and Andrew E. Taslitz,
Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52
Md. L. Rev. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Taslitz, Myself Alone]. On its role in criminal
procedure, see Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30. On the significance of the
neighborhood's character and the Court's decisions in that area, see infra notes 231-75
and accompanying text, and Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the
Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable
Suspicion, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 99 (1999). See also Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion Of Order:
The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing 127-60 (2001) (discussing the dangers
of generalizations regarding the "sorts of people" who are "disordered" being used as
the basis for search and seizure policy).
158. On the consent doctrine and the evils of colorblindness, see David Cole, No
Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System 16-62 (1999)
[hereinafter, Cole, No Equal Justice]; cf Forell & Matthews, supra note 96, at xvii-19
(protecting the most vulnerable among us).
159. See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 70, at 771-75. Racially discriminatory
searches based upon alleged "consent" can be just as problematic. See Robert Hanley,
Search Rules Stricter for New Jersey Troopers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2001, at B5
(explaining that troopers in New Jersey are now required to get a sergeant's
permission for consent searches of automobiles). I am not suggesting that a suspect's
race should be ignored as a factor in a case in which victims have described their
specific offender as being of a particular race.
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3. Minority Communities Must Be Given Voice: notably by explicitly
making their communal experiences and attitudes about the police,
privacy, property, and freedom of movement relevant to Fourth
Amendment reasoning. As one example, a "seizure'" occurs,
implicating the amendment, if a "reasonable person" would not feel
free to leave.' 60 Yet. African-American, Hispanic-American, or
Asian-American communities might on average have different
notions from the white community about whether an encounter with
the police is voluntary or not.16'
4. Shared Institutional Obligations: the three branches of
government-judicial, legislative, and executive-must more self-
consciously recognize that they each have obligations in articulating
and enforcing Fourth Amendment principles. - Furthermore, the
competence of each to act in a particular area must be understood as
varying with context. If courts are unable or unwilling to provide
certain protections, legislatures and executives occasionally face a
constitutional imperative to do so.
1kA
5. The Citizenry's Monitorial Role in Regulating the Police: must be
acknowledged, requiring state action to educate citizens about
police conduct. Notably. wide-open discovery by the defense of
potential flaws in police procedures may be necessary to creating an
informed, watchful citizenry.'64 Similarly. the media's role in
exposing abusive police practices must be enhanced, and criminal
defense counsel's function in aiding citizen monitoring must be
recognized.165
160. See Taslitz and Paris. Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at
318-40 (summarizing law on when a person has been 'seized"); see also Taslitz, Rape
and Culture, supra note 142, at 134-51 (arguing the need for courts and legislatures to
give the oppressed a voice in law creation and application); Taslitz. Bottom Up, supra
note 30 (noting a similar argument in the Fourth Amendment context).
161. See infra text accompanying notes 231-75.
16Z See Mark V. Tushnet. Taking the Constitution away from the Courts (2000);
Taslitz, Rape and Culture, supra note 142. at 148-51 (on the -legislative
constitution"): accord John J. Dinan, Keeping the People's Liberties: Legislators.
Citizens, and Judges as Guardians of Rights (1998) (discussing the historical review of
the relative success of different branches of government in protecting civil liberties);
Wayne D. Moore, Constitutional Rights and Powers of the People 196-238 (1996)
(noting the legislature's role in constitutional interpretation): cf. Luna. Constitutional
Roadmaps, supra note 85 (promoting inter-branch conversations); Maclin, supra note
85 (discussing undue deference to the executive).
163. On institutional competence in interpreting or implementing constitutional
rights, see sources cited supra note 162. Other branches have, in the past, somtimes
stepped in when the courts have failed. Compare Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547 (1978) (holding the search warrant for innocent third party newspaper's office
was constitutional), with Privacy Protection Act of 1980. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994)
(limiting permissible searches of persons reasonably believed to have the purpose of
public communication in or affecting commerce, the Act being adopted as Congress's
reaction to Zurcher).
164. See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 70. at 761-75.
165. See id. at 756-61 (criminal defense counsel's critical role in supporting a
"monitorial citizenry"): see also Luna, Transparent, supra note 85 (recommending
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6. Ensuring a High Quantity and Quality of Evidence to Justify
Police Action: must be a central goal of each branch of government.
For example, better evidence of reasonable suspicion to link a
suspect to a crime than is now often the case should be required by
the courts. 166 As one illustration, the Court has wrongly declared
that reasonable suspicion can be based on not only a lower quantity
but a lower quality of evidence than is required for probable
cause. 167
These six interrelated principles jointly promote respect by treating
all citizens equally and as equal members of a common American
political community."6 If we protect the most vulnerable among us,
surely we will equally protect the less vulnerable. 69 "Protection" must
be understood to be both from the police and from the devastation of
crime.17° Each of these principles is therefore attentive to the balance
among citizen rights, group rights, and crime control. 7' Some, or all,
of these six principles will be seen at work in the tales that follow.
While fully justifying and exploring the implications of these
principles is the task of my forthcoming book,'72 this Article seeks to
lay the groundwork for the book's larger task by using specific
examples. My hope is that such examples illustrate the meaning and
importance of these principles in a way that a more abstract discussion
cannot.
various institutional devices for increasing the citizenry's involvement in monitoring
police conduct).
166. See Taslitz and Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at
340-42 (summarizing law on quantity and quality of evidence necessary to
demonstrate reasonable suspicion); infra text accompanying notes 231-75, 381-441
(illustrating how weak evidence of wrongdoing can be sufficient for reasonable
suspicion).
167. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). Another area where the
Court has failed adequately to require high quality evidence of data reliability is in
the area of informants. See generally Clifford S. Zimmerman, From the Jailhouse to
the Courthouse: The Role of Informants in Wrongful Convictions, in Wrongly
Convicted: Perspectives on Failed Justice 55 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A.
Humphrey eds., 2001).
168. See Taslitz, American Passions, supra note 107, at 8-13 (procedural justice
research on "respect"); Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30 (defining "respect" in
social science and political philosophy); Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 38-44
(defining respect in political philosophy).
169. Cf Forell & Matthews, supra note 96, at xvii-19 (emphasizing the importance
of protecting women in gender discrimination cases).
170. See Kate Stith, The Government Interest in Criminal Law: Whose Interest Is It,
Anyway?, in Public Values in Constitutional Law 137 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993)
(describing sources of constitutional duty to protect citizens from crime); see also
Taslitz and Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 4-5
(summarizing reasons for protecting the citizenry from excessive police discretion);
Urgent Times, supra note 57, at 3-30 (noting that Fourth Amendment law must reflect
a concern with the safety of the members of poor, minority communities).
171. Cf. Community Justice: An Emerging Field 137-252 (David R. Karp ed. 1998)
(addressing whether such a balance is possible).
172. See Taslitz and Paris, Law on the Street, supra note 60.
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D. Why These Stories Are Told Through a Fourth Amendment Lens
First, it is necessary briefly to explain why the problems that I
discuss should be addressed under the Fourth Amendment in the first
place. After all, my emphases on Reconstruction, equality, and the
fair airing of views smack of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
and due process analyses)73
Equal protection, however, generally requires proof of
discriminatory animus. 74 It is useful to permit proof of such animus,17
but requiring it makes evidence of disparate impact irrelevant unless it
is sufficient to raise an inference of wrongful purpose."'b Furthermore,
the equal protection standard of proof in this area, as noted earlier, is
extraordinarily high."7 Additionally, the Fourth Amendment, while
not subject to these same limitations,""s also has substantive content
independent of any inequality. For example, arresting people on less
than probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment even if those
arrests are equally distributed among all racial and ethnic groups.t
Additionally, viewing the Fourth Amendment as serving both
substantive and equality goals more completely identifies the nature
of the injury when discrimination is present."MI In one of the stories
173. See generally Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism: Reconstructing the
Fourteenth Amendment (1994).
174. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25. at 393-
95. 410-12 (analyzing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). an equal
protection case requiring proof of racial animus. and its implications for Fourth
Amendment doctrine).
175. See Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30 (arguing that proof of racial animus,
where possible, is necessary to address individual and community needs for
retributive justice in response to police misconduct).
176. See Maclin, supra note 28, at 354-92 (arguing that United States Supreme
Court case law and the Constitution can be read implicitly to support the relevance of
disparate racial impact under the Fourth Amendment).
177. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 393-
95, 410-12; supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text; infra notes 392-401 and
accompanying text.
178. See Maclin, supra, note 28, at 354-92. It should be noted, however, that the
Court has never squarely decided whether disparate racial impact is ever sufficient to
make out a Fourth Amendment violation. The tone of the Court's opinion in Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (effectively rendering pretext and racial animus
irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment); the Court's tendency to emphasize a
search or seizure's costs to the individual, but benefits to society as a whole, see
Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note 48; and the Court's likely narrow reading of
substantive evidence law, see Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in
the Courts, 47 Buff L. Rev. 1275 (1999), raise serious doubts about whether the Court
would embrace a disparate effects test, despite the soundness of Maclin's reasoning.
179. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 150-
92 (summarizing relevant case law).
180. This seems to be Akhil Reed Amar's position. See Akhil Reed Amar, The
Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles 37-40 (1997) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment speaks to both substance and procedure, reasonableness and
equality, rendering racially discriminatory effects, as well as some suspicionless
searches, unreasonable).
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told here-that of the Japanese-American internment-the internees
therefore suffered both because they faced irrational racial
discrimination and because they were effectively arrested without
individualized probable cause. 8
As for the Due Process Clause, the Court has generally at least
claimed to disfavor free-standing reliance on that clause where it has
incorporated more specific Bill of Rights guarantees, like those
contained in the Fourth Amendment." With few exceptions, free-
standing due process cases also tend to focus on the value of
adjudicatory fairness-of protecting against convicting the innocent-
rather than on the broader range of values in specific Bill of Rights
guarantees. 83  The Fourth Amendment, especially where the
exclusionary rule is applied in criminal cases, has nothing to do with
the accuracy of convictions or acquittals at trial."' Instead, the
Amendment subverts the truth, keeping truthful evidence from the
jury to promote other values, such as protecting privacy, property, and
free movement from unjustified invasion. 85
Exploring the Fourth Amendment's independent role from the
Fourteenth also encourages closer analysis of the special values that
the former Amendment protects.8 6 Again, viewing the Japanese-
American internment through Fourth Amendment eyes highlights the
losses suffered by the internees' being specifically subjected to
searches and seizures without individualized evidence of their
181. See infra Part II.C.
Yet a great many government actions can be properly understood as
searches or seizures, especially when we remember that a person's "effects"
may be intangible .... Unlike the due process clause, in whose name so
much has been done, the Fourth Amendment clearly speaks to sul~stantive
as well as procedural unfairness and openly proclaims a need to distinguish
between reasonable and unreasonable government policy. For those who
believe in a "substantive due process" approach to the Constitution, the
Fourth Amendment thus seems a far more plausible textual base than the
due process clause itself. For those who believe in general rationality
review, the Fourth, here too, is more explicit than its current doctrinal
alternative, the equal protection clause.
Amar, supra note 180, at 39-40
182. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The
Supreme Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 St. Louis U. L.J. 303, 388-89
(2001); accord Amar, supra note 180, at 39-40 (stating that the Fourth Amendment is
a better textual home than due process for these sorts of issues and should best be
read to have a wider scope than is now the case).
183. See Israel, supra note 182, at 397-99, 405-17.
184. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule impedes the truth-finding function at trial, thus
requiring a balancing of the gains in deterring the police against the harm done to
truth).
185. This observation is why Professor Amar argues against the exclusionary rule.
See Amar, supra note 180, at 20-22.
186. See id. at 20-22 (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects "personhood,
property, and privacy"); infra notes 411-41 and accompanying text (explaining the
interests that the Fourth Amendment protects).
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wrongdoing, rather than, as procedural due process might, only
whether they received fair hearings on these questions."
Additionally, with few exceptions, the Court's free-standing due
process rulings are limited to the facts of each specific case.' This is,
of course, true of much Fourth Amendment jurisprudence also."'
However, the Court in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence strives,
where possible, for maximizing the number of bright-line case-
transcendent rules that will give the police clearer guidance.'"
Ultimately, there is much potential overlap between the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Many actions can be viewed in different
ways to bring them under either or both amendments.'"' But, the real
error seems to be in reading the two Amendments as sharply distinct.
The Fourteenth Amendment, in the process of incorporating the
Fourth Amendment against the states, imported equality and fair
hearing values into the latter's meaning.' As Akhil Amar has argued
in the analogous context of the First Amendment, the soundest
approach is to view search and seizure issues as raising mutated
Fourteenth Amendment problems. 3  That way, the principles
embodied in both amendments are equally honored and their joint
history properly respected. Moreover, seeing the Fourth Amendment
as informed by equality values also prompts us to consider, at least as
a starting point, search and seizure from the perspectives of the
marginalized groups with which the Fourteenth Amendment is
especially concerned.M Viewing the Fourth Amendment from the
bottom up gives us a different perspective. 5 As the tales to come will
reveal, the result can be changes in the nature of fact-finding at
suppression hearings (for example, in what inferences can fairly be
187. See infra Part II.B.
188. Israel, supra note 182. at 396.
189. See id. at 396-97.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 50-61 (discussing the Supreme Court's
majority opinion in Atwater). I will not address the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause here, although I do so elsewhere. See Taslitz &
Paris, Law on the Street, supra note 60. Despite its historical importance to its
framers and the modem Court's hint of a modest revival of the Clause, it is still
currently largely a dead letter in modem constitutional doctrine. See Konvitz, supra
note 70, at 22-25. 35, 162-64 (bemoaning this fact, but noting with cautious optimism
the Court's recent reliance on the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Saenz v. Roe.
526 U.S. 489 (1999)).
191. See Israel, supra note 182, at 397-98 (suggesting that this may be true for many
problems under each of the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure guarantees, and that
the Court, therefore, needs to provide clearer guidance).
192. See generally Taslitz, Slaves No More supra note 70.
193. See id. at 751-56. Although paying close attention to how incorporation of the
First Amendment changed its meaning, Amar has ignored the lessons of his own
theory when analyzing Fourth Amendment problems. See id.
194. See generally What "Brown v. Board of Education" Should Have Said, supra
note 140 (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment's animating force was to
protect marginalized groups, especially African-Americans).
195. See generally Taslitz. Botton Up, supra note 30.
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drawn from the evidence); in the degree of intrusiveness to be found
in police action, thus affecting whether a police-citizen interaction was
a voluntary encounter or a seizure; in the relevance given to disparate
racial impact and the even greater importance of racial animus; in
courts' reducing their deference to other branches in some instances
while retaining it in others; in the imperative for adherence of other
branches to the principles of respect as a condition of deference to
their decisions; and in the way that social science can alter
preconceived notions about social reality.
A final comment is needed on the groups chosen as "oppressed" in
the following stories. The experiences of three groups are considered:
African-Americans, Japanese-Americans, and Miami's Cuban-
Americans. I would get little quarrel with my choice of the first of
these three groups. But, many might argue that today Japanese-
Americans have attained an extraordinary degree of status in the
United States.196 Even if that is correct, however, who is oppressed
changes over time. The internment period examined here was
unquestionably a time of extreme oppression of Japanese-Americans.
Although each group's experience of oppression at each point in time
is unique, Japanese-Americans during the internment shared with
African-Americans during most of their sojourn in this country at
least this: the experience of being on the receiving end of search and
seizure practices insulting to both groups and individuals, denying
them their equal humanity. 19 7
Other critics might object that Miami's Cuban-Americans are not
oppressed and are, in fact, a powerful political force in that City, even
in national politics. 98 Oppression, however, can also be contextual. A
group with significant power in some contexts can be oppressed by the
196. This is, in any event, the popular stereotype, ignoring the diversity and
complexity of the modern day experiences of all Asian-American groups with
continuing inequalities. See Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Distant Shore: A
History of Asian Americans 478 (1989) ("Even middle-class whites, who are
experiencing economic difficulties because of plant closures in a deindustrializing
America and the expansion of low-wage service employment, have been urged to
emulate the Asian-American 'model minority' and to work harder.").
197. One commentator has said:
During the time of the internment, Jim Crow laws and formal racial
segregation existed in the American South and was so reified that virtually
no one could imagine it ending. A nation that had long ago learned to
tolerate and accept Jim Crow laws that victimized African Americans was
well prepared to accept internment that victimized Japanese Americans.
Meeks, Driving While Black, supra note 18, at xi-xii; see also infra Part II.C (stating
that similar oppression of African-Americans by search and seizure practices
continues today).
198. See Cynthia R. Mabry, Devuelvan los ninos a sus paises (Send the Children
Home to Their Country), at 37 (2002) (draft manuscript, on file with author)
[hereinafter Mabry, Send the Children Home] ("There are approximately 700,000
Cubans in Miami. They control Miami politics.").
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majority in other circumstances.'" Miami's Cuban-Americans in the
events explored here-those surrounding six-year-old Elian
Gonzalez-certainly perceived themselves, or at least portrayed
themselves, as oppressed as a group.2° Furthermore, many members
of that group experienced undoubted victimization at the hands of
Cuba's communist regime, making their perceptions of current
subjugation likely both sincere and understandable."' Therefore, I
choose to accept their self-characterization partly to make the point
that, even if true, an oppressed group's perspective does not
necessarily prevail. Additionally, I choose to look at the experiences
of oppressed groups for the insight it may offer us. But everyone,
regardless of racial, ethnic, or class status, is entitled to respect under
the Fourth Amendment. Even if Cuban-Americans are not today
oppressed as a group in the United States, they deserve that respect.
More importantly, however we characterize their current status, their
199. See generally Ronald Takaki, A Different Mirron A History Of Multicultural
America (1993) (tracing rising and falling levels of oppression of various groups in
America over time and changing circumstances). Nor should it matter for Fourth
Amendment purposes that Elian was an illegal immigrant. Though there is some
dispute among academics about whether the Fourth Amendment protects non-
citizens in this country illegally, it is likely that the Amendment does indeed protect
them. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 271 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (noting the "People" consist of a "class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country
to be considered part of that community," therefore including those aliens who have
"come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections
with this country"); cf Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of
Constitutional Self-Government 155 (2001) ("But in a sense, every person who
spends a year in America is for that year an American. There would be nothing
incoherent, as a matter of logic or law, in recognizing every such person as a member
of the American people."). Despite the language quoted above from Verdugo-
Urquidez (joined in by only four members of the Court), the precise circumstances
under which a non-citizen becomes one of "the People" of the United States is
unclear. Four Justices-Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-in three
separate opinions argued for a more expansive definition than the plurality's position,
and one member-Justice Kennedy-concurred but argued for the irrelevance of
"peoplehood" to the question before the Court. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at
275-98. But see Victor C. Romero, The Domestic Fourth Aiendnent Rights of
Undocumented Innigrants: On Guitterez and the Tort Law/Inunigration Law
Parallel, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 57 (2000) (noting the lack of clarity, but
persuasively arguing that the Fourth Amendment should apply to all non-citizens
ensnared in the American criminal justice system); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship
151 (2002) (flatly declaring, without even recognizing the plausibility of a contrary
position, that "[even undocumented aliens] arrested in the United States for crimes
are entitled to all the usual protections afforded criminal defendants"). Whatever
doubt there may be about Elian's status under the Fourth Amendment, there is little
doubt that the Amendment protected Elian's uncle, Lazaro, whose house was raided
by the INS in search of Lazaro. See Romero, supra, at 81 (arguing that those in this
country with at least legal permanent residence status, and certainly naturalized
citizens, are protected by the Amendment).
200. See infra Part II.B.
201. See infra text accompanying notes 458-87.
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experiences at Castro's hands and their dealings with the federal
government concerning Elian's fate offer illumination of both the
advantages of a respect-based approach and its limits.
E. The Importance of Stories
Real-life stories are more effective at persuading and reaching a
wider audience than are abstract theorizing and the cold collection of
historical and social science data.2" Stories also have the benefit of
being concrete. The concrete detail of a narrative can convey
subtleties and emotions that other forms of academic writing
cannot.203 The emotional flavor of stories is particularly important
here because I define respect partly in emotional terms: as individuals
and groups feeling that they have been treated as equal status
members of an inclusive American community. 2°4 This Article tells
four tales to convey the emotional need of minority communities for
revised search and seizure practices that demonstrate respect.
The first of these stories, addressed in Part II.A of this Article,
concerns Judge Baer, an important figure in the 1996 Presidential
campaign between William Jefferson Clinton and Robert Dole."5
Judge Baer had granted a motion to suppress evidence in a drug case,
in which police suspicion was aroused by the African-American
suspects' flight from the officers. Baer granted the motion, because he
saw it as perfectly rational for entirely innocent minority group
members to flee from the police because they feared being physically
abused or wrongfully accused by the officers. 26 The suspects' flight
did not therefore necessarily constitute an admission of their guilt."7
Apparently because of the political outcry from the majority
community, however, Baer ultimately reversed his decision.2 8 Baer's
story, and that of a suspect in a later similar case, Illinois v.
Wardlow,20 9 also recounted here, demonstrate how denying a minority
group's perspective a voice (African-American attitudes toward the
police often differed from white attitudes),"'0 while giving weight to
202. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the
Courtroom, 5 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 387, 404-39 (1996) (analyzing
psychological and social processes that give stories persuasive power); see also
Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law 63-78 (1995)
(juries are persuaded by culturally resonant stories).
203. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction
37-46 (2001) (explaining the advantages of storytelling as a method of academic
discourse).
204. See Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30 (defending this conception).
205. See infra text accompanying notes 241-44.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 237-40.
207. See infra text accompanying notes 237-40.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 241-49.
209. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
210. See id. at 132 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (summarizing social science and
anecdotal evidence on minority group attitudes toward the police).
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weak evidence of criminality and embracing a "color-blind" Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, undermine respect for individual suspects
and for the salient groups to which they belong.2"
The second story, recounted in Part II.B of this Article, is that of
the Japanese-American internment during World War II. That story
involves an early incident of racial profiling on a dramatic scale:
thousands of citizens were arrested and imprisoned for years because
of their race.212 Modem profiling is less noticeable than the
internment, because modern efforts usually proceed one-by-one
instead of involving mass detention.1 3 The internment story vividly
illustrates, however, the emotional power of using the state's search
and seizure tools to express disrespect for an entire racial group.
Moreover; efforts akin to the internment's mass detention happen
today, albeit on a smaller scale. 14
The third tale, recounted in Part II.C, reveals the emotional links
between the internment story and instances of modern profiling. This
third story occurred in Oneonta, New York. There, the white victim
of a robbery had described her assailant only as a young African-
American male whose hand got cut during the struggle. There being
only about fifty young African-American males in Oneonta, the police
stopped all of them. None of them had a cut on his hand."' The
courts initially dismissed most of the plaintiffs' claims in the
subsequent civil rights lawsuit.2 1 Without explaining its change of
heart, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recently entered a revised opinion, backtracking without
explanation on its dismissal of many of these claims.21' Despite the
altered result, the court's reasoning hampers minority communities'
sense of respect, for reasons to be explored shortly.21'
The Oneonta and internment cases, like Judge Baer's case,
demonstrate the dangers of color-blindness, minority group voice-
suppression, and reliance on weak evidence of wrongdoing.21 ' But
both cases add one further element to that in the Baer case: the pain
imposed by replacing individualized assessments of a person with
211. On the failures of colorblind constitutionalism, see Taslity, Slaves No Morel,
supra note 70, at 771-75 (rejecting Fourth Amendment colorblindness as inconsistent
with that Amendment's history).
212. See infra Part II.B.
213. See Sean P. Trende. Why Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solution for
Combating Racial Profiling, 50 Duke L.J. 331, 33142 (2000) (illustrating the nature of
modem racial profiling and collecting the growing scholarly literature on the subject).
214. See infra Part II.C (discussing a "round-up" of African-American males in a
recent criminal investigation).
215. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing Brown v. Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
1999), vacated, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000)).
216. See infra text accompanying notes 392410.
217. See infra text accompanying notes 424-30.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 431-41.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 43141 and 636-55.
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generalized or group-based stereotypical judgments. 220  The
internment and Oneonta cases also demonstrate the need for closer
citizen monitoring of the state, though it is unlikely that such
monitoring would have made a difference under the particular
political circumstances of the World War II internment. 22' The
internment case, because it largely involved executive action and
judicial deference to that action, also demonstrates one way in which
inadequate recognition of the Fourth Amendment's binding all three
branches of government, and poor assessments of which branch is
institutionally competent, fan the flames of group exclusion and
resentment. z2
This Article nears its end in Part II.D, with a story meant to
illustrate the limits of a jurisprudence of respect: the tale of six-year
old Elian Gonzales. 2 3 Elian's mother fled Cuba with him in a boat.
She died in the effort, but he lived.24 A contest developed between
his uncle, who wanted Elian to stay in the United States, and his
father, who wanted Elian to return to Cuba.2 5 The courts ultimately
deferred to the executive branch's decision to allow Elian to return to
Cuba,226 and the executive engaged in a raid of the Uncle's home, with
the approval of the judiciary via a warrant, to assist Elian's return to
the Castro regime. Miami's Cuban-Americans did not object to the
raid or authorizing warrant on a ground of lack of individualized
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, in sharp contrast to the other
three cases considered in this Article. Rather, like Ms. Atwater (the
mother arrested for driving without her seatbelt buckled), the Cuban-
Americans argued that the search of Lazaro's home to seize Elian was
unreasonable despite the existence of probable cause.227 Specifically,
the Cuban-American community argued that these state actions were
inherently unreasonable because they were done to return a child to
the mercies of a totalitarian regime. Furthermore, they argued that
the courts were obligated to act and that deference to the decisions of
the politically motivated Clinton Administration was an insult not just
to Elian and Lazaro, but to the Cuban-American community as a
whole.228 I start Part II.D by presenting the Cuban-American
220. On the emotional pain caused by replacing individualized with generalized
assessments of character and worth, see Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 31, at
746-58.
221. See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 70, at 751-79 (describing the citizen-
monitoring function); infra Part II.B (describing the political circumstances
surrounding the Japanese internment).
222. See Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30; Taslitz, Slaves No Morel, supra note 70,
at 757-79 (discussing the citizen monitorial function).
223. See infra Part II.D.
224. See infra text accompanying notes 44648.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 449-57.
226. See infra text accompanying notes 521-30.
227. See infra text accompanying notes 488-520,531-36.
228. See infra text accompanying notes 531-41 (describing the nature of the Cuban-
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perspective in as favorable a light as I am able, both to give them their
due and because of the way that their life experiences illustrate the
importance of Fourth Amendment values.
Nevertheless, I conclude that the Cuban-American community was
wrong on all counts. There were good reasons (unlike in the case of
the internment) to defer to the Executive, who in fact treated Elian,
Lazaro, and the Miami Cuban-American community with great
respect. In our political culture, the Clinton Administration's actions
cannot fairly be understood as treating Cuban-Americans with less
than equal recognition of their full humanity. Rather, the
Administration acted to vindicate the deep American commitment to
parental autonomy and the sanctity of the family.2-9 Moreover, the
Administration fully adhered to all six of the principles of the
jurisprudence of respect.'
II. STORIES OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DISRESPECT
This part recounts the four historical tales noted in the Introduction
that demonstrate the need for a jurisprudence of respect. The first of
these tales is the saga of Judge Harold Baer.
A. The Saga of Judge Baer
1. If I Saw the Cops, I'd Run Too
The Honorable Harold Baer, sitting in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, is a well-respected jurist
with a distinguished career.2- In 1996, he was also the subject of
angry calls for his impeachment by Congressmen on both sides of the
aisle and by then-President William Jefferson Clinton.- -
Americans' complaint); supra text accompanying notes 50-57 (summarizing Atwater
facts).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 589-631.
230. See infra Part II.D.2.b.
231. See James D. Zirin, Judges Who Dip Ito Politics, N.Y. Times, July 16. 1996, at
Al (describing Judge Baer as a "respected federal judge and former New York State
trial judge and prosecuting attorney").
232. See, e.g., Senator Robert Dole, Luncheon Address at American Society of
Newspaper Editors (Mar. 21, 1996). httpJ/vww.asne.orglkiosk/archivelconvention/
conv96/dole.htm; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by
Mike McCurry (Mar. 21, 1996), http://clinton6.nara.govl199610311996-03-21-press-
briefing-by-mike-mccurry.html; National Drug Strategy Network, NewsBriefs, Judge
Cites Police Abuse and Corruption, Throws Out Seized Drug Evidence and
Confession, Incites Controversy About the Exclusionary Rule (March 1996),
http://www.ndsn.org/March96/Baer.html; National Drug Strategy Network.
NewsBriefs, New York Federal Judge Reverses Decision in Controversial Drug Case;
Clinton, Dole Had Threatened to Ask for Resignation, Impeachment (Apr. 1996)
[hereinafter New York Federal Judge Reverses Decision], http'dtwww.ndsn.org/
April96lbayless.html; Bruce Fein, Not for the Thin-Skinned: Scathing Criticism of
Federal Judges is Constructive, Legal Times. May 13. 1996 at 22: Liberal Judgements,
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Baer's sin had been to grant a motion to suppress evidence against a
drug dealer. More precisely, his sin consisted of giving reasons for
doing so that were culturally unacceptable, ready fodder for the
politics of the 1996 presidential campaign.
Baer's first reason for granting the defendant's motion was that the
judge found the officers' testimony at the suppression hearing simply
unbelievable .1 3 The police claimed that they saw a woman named
Carol Bayless double park her car in a neighborhood center for the
drug trade. Four men promptly crossed the street, leading Bayless
simultaneously to pop open the trunk's lid. One man opened the
trunk and put two duffel bags in it, then closed the lid. When the men
saw Officer Carroll and his partner stop their unmarked car, the men
fled rapidly in different directions. The officers' suspicions now
aroused, they stopped Bayless's car, which sported Michigan license
plates, and which had been leaving the area at a legal speed. Bayless
explained that the car was rented but produced an agreement in
another's name. She also denied that anyone put anything in her car.
Officer Carroll accordingly arrested her, searching the trunk and
finding drugs in the duffel bag.
Bayless quickly confessed on videotape, admitting not only to this
crime, but also to twenty other drug buys. But, Bayless told a very
different story from Officer Carroll's about that day's events. Judge
Baer summarized those differences:
Officer Carroll testified that when he first observed defendant, she
was driving a Red 1995 Chevrolet Caprice slowly along 176th Street.
In contrast, defendant asserts that she did not drive to New York
City from Detroit, rather she was ... a passenger in the Caprice
driven by Terry. Further, defendant did not get behind the wheel of
the car until after it was stopped on 176th Street and Terry had
exited the vehicle. Put another way, Officer Carroll apparently
missed or overlooked the fact that the car had come to a halt, never
saw the man exit the Caprice, and missed the million dollars [that
her cohort Terry had earlier placed in the trunk] being taken out of
the trunk .... If we credit the defendant's statement, and I do, one
cannot keep from finding Carroll's story incredible.Y-4
Judge Baer believed Bayless because of the "candor and the
breadth" of her confession in which she freely implicated herself in
numerous other crimes. 5  Baer also disbelieved Officer Carroll
because it made no sense that the four men putting items in the trunk
fled from the police, yet the officers did nothing to stop those men, or,
at the very least, did not "call for backup assistance in locating the
Transcript. Online Newshour (Apr. 2, 1996), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/lav/
baerl_4-02.htm.
233. United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
234. Id. at 239-40 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 236.
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males." 6 The most controversial part of his opinion, however, was his
explanation for why he found the four men's flight irrelevant to
whether Officer Carroll could reasonably suspect that criminal activity
was afoot. Baer explained that such flight was perfectly
understandable, even wise, behavior, and "hard to characterize... as
evasive conduct":2
7
Police officers, even those traveling in unmarked vehicles, are easily
recognized, particularly, in this area of Manhattan. In fact, the same
United States Attorney's Office which brought this prosecution
enjoyed more success in their prosecution of a corrupt police officer
of an anti-crime unit operating in this very neighborhood. Even
before this prosecution and the public hearing and final report of the
Mollen Commission [on police corruption in New York City],
residents in this neighborhood tended to regard police officers as
corrupt, abusive and violent. After the attendant publicity
surrounding the above events, had the men not run when the cops
began to stare at them, it would have been unusual.2-"-
Judge Baer went even further, suggesting that either conscious or
subconscious racism infected the actions of New York's finest: "What
I find shattering," said Baer, "is that in this day and age blacks in
black neighborhoods and blacks in white neighborhoods can count on
little security for their person." 9 Judge Baer saw this observation as
contrary to the values embraced by our constitution's founding
generation: "As Thomas Paine wrote just 220 years ago: 'here too is
the design and end of government, viz., Freedom and security."' 2"'z
2. Baer Reconsiders
Reaction to Judge Baer's opinion was swift and angry. Locally,
former New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly was
outraged that Judge Baer had "impugned an honest officer.
' 24
'
Nationally, presidential candidate and then-Senator Bob Dole
described Judge Baer's decision as "hardly an exception among
236. Id. at 242 & n.17.
237. Id. at 242.
238. Id. Although focusing on the specifics of Officer Carroll's testimony, Judge
Baer's tone here is reminiscent of wariness about police "testilying." See Taslitz,
Slaves No More!, supra note 70, at 761-69. "Testilying" is a term coined by the
Mollen Commission, investigating corruption in the New York City Police
Department, to capture the frequency of police perjury at suppression hearings in that
City. See id. On the general skepticism about police testimony and police behavior
that is common among many African-American jurists and jurors, see Taslitz, Black
Judges on Justice, supra note 93, at 235-37.
239. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 240; see generally Cole, No Equal Justice, supra note
158 (arguing that current search and seizure law promotes discriminatory treatment of
African-Americans by the police).
240. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 240 (citation omitted).
241. See Raymond W. Kelly, Handcuffing tie Police, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1996, at
A21
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President Clinton's judicial appointees... [an] example [ ] from Bill
Clinton's judicial hall of shame.""24  Mike McCurry, President
Clinton's press secretary, unwilling to allow Dole alone to adopt a law
and order posture, reported that Clinton had encouraged the Justice
Department to ask Baer to reconsider. McCurry suggested that the
judge's action was on the list of the most "wrongheaded, stupid"
judicial decisions.243 The press described McCurry as further declaring
that Clinton regretted ever appointing Baer to the bench. A firestorm
now erupted in the media as calls for Baer's impeachment mounted.244
Baer quickly relented, though he denied doing so. He granted the
prosecution's motion to reconsider. 245 At a new hearing, additional
officers testified, allegedly confirming Officer Carroll's story. The
defendant, Carol Bayless, also testified for the first time. Claiming
that this new evidence placed the case into a wholly different light,
Judge Baer declared that he now believed the police. He also used his
new opinion as an opportunity to apologize for his original language:
"[U]nfortunately the hyperbole... in my initial decision not only
obscured the true focus of my analysis, but regretfully may have
demeaned the law-abiding men and women who make Washington
Heights their home and the vast majority of the dedicated men and
women in blue who patrol... our great City."246 Despite the flip-flop,
Judge Baer insisted that he had not given in to political pressure. He
would, he said, "fearlessly" work against the "'unfettered discretion of
officers in the field."'2 47 He cautioned that "'[b]ecause the strongest
advocates of Fourth Amendment rights are frequently criminals, it is
easy to forget that our interpretations of such rights apply to the
innocent and the guilty alike.' 2 48  Judge Baer's actions, however,
seemed to belie his words, as judges and commentators stepped
forward to defend against what they perceived had been a successful
assault on judicial independence. 49
242. Dole, supra note 232.
243. New York Federal Judge Reverses Decision, supra note 232.
244. See United States v. Bayless 201 F.3d 116, 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Judge
Baer's original decision.., was fiercely criticized by politicians and press alike" and
"perceived by many as an affront to the police and to victims of drug-related crime.").
245. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(deciding upon motion for reconsideration).
246. Id. at 217.
247. Id. (quoting United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir.
1980)). Academics increasingly share Judge Baer's concern with unfettered police
officer discretion. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, Taming the System: The Control of
Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950-1990, at 21-53 (1993) (considering successes and
failures of efforts to control police officer discretion); Maclin, supra note 85 (extolling
vagueness doctrine's concern with limiting police officer and prosecutor discretion as
a model for Fourth Amendment analysis).
248. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. at 217 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
249. See David Cole, Hope in the Face of Adversity: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
in 1996, Legal Times, Dec. 23, 1996, at 33 ("[Judge Baer's] ... reversal illustrated the
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3. A Radical Theory
Why did Judge Baer's opinion inspire such ire that it became part of
a presidential campaign and raised serious calls for the judge's
impeachment? The answer: Judge Baer adopted a then novel
perspective on the Fourth Amendment's meaning.
For Baer, Carol Bayless's fate was inextricably linked to that of her
racial group, African-Americans. Though Bayless herself was a
confessed criminal, her fate in the courts and at the hands of the
police had implications for the future of all African-Americans. Baer
thus openly worried about his "shattering" fear that blacks could
"count on little security for their person."' African-Americans in
certain inner-city communities had indeed too often suffered from
police abuses. Baer saw his judicial role as imposing a duty to protect
such communities because they are especially vulnerable to excessive
state zeal in investigating crime."
Baer was also unwilling to let the law in practice undermine the law
on paper. He initially refused to be an accomplice in the officers'
apparent "testilying" game. Baer had served on the Mollen
Commission investigating police corruption in New York City, which
had coined the "testilying" term.2- He was, therefore, especially
sensitive to the possibility that officers might lie to evade Fourth
Amendment strictures. Judge Baer was further reluctant to follow a
"colorblind" jurisprudence that left police the discretion in practice to
use skin color as an indicator of suspicion.
Perhaps because of his Mollen Commission work, Judge Baer also
understood that many in the lay African-American community had a
very different view than many whites and police of what conduct
justified "suspicion." Judge Baer gave that view voice: flight from the
police, at least in this neighborhood, may be a wise way to avoid
police harassment, not an acknowledgment of guilt. "3
limits of an independent federal judiciary."), Judges: Attacks on Baer Go Too Far,
Legal Times, Apr. 1, 1996, at 12; cf. The Vindication of Judge Baer?, N.Y. Post, Apr.
3, 1999, at 16 (describing recent investigations into abuses by the NYPD showing that
"the prescient Judge Baer should take a bow").
250. United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232,240 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
251. Cf. The Vindication of Judge Baer?, supra note 249. On the vulnerability of
African-Americans to police abuses, see, e.g., Cole, No Equal Justice, supra note 158,
at 16-62; Maclin, supra note 28, at 336 ("[Plolice departments across the
nation ... continue to target blacks in a manner reminiscent of the slave patrols of
colonial America."); Walker, supra note 247 (statistical data).
252. See David Cole, When Running Is Reasonable: Police Brutality in High-Crime
Neighborhoods, Legal Times, Mar. 4, 1996, at 20 (summarizing Judge Baer's
background).
253. See Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 242; cf Cole, No Equal Justice, supra note 158, at
16-62 (how colorblind Fourth Amendment jurisprudence discriminates against
minorities).
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Baer drew as well on American history as an important source of
Fourth Amendment values. His treatment of history was cursory and
limited to the Founding Period.14 Yet he clearly recognized the need
to turn to history to inform ourselves in resolving modern dilemmas.
Additionally, he saw that history as reflecting a value of inclusion, of
treating white and black alike to include all in the definition of an
"American.""55
Finally, Baer was unwilling to allow citizens' free movement to be
infringed without a significant quantity of reliable evidence of
individualized criminal wrongdoing. The police needed "reasonable
suspicion" that Carol Bayless was involved in criminal activity before
the officers could legitimately stop her car.15 6  Ignoring Bayless's
alleged cohorts' flight as irrelevant left the police aware of only these
facts: a Michigan resident was driving in an alleged high crime area of
New York City in the early morning hours, first loading her car with
baggage before setting off. She drove at a normal speed, engaging
neither in flight nor in furtive conduct. Such a visitor could easily
have been leaving so early in order to arrive in her home state by
nightfall. That totality of circumstances is thoroughly consistent with
innocent behavior and could not alone create reasonable suspicion. 2 .
Baer's original opinion was an excellent first start toward a
jurisprudence of respect. His second decision, which shied away from
his original noble effort, was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. On April 3, 2000, the United States
Supreme Court let that affirmance stand, refusing to hear Bayless's
further appeal. 8 Interestingly, the Supreme Court probably acted as
it did because it decided a similar case that same term.
254. See Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 240. For general background on the role of
history in Fourth Amendment analysis, see, e.g. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547 (1999); Tracey Maclin, The
Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 925
(1997); Sklansky, supra note 57.
255. See generally George P. Fletcher, Our Secret Constitution: How Lincoln
Redefined American Democracy (2001) (arguing that Lincoln helped to transform
America from rule by a republican elite to rule by popular democracy in an organic
nation committed to the equality of all persons); Taslitz, Rape And Culture, supra
note 142, at 134-45 (post-Reconstruction equality concepts embody ideas of inclusion
and voice); Taslitz, Mutual Indifference, supra note 75 (post-Reconstruction
American constitutionalism rejects indifference to the physical and economic
suffering of racial and ethnic minorities); Taslitz, Slaves No Morel, supra note 70
(Fourth Amendment embodies a principle of racial inclusion); Taslitz, Racist
Personality, supra note 31 (post-Reconstruction constitution seeks to promote a
virtuous citizenry committed to certain minimal principles of equality).
256. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 340-
42.
257. See Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 240.
258. See United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1061 (2000).
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The majority opinion in that case, Illinois v. Wardlow2-" reflects the
high Court's current approach to the Fourth Amendment, highlighting
why Judge Baer's original position seemed so radical. Importantly,
however, the dissenters in Wardlow moved in some ways even closer
than Judge Baer originally did toward an alternative jurisprudence.
Yet, the dissenters' words drew no outrage, perhaps because their
position lost, or because their tone was more measured than Baer's,
though the message was equally, if not more, radical.
4. Illinois v. Wardlow
a. Flight Isn't Right
William Wardlow fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area
known for heavy narcotics trafficking.2 Two officers chased him,
ultimately stopping and frisking him. On his person, the officers
found an illegally possessed .38 caliber handgun. Wardlow was
convicted for illegally possessing that weapon. When his appeal made
its way to the United States Supreme Court. a majority affirmed.
That majority agreed that neither Wardlow's mere presence in a
high crime area nor his refusal to cooperate with the police could
alone establish reasonable suspicion that he was involved in a crime.
"But unprovoked flight," said the Court. "is simply not a mere refusal
to cooperate."26' "Flight, by its very nature," the Court explained, "is
not "'going about one's business'; in fact, it is just the opposite. '"2
Indeed, "[h]eadlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate
act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is
certainly suggestive of such.1263 That there might be innocent reasons
for the flight was irrelevant, because, argued the majority, the Court
"accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people," especially
given the "minimal intrusion" involved in stopping someone to
investigate.2 6
The majority's approach differed sharply from Judge Baer's original
perspective. The majority was almost ostentatiously indifferent to
African-American views of the police and to the tension between
individualized and group justice so central to Judge Baer's original
265opinion.
259. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
260. Id. at 121-22.
261. Id. at 125.
26Z Id
263. Id. at 124.
264. Id. at 126.
265. On the group-individualized justice tension, see Taslitz, Racist Personality,
supra note 31, at 746-65; see also Omar Saleem. The Age of Unreason: The Impact of
Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and
Frisk", 50 Okla. L. Rev. 451. 453 (1997) (arguing Terri stop-and-frisk rule is
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The dissenters' perspective was the polar opposite of the majority's
opinion.
b. Vindicating Judge Baer
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.266 Stevens concisely summed up his position:
Compare, e.g., Proverbs 28:1 ("The wicked flee when no man
pursueth: but the righteous are as bold as a lion") with Proverbs
22:3 ("A shrewd man sees trouble coming and lies low; the simple
walk into it and pay the penalty"). I have rejected reliance on the
former proverb in the past, because its "ivory-towered analysis of
the real world" fails to account for the experiences of the many
citizens of this country, particularly those who are minorities.2
67
Justice Stevens, unlike Judge Baer, made no claim that he could
understand minority perspectives by common sense or by drawing on
his own life experiences. Instead, Justice Stevens looked to social
science research.21 There, he found a wealth of material suggesting
that large percentages of African-Americans considered police
brutality and harassment serious problems in their own communities.
Indeed, one study found, in Justice Stevens's reading of the data, that
African-Americans in twelve cities were more than twice as likely as
white residents in the same community to be dissatisfied with police
practices.2 69 Echoing Judge Baer, Justice Stevens saw these practices
and minorities' reactions to them to be critical to Fourth Amendment
analysis:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in
high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person
is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that
contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any
criminal activity associated with the officer's sudden presence. For
"particularly inappropriate for Black Americans").
266. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 129 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. See id. at 132 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens's use of social science in
the Fourth Amendment context seems consistent with Professor David Faigman's
suggestions for using social science in constitutional interpretation more generally.
See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 (1991).
For an example of how social science can be used more effectively under the Fourth
Amendment, see Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer, Illinois v. Rodriguez and
the Social Psychology of Third-Party Consent, 27 Crim. L. Bull. 42 (1991) (discussing
discrepancies between judicial assumptions about lay perceptions of risk and consent
and actual lay consensus); see also Meares & Harcourt, supra note 93, at 775-93
(reviewing social science demonstrating the Wardlow majority's errors).
269. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). There are subtleties
in the reading of the data that can, however, result in different, if less persuasive,
interpretations of the data. See Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30; Taslitz, Respect,
supra note 30, at 62 n.56.
2300 [Vol. 70
2002] STORIES OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DISRESPECT 2301
such a person, unprovoked flight is neither "aberrant" nor
"abnormal." Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to the
police officers themselves, and are validated by law enforcement
investigations into their own practices. Accordingly, the evidence
supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is too pervasive to be
dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as
inconclusive or insufficient.
270
Stevens concluded, therefore, that the characterization of a
neighborhood as a high crime area made an inference of guilt from
unprovoked flight less appropriate than in a lower crime area. This
was so "because many factors providing innocent motivations for
unprovoked flight are concentrated in high crime areas."27! In other
words, ordinary, honest citizens living where crime is most widespread
are also those who believe that they have the most to fear from the
police.
Stevens acknowledged, on the other hand, that flight can sometimes
be a significant indicator of guilt. Given the concerns of minority
communities, however, Stevens required highly reliable additional
evidence before he would reach that conclusion. Consequently,
Stevens closely examined the evidence in the Wardlow case in a way
that the majority did not.272
The testifying officer in Wardlow, Officer Nolan, admitted that he
did not have any credible information that specific criminal activity
was then afoot when he saw Wardlow run. Officer Nolan did testify
that Wardlow "'looked in our direction and began fleeing."' '  That
interpretation of Wardlow's conduct seemed oddly incomplete to
Justice Stevens. Four police cars drove through this area, yet
"presumably... [Wardlow] did not react to the first three cars, and
we cannot even be sure that he recognized the occupants of the fourth
as police officers."274 Absent more testimony, there was, therefore,
little evidence to support Officer Nolan's conclusion that Wardlow ran
from the police.
Moreover, Stevens noted, Officer Nolan had further testified that
he expected to find an enormous number of people, including drug
customers and lookouts, in an area where drug sales take place. Yet,
Nolan never mentioned seeing anyone else nearby when Wardlow
ran. That presumed absence of other people meant that there was no
reason to believe that drug sales or other illegal activities were afoot.
270. 528 U. S. at 132-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 139 (Stevens. J.. dissenting).
272. Compare id. at 124-26 (majority's analysis), with n/. at 132-39 (dissent's
analysis). See generally Raymond, supra note 157 (considering when, if ever, the
neighborhood in which an activity takes place is relevant to establishing the degree of
suspicion that the activity creates).
273. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 137 (Stevens, J.. dissenting) (quoting Officer Nolan's
testimony).
274. Id. at 138 (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
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Unlike the majority, therefore, Stevens sought more than the sort of
evidence that is as consistent with guilt as with innocence. Unlike
Judge Baer, however, Stevens never charged the police with a
propensity to perjure themselves. Nevertheless, Stevens was unwilling
to defer to police judgment unsupported by other evidence. Stevens's
opinion thus added several features to the approach of Judge Baer.
Both jurists considered minority perceptions and real-world evidence
of police treatment of minority communities to be important. But,
Stevens crafted a more practical methodology than Baer's for gauging
perceptions and practices by drawing on social science rather than
personal experience. While Baer's independence from police
judgment turned on credibility, Justice Stevens's independence turned
on a willingness to carefully examine the quality of the evidence and
the inferences that could fairly be drawn from it.
Stevens also required more evidence-a greater probability of
guilt-than does current law, an issue Baer did not address. Because
of the negative impact of certain actual or perceived police practices
on individual minority members and on their communities, Stevens
tread cautiously. He asked for confident assurance of a justified belief
in individual wrongdoing before he would permit the police to
intervene in citizens' lives.
Stevens did not pay homage to history the way that Baer did,
however fleetingly. Nor did Stevens expose the problem of testilying
to the light of day. Nevertheless, by looking to social science,
carefully and critically examining the quality of evidence, giving voice
to minority concerns in their own words (recorded in the social
science studies), and raising the bar necessary to establish reasonable
suspicion, Stevens at least implicitly outlined a more practical and
potentially more radical way than Baer's to re-craft the Fourth
Amendment. Stevens's approach, only one vote from garnering a
majority of the Court, takes an excellent additional step toward a
jurisprudence of respect.275
B. Racial Profiling Writ Large: The Japanese Internment
The Judge Baer and Wardlow stories are largely of minority
community voices suppressed in the judicial determination of Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness." That disregard of dissenting
perspectives stemmed from the judiciary's narrow vision of Fourth
Amendment costs and benefits. Such silencing crushes the human
senses of self-worth, uniqueness, and autonomy: Our voices help to
275. For more details on the shape of such a jurisprudence, see Taslitz & Paris,
Law on the Street, supra note 60. Of course, adding a sensitivity to American history
and an awareness of testilying to Stevens's approach would fuse the best of his
analysis with the best of Judge Baer's to create an even better third way.
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define who we are and how we plan to live. - 6 But, in neither tale
were minorities specifically targeted for searches of their cars, homes,
and property. Were that to happen, it would constitute the
phenomenon of "racial profiling."2'  That phenomenon also silences
minority voices, but it is nevertheless different from the sort of assault
on a minority group's status that was involved in Judge Baer's or
William Wardlow's cases.
Profiling has grabbed many headlines of late. -" "Driving while
black"-that is, having your car stopped by the police because police
see black skin color as inherently suspicious-is now a common buzz
phrase. 79 The sort of damage that such profiling does to the human
spirit is highlighted by the story of the twentieth century's most
massive and infamous profiling incident: the Japanese internment, or
racial profiling writ large. While the internment was unusual in its
scope, severity, and candor as an instance of profiling, the story of the
internment's victims dramatically brings home the kind of damage to
the human spirit and to that of the polity done by racial stereotyping.
1. Trying to Stem White Vitriol's Tide
For many decades before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, political
pressure for anti-Asian legislation originated in the western states.2
Japanese and Chinese workers were temporarily needed to build
railroads and cut forests. But they would not be welcomed as "real
Americans."'
276. See, e.g., Taslitz. Rape and Culture. supra note 142, at 134-48 (on the
psychological and social functions of group voice concerning the meaning and
application of legal standards).
277. On racial profiling generally, see Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic
Stops, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 425, 427 (1997) (discussing "discriminatory pretextual
traffic stops"); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretertual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L &
Criminology 544, 546 (1997) ("[I]f past practice is any indication, [the police] will use
the traffic code to stop a hugely disproportionate number of African-Americans and
Hispanics."); Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving While Black". Corollary Phenomena and
Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 717, 717 (1999) (cataloguing the -wide range
of race-based suspicion of Black and Brown motorists" known as -Driving While
Black").
278. See, e.g., Profiling Study Raises More Questions, Hartford Courant, Jan. 31,
2001, at A8; Susan Vela, Blacks Share Profiling Stories, Cin. Enquirer. Jan. 28. 2001,
at B1.
279. See, e.g., Laura Wides, LAPD Worker Files Racial Profiling Suit Against
Redondo Beach Police, L.A. Times, Dec. 2, 2000, at B4. See generally Meeks, Driving
While Black, supra note 18 (nature, scope, media coverage, and remedies for racial
profiling, especially "Driving While Black"): Bob Herbert. In America; Breathing
While Black, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4. 1999, at A29 (illustrates media coverage): Randall
Kennedy, Racial Profiling Usually Isn't Racist, The New Republic. Sept. 13, 1999, at
30 (similar).
280. See Donald W. Shriver, Jr.. An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics 157
(1995).
281. See id. at 123-24, 157.
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The December 7, 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor prompted the
open venting of white vitriol and fear against, and dehumanization of,
west coast Japanese immigrants (the Issei) and their American-born
children (the Nisei).2  After Pearl Harbor, it became "utterly
commonplace" to speak of all persons of Japanese ancestry as the
"yellow enemy." 3 The New Yorker magazine responded to the
attack with a short story describing those of Japanese descent as
"yellow monkeys."'  Monkey imagery dominated American cartoon
art throughout the war, matched by press, cinema, radio, newsreel,
and political propaganda, portraying Japanese Americans as sub-
human.25
The military was poised to act quickly. As early as five years before
the bombing, the federal government had contemplated interning the
Japanese. 6 In March 1941, the Justice and War Departments had
developed contingency plans, reaching a secret agreement to
coordinate the internment of enemy aliens. That agreement did not,
however, contemplate mass incarceration, and explicitly provided for
arrest under warrant obtained by a federal prosecutor, a subsequent
preliminary hearing, and a Justice Department determination of
individual loyalty.' Citizens were also distinguished from aliens.28,
On the very day of the bombing, this machinery was set into
motion, with the Justice Department arresting over 2000 individuals,
most of whom were Japanese. 89 Enemy alien review boards quickly
processed these people through individual loyalty hearings, then
detained them, by the spring of 1942, in INS internment camps in
Montana, New Mexico, and North Dakota, along with a smaller
number of German and Italian enemy aliens suspected of disloyalty.
2 1
Many swept up in this initial roundup of the Issei were leaders in
the Nikkei (those of Japanese descent) community. That loss of
leadership, combined with the desire of some Nikkei to prove their
loyalty and with a cultural acceptance of what cannot be changed,
made Nikkei resistance to later events difficult.29' The Issei also
discouraged their children from drawing others' attention. "The nail
that sticks up," they explained, "gets hammered."" g
282. See id. at 123-24, 254 n.12.
283. See id. at 123 (quoting John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power
in the Pacific War 37 (1986)).
284. Id.
285. See Dower, supra note 283, at 37, 182-85.
286. See Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation: Law and the Japanese
American Internment 3-4 (2001).




291. See Paul R. Spickard, Japanese Americans: The Formation and
Transformations of an Ethnic Group 101 (1996).
292. Eric Muller, Free to Die for Their Country: The Story of the Japanese
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For a few weeks, the Nisei held hope that, as citizens, they would
not suffer a fate similar to many of their parents. United States
Attorney General Francis Biddle had publicly urged the nation to
care about ensuring the reality of democracy "for Germans, for
Italians, for Japanese."293  Biddle continued: "[TIhe Bill of Rights
protects not only American citizens but all human beings who live on
our American soil under our American Flag.""z Biddle assured the
public that arrested aliens were given individualized assessments and
that "[n]o alien was apprehended, and none will be, on the score of
nationality."'29 The day after Pearl Harbor, Representative Coffee of
Washington declared in Congress that programs against Japanese
Americans would make a "mockery of our Bill of Rights."' In his
February 10 diary entry, Secretary of War Henry Stimson worried that
evacuation would "'make a tremendous hole in our constitutional
system.""'2  FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover by December 10 "reported
that 'practically all' the persons whom the FBI had intended to arrest
had been taken into custody.""98 Hoover would later describe the
coming calls for mass internment as a move more from "'public and
political pressure rather than factual data."'" A significant number
of high-level federal officials also believed that the military, legal, and
constitutional bases for mass detention were weak. -' The military
Governor of Hawaii, General Delos Emmons, further assured
Japanese-Americans that the federal government had neither the
intention nor the desire to create mass concentration camps.'"
"'[T]his is America,"' he said, "'and we must do things the
American Way."'3  "'We must distinguish between loyalty and
disloyalty among our people.""'3  Chicago businessman, Curtis
Munson, who had been asked to gather intelligence on Japanese in
American Draft Resisters in World War II, at 26 (2001); Spickard, supra note 291, at
101.
293. Muller, supra note 292, at 20.
294. Id.
295. Yamamoto et al., supra note 286, at 98 (quoting Biddle) (alteration in
original).
296. Ronald Takaki, Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World
War II, at 144 (2000) [hereinafter Takaki. Double Victory].
297. Comm. on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Citizens, Personal Justice
Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment 79 (1982)
[hereinafter Relocation Commission].
298. Yamamoto et al., supra note 286, at 97.
299. Shriver, supra note 280, at 159; see also Relocation Commission, supra note
297, at 73.
300. See Shriver, supra note 280, at 159.
301. Relocation Commission, supra note 297. at 265; see also Takaki, Double
Victory, supra note 296, at 138.
302. Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 265; see also Takaki, Double
Victory, supra note 296, at 138.
303. Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 265; see also Takaki, Double
Victory, supra note 296, at 138.
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the United States, had indeed already told Roosevelt in a pre-attachd
(11/7/41) report that no uprising was likely because many "local
Japanese" were loyal or wanted to "lay low" to avoid concentration
camps. 304 "Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle of the Office of
Naval Intelligence found that the large majority [of Nisei] were at
least passively loyal."3 5 Many business interests supported resistance
to relocation, and some local public officials urged restraint; the local
press behaved responsibly too, cautioning against the spreading of
rumors."° Nikkei already in the Army showed loyalty by battling
enemy planes at Pearl Harbor, while Nikkei civilians rushed to
volunteer to defend ports, give blood, and serve in the ROTC.0 7
Political forces pushing toward mass incarceration were, however,
far more powerful. The declaration of war, building war hysteria, and
the failure of political leadership to resist the tide soon drowned Nisei
hopes.3""
2. Higher Tide: First Moves Against Japanese-Americans
Within two weeks of Pearl Harbor, Lieutenant General John
DeWitt, head of the Western Command, requested approval to
conduct search and seizure operations to prevent alien Japanese from
making radio transmissions to Japanese ships.3 9  The Justice
Department refused, however, to seek the warrant without probable
cause, and the FBI concluded that the security threat was only a
perceived one.310 In January, the FCC reported that the Army's fears
were groundless. 1
Public opinion would not support the direction of the Justice
Department and the FBI, however, and DeWitt was undeterred.3 2 By
January 2, the Joint Immigration Committee of the California
Legislature sent a manifesto to California newspapers summing up
"the historical catalogue of charges against the ethnic Japanese," who,
said the manifesto, were "totally unassimilable. '' 31 3 The manifesto
declared that all of Japanese descent were loyal to the Emperor, and
attacked Japanese language schools as teaching Japanese racial
304. Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 52-53; see also Takaki, Double
Victory, supra note 296, at 144.
305. Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 55: Takaki, Double Victory, supra
note 296, at 144-45.
306. Takaki, Double Victory, supra note 296, at 140.
307. See id. at 140-41.
308. See Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 18 (describing the causes of the
internment); Yamamoto et al., supra note 286, at 97-100; see also Shriver, supra note,
280 at 155-62.
309. Takaki, Double Victory, supra note 296, at 145.
310. See Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 74.
311. See id. at 62-63; Takaki, Double Victory, supra note 296, at 145.
312. See Shriver, supra note 280, at 158.
313. Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 67-68.
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superiority.314 The committee had the support of the Native Sons and
Daughters of the Golden West and the California Department of the
American Legion, which in January demanded that all Japanese with
dual citizenship be "placed in concentration camps."'1" By February,
Earl Warren, at the time Attorney General of California, and U.S.
Webb, a former Attorney General, were vigorously seeking to
persuade the federal government to remove all ethnic Japanese from
the west coast.316
White American farmers admitted that their self-interest required
removal of the Japanese. Explained one farmer on behalf of the
Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association in the Saturday Evening Post:
"It's a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or
the brown man. They came into this valley to work, and they stayed
to take over."31 7 Fear. combined with prejudice, was also at work,
aided by the January release of the Roberts Commission Report,
prepared at President Franklin D. Roosevelt's request. That report
concluded that Japanese in America were responsible for espionage,
contributing to the Pearl Harbor tragedy."' Columnist Henry
McLemore reflected growing public sentiment fueled by this report:
I am for the immediate removal of every Japanese on the West
Coast to a point deep in the interior. I don't mean a nice part of the
interior either. Herd 'em up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside
room in the badlands. Personally, I hate the Japanese. And that
goes for all of them.319
California newspapers endorsed mass evacuation. The Los Angeles
Times caught the spirit of the times: "A viper is nonetheless a viper
whenever the egg is hatched-so a Japanese American, born of
Japanese parents-grows up to be a Japanese, not an American."'3'2
State politicians joined the bandwagon embraced by Leland Ford of
Los Angeles, who demanded that "all Japanese. whether citizens or
not, be placed in [inland] concentration camps."'2
Emboldened by further events, General DeWitt in February of
1942 sent a final report to Henry Stimson recommending mass
exclusion of Japanese-Americans. Similarly, in testimony before
Congress, DeWitt said, "The Japanese race is an enemy race." He
314. See id. at 68.
315. Id.
316. See id.: see also Yamamoto et al.. supra note 286, at 98.
317. Jacobus Ten Broek et al.. Prejudice, War, and the Constitution 80 (19541: see
Takaki, Double Victory, supra note 296. at 146-47.
318. See Relocation Commission. supra note 297. at 57.
319. Yamamoto et al., supra note 286. at 99 (internal quotations omitted).
320. Gary Y. Okihiro & Julie Sly. The Press, Japanese Americans, and the
Concentration Camps, 44 Phylon, No. 1. at 66-69 (1983) (citation omitted), see also
Takaki, Double Victory, supra note 296, at 146.
321. Relocation Commission. supra note 297. at 70: see also Takaki, Double
Victory, supra note 296, at 147.
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continued: "[W]e must worry about the Japanese all the time until he
is wiped off the map. 3122
On February 19, 1942, Roosevelt added his aid to DeWitt's cause by
signing Executive Order No. 9066. That order directed the Secretary
of War to prescribe military areas in which the "right of any person to
enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the
Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose
in his discretion. ' 323
3. The Racial Curfew
DeWitt's first move against the West Coast Nikkei was a curfew
order signed in March, 1942. The order confined all German, Italian,
and Japanese aliens, and all U.S. citizens of Japanese (but not of
German or Italian) ancestry, to their homes between 8 p.m. and 6
a.m., and required them to get military leave to travel more than five
miles from their home.324 The five mile limit was especially onerous.
Those in rural areas needed permission to grocery shop, while truck
farmers needed permits to deliver vegetables. In some cases the office
where one would seek permission to leave the perimeter was itself
outside that perimeter.325 Getting permission was difficult. In one
case, for example, fifteen-year-old Helen Murao had such difficulty
getting permission to see her ill sister that, by the time Murao arrived,
her sister was dead.326 Murao explained the inchoate sense of
exclusion-of being outside the American community-that this
experience fostered:
All I knew was that she was dead, and "they" had done it. And I
can't identify even now who I felt "they" were. It was just, you
know, me against everybody, and everybody else had done it to me,
or to us. [All I wanted to do] was get out of there, and I was very
upset that nobody accorded us any kind of sympathy or any kind of
human courtesy at all.327
Many Nisei similarly recognized the race discrimination in DeWitt's
order. "[T]hey had to sit at home while the American-born children of
German and Italian immigrants, many of whom were their school
322. Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 66 (discussing congressional
testimony); id. at 86-90 (discussing Final Report).
323. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 97(a)
(Supp. 1943).
324. See Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 101 (citing John L. DeWitt,
Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, at 297-98 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Off. 1943)); Muller, supra note 292, at 20-21.
325. Muller, supra note 292, at 21.
326. See John Tateishi, And Justice for All: An Oral History of the Japanese
American Detention Camps 41-42 (1984).
327. Id. at 42; see also Muller, supra note 292, at 21-22 (setting Murao's plight in
historical context).
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classmates, were free to walk the streets." -" This recognition
"offended and angered the Nisei."11 21
4. Race-Based Relocation
The military also embarked, as early as December 1941, on an
effort to encourage the voluntary relocation of the Nikkei."' That
effort failed, for few Nikkei knew anyone in relocation areas, and the
handful that did go faced great hostility in their new homes.
Furthermore, wrapping up affairs and disposing of property was time-
consuming and difficult.33" ' So DeWitt converted the voluntary
program into a mandatory one, being empowered to do so by
Executive Order No. 9066.32 "[T]he military was to empty the West
Coast of all ethnically Japanese people, aliens and citizens alike." '
On March 21, 1942, Congress passed Public Law 503, criminalizing
violations of certain military orders."- Three days later DeWitt began
issuing a series of Civilian Exclusion Orders. Japanese communities
were given seven days to evacuate to the relocation areas. They were
to be shipped to sixteen Army-operated assembly centers. By March
29, the Nikkei up and down the west coast were notified that they
must register with the Wartime Civil Control Administration
("WCCA"), a military agency set up by DeWitt to administer the
evacuation, and then prepare to be removed to "temporary residence
elsewhere. 33 5 They were told that they could bring only whatever
possessions they could carry.336
With little time to act, the Nikkei had to sell most of their
possessions: their refrigerators, cars, furniture, pianos, farms, and
houses. 337 Facing the prospect of no income stream to make mortgage
payments, property went on the market. It was a buyer's market,
mostly to whites all too eager to gouge the Nikkei, paying minimal
328. Muller. supra note 292, at 22.
329. See id.
330. See Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 101. But see Yamamoto et al.,
supra note 286, at 101 (placing the date of the "voluntary" relocation's start at March
1942, while the Relocation Commission places the date at February 1941).
331. Muller, supra note 292. at 22-23.
332- See id at 23-24.
333. Id. at 23-24 (explaining why voluntary evacuation became mandatory), see
also Yamamoto et al., supra note 286. at 101 (discussing the original voluntary nature
of the program).
334. Yamamoto et al.. supra note 286. at 101. But see Muller, supra note 292, at 25
(placing the criminalization order date at March 29. 1942).
335. Muller, supra note 292. at 25-26. General DeWitt's Final Report permitted
evacuees to take with them only what they could carry. See DeWitt. supra note 324, at
100.
336. See Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 135-36; Takaki, Double
Victory, supra note 296, at 154.
337. See Takaki, Double Victory. supra note 296. at 154.
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prices for the fruits of a lifetime's worth of work.33s Families tried to
avoid such losses by searching for adequate, affordable storage space.
Such space was rarely available, however, forcing families to abandon
valuables, heirlooms, and household goods in large quantities. When
space was found, families would return years later to find their storage
areas ransacked and their belongings stolen.339
The Nikkei later spoke despairingly of the pain caused by what was
in effect confiscation of their property for white advantage. Explained
one survivor:
It is difficult to describe the feeling of despair and humiliation
experienced by all of us as we watched the Caucasians coming to
look over our possessions and offering such nominal amounts
knowing we had no recourse but to accept whatever they were
offering because we did not know what the future held for us.
... People who were like vultures swooped down on us ..... 4
Another survivor said it this way:
I went for my last look at our hard work... why did this thing
happen to me now? I went to the storage shed to get the gasoline
tank and pour the gasoline on my house, but my wife ... said don't
do it, maybe somebody can use this house; we are civilized people,
not savages.
341
Survivors also bemoaned the degradation involved in the forced
journeys to assembly centers. One family was especially hurt by the
assigning of numbers at registration centers to be affixed to baggage
and coat lapels. "From then on," this family complained, "we were
known as Family #10710.''32 Still another survivor poignantly
summarized the atmosphere of this ethnic roundup:
On May 16, 1942 at 9:30 a.m., we departed... for an unknown
destination. To this day, I can remember vividly the plight of the
elderly, some on stretchers, orphans herded onto the train by
caretakers, and especially a young couple with 4 pre-school children.
The mother had two frightened toddlers hanging on to her coat. In
her arms, she carried two crying babies. The father had diapers and
other baby paraphernalia strapped to his back. In his hands he
struggled with duffle bag and suitcase. The shades were drawn on
the train for our entire trip. Military police patrolled the aisles. 3
338. Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 131-32.
339. Muller, supra note 292, at 27 (describing how the storage space was
ransacked).
340. Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 132; see Shriver, supra note 280, at
160-61.
341. Relocation Commission, supra note 297, at 132.
342. Id. at 135.
343. Id. at 136.
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Organized protest against these events did exist. For example, the
President of the University of California, the Federal Council of
Churches, a number of other church bodies, and a few labor leaders
protested the forced relocation. '  The single largest public
demonstration was held on February 19, 1942. when a thousand
members of the United Citizens Federation protested in Los Angeles.
But protest was generally sporadic and slow, doing little to stop
DeWitt's momentum. 345
5. Privacy, Property, and Free Movement No More: The Relocation
Centers
When evacuees arrived at assembly centers, they found that they
were to be housed at stockyards, fairgrounds, and racetracks jammed
with tiny barracks. The centers were filthy, smelly, and dirty. Two
thousand people were packed into one large building.' Rather than
beds, the Nikkei were given gunnysacks that they stuffed with straw.
Stables sometimes served as housing." Perhaps the worst condition
for the detainees was the virtual absence of privacy. Law professor
Eric Muller, in a recently-released book,-' told the story of the
Nozawa family, who lived in a twenty foot by twenty foot square
room, with huge gaps into the rooms of their neighbors on either side.
Nearly 19,000 deportees shared but six latrines. " "Privacy was out of
the question; already they could hear their neighbors' conversation
from the five other rooms up and down the long barrack.""w No
family had its own kitchen, everyone ate in common mess halls, and
lines at the washrooms were so long that the eldest member of the
Nozawa family went to shave at midnight."' Visitors were greeted at
the "zoo," a border of the camp where Caucasian and other guests
could be greeted, but only through the fence. Said George Nozawa, "I
didn't know whether we were the chimpanzees or they were."" -
After several weeks in the assembly center, evacuees were shipped
by train to longer-term internment camps. 3 Here, too, the Nikkei
lived in spare barracks devoid of privacy3-' Floor and wallboards soon
344. See Shriver, supra note 280, at 160.
345. See id.
346. See Relocation Commission, supra note 297. at 139.
347. See id.
348. See Muller, supra note 292, at 28-31.
349. See id. at 29.
350. See id.; see also Relocation Commission. supra note 297, at 140; Tateishi, supra
note 326, at 19.
351. See Muller, supra note 292, at 29.
352- See id. at 29-30.
353. Takaki, Double Victory, supra note 296, at 155.
354. See Muller, supra note 292, at 36-38.
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warped, exposing the internees to the elements and to "the vermin
from below." '355
These "relocation centers" were operated by the War Relocation
Authority, a civilian agency created by executive order on March 18.
Most of the internees would remain at these camps for several years,
daily facing barbed wire and armed guards." 6 Internees were
forbidden to leave the camp without a pass from the Project
Director. 7 Guards were told to shoot anyone violating this rule. 8
The Issei particularly suffered from the loss of property and
enforced idleness, but, again (as earlier, in the assembly centers), even
more so from the loss of privacy:
Family life [in the relocation centers] was transformed overnight.
There was no privacy, either within a family unit or between a
family and its neighbors. Quarters were so cramped that the
younger generation typically spent most of the day outside the
family home. As the Nisei spent more time with each other and less
with their parents, the Japanese tradition of strong parental control
began to falter. Issei fathers, accustomed to unquestioned authority
as family breadwinners, won no bread and began to lose their
authority. Mealtimes, the anchor of family life, were no longer
private matters, but communal affairs that often scattered family
members across a mess hall by gender and generation, rather than
by family unit.359
For many of the young Nisei, who were growing up accustomed to
these conditions, there was less of a sense of pain from lost property
and privacy. The conditions indeed encouraged enjoyable social
contact with the other Nisei children6.3  But the loss of free movement
and of the accompanying autonomy it brought to many of life's
choices was agonizing. As one young Nisei woman explained: "[T]he
overriding feeling that I had, without even being conscious of it at that
time, was the deprivation of freedom, and that is a very traumatic
thing. You don't appreciate it until you don't have it."36'
6. The High Court's Complicity
It does not take a legal education to understand that arresting and
imprisoning masses of persons without individualized probable cause,
or even reasonable suspicion to believe that any of them had
committed or were about to commit a crime, impinges directly on the
355. Id. at 36.
356. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 286, at 101.
357. See Muller, supra note 292, at 33-34.
358. See id.
359. Id. at 38.
360. Id. at 38-39.
361. Id.
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Fourth Amendment.362 Privacy and free movement were robbed from
the Nikkei for years. Though the government generally did not
directly confiscate Nikkei property (the government did freeze
significant numbers of Issei bank accounts and otherwise sometimes
acted directly), the forced sale, abandonment, exposure to theft, and
deprivation of use of their property by the Nikkei stemmed directly
from government action.3 The primary justification for these abuses,
moreover, was the dangers of the Japanese "'racial strain."'' Yet,
Supreme Court opinions arising from these events never once framed
the issue as a Fourth Amendment problem,' and the Court closed its
eyes to the racial animus involved, describing the events as justified by
legitimate concerns of war rather than race hatred.'
The Court itself embraced in its opinions many of the white public's
racial stereotypes of the Japanese. In one case, for example, the
Court interestingly recognized that there was a long history of white
prejudice against persons of Japanese descent, but argued that this
prejudice, combined with Japanese cultural characteristics, rendered
the government's action eminently sensible:
There is support for the view that social, economic and political
conditions which have prevailed since the close of the last century,
when the Japanese began to come to this country in substantial
numbers, have intensified their solidarity and have in large measure
prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white
population. In addition, large numbers of children of Japanese
parentage are sent to Japanese language schools outside the regular
hours of public school in the locality. Some of these schools are
generally believed to be sources of Japanese nationalistic
propaganda, cultivating allegiance to Japan. Considerable numbers,
estimated to be approximately 10,000, of American-born children of
Japanese parentage have been sent to Japan for all or a part of their
education.
The adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of
threatened invasion, of measures for the public safety, based upon
362. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 150-
58 (summarizing standards for the reasonableness of searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment); see infra text accompanying notes 381-441 (discussing the
Fourth Amendment's application to a modem day racial roundup).
363. On the freezing of bank accounts, see Muller, supra note 292, at 36-37. On
other injuries to Nikkei property, see supra text accompanying notes 337-39.
364. See Takaki, Double Victory, supra note 296, at 147 (quoting General DeWitt).
365. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 286, at 96-176 (analyzing, giving historical
background of, and reproducing the Supreme Court cases).
366. See, eg., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayshi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); see also John E. Semonche, Keeping the Faith: A
Cultural History of the U.S. Supreme Court 225-30 (1998) (critiquing the internment
cases).
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the recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate that a
group of one national extraction may menace that safety more than
others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not
to be condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances
racial distinctions are irrelevant.3 67
In its other opinions arising from the internment, the Court
similarly generally deferred to the Executive as properly acting
pursuant to its war powers.3 s In only one case, the Endo case, did the
Court grant relief. There, the Court did briefly pay tribute to the fact
that our "Constitution has prescribed procedural safeguards
surrounding the arrest, detention and conviction of individuals. ' ' 69
But the Court limited its decision to Endo's circumstances: a citizen
whom the Department of Justice and the War Department admitted
was loyal and law-abiding, as was true of Endo, could not continue to
be held in detention. 370 Nevertheless, the Court again described the
evacuation program as justified by legitimate fears of espionage and
sabotage, not by group hostility to a whole class of persons."'
The Court's rhetoric of racial color-blindness arguably aided the
progressive elaboration of future individual rights doctrine.3 1 Its
embrace of racial stereotyping, dodging of important issues, extreme
deference to the Executive, and results in the internment cases, on the
other hand, did little to heal the festering wounds of the incident.373
Japanese-American outrage and exclusion had been making, and long
would make, itself felt, however. For example, when the Government
had the audacity to draft Nikkei-to ask those whom it had wrongly
imprisoned to die defending it-many Nisei resisted. They did so
largely on moral grounds, and their bravery is to be celebrated. 74
367. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96-101; see also Semonche, supra note 366, at 225-30
(analyzing the racial assumptions underlying the Court's internment opinions);
Yamamoto et al., supra note 286, at 102-76 (citing critical excerpts from these
opinions).
368. See Semonche, supra note 366, at 225-30.
369. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,286 (1944).
370. See Semonche, supra note 366, at 228.
371. See id.
372. See Peter Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court 455-56 (1999). But
see generally Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme
Court Moves from Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving
Affirmative Action for African Americans, 1 Mich. J. Race & L. 165 (1996) (arguing
that the Court has most recently used Korematsu to justify reactionary civil rights
policy).
373. See Semonche, supra note 366, at 229.
In terms of its role within the civil religion, the Court had been derelict in its
duty .... [Tihe American experiment necessitated a respect for diversity
free of the suspicion that the different were disloyal or a threat to national
security .... [T]o accept the idea that ancestry precluded the full
incorporation of individuals within the American community mocks the
theological premises that lie at the very heart of the nation.
Id.
374. See generally Muller, supra note 292 (documenting the grounds for, and details
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Similarly, some sixteen percent of internment camp residents
renounced their American citizenship. Most, however, did not truly
want to leave, later withdrawing their renunciation, withdrawals
accepted in 1948 by United States courts.7  The renunciations were
thus not truly expressing commitment to another polity but rather an
expression of "rage and alienation." '76 Said Edward Ennis, head of
the Alien Enemy Control Unit: "They just threw back their
citizenship at us. This was a perfectly honest expression of how they
felt. '" 377 But the broader Japanese-American community's pain
continued as well. Finally, the nation made an important symbolic
effort to welcome Japanese-Americans to the American political
community: awarding reparations to the survivors in 1988. The scars
and indignities of the camps nevertheless continued to be carried, and
will be carried, by survivors for the rest of their lives."
7. The Internment's Lasting Significance
The wholesale deprivation of Japanese-American rights to privacy,
property, and free movement during the internment saga is a powerful
reminder of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. Without
freedom of movement, Japanese-Americans lost both their property
and their means of acquiring more property. They lost as well their
abilities to pursue their individual interests, to maintain certain
friendships and community ties, and to pursue an education for their
children. Without property, they lacked independence or any
significant measure of power over their own fate. They depended on
the state for the necessities of survival. The absence of most of their
property in turn also meant loss of privacy. These combined losses
played havoc with traditional social hierarchies, family life, and self-
esteem.
That these deprivations were imposed on each victim because of his
membership in a perceived racial group magnified the harms done.n9
Japanese immigrants and their descendants in America understood
that they were neither valued by, nor considered full members of, the
American people. s° Their value as individuals became equated to the
of, Nisei draft resistance during World War II): Takaki. Double Victory, supra note
296, at 156-65 (summarizing the history of the drafting of the internees and their being
required to take loyalty oaths).
375. See Shriver. supra note 280, at 162.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See id. (indignities and scars), id. at 164-67 (reparations).
379. See Taslitz. Racist Personalit.y supra note 31, at 758-65 (describing the special
harm of the insulting messages sent to an individual by society's actions based on the
majority's perception that that individual belongs to an "inferior" group).
380. See Karst, supra note 125, at 90-92: see also Interview by Tom Ikeda with
Henry Miytake (Oct. 28, 1999). reprinted in Yamamoto et al., supra note 286, at 392.
Miytake explains:
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value of their racial group; but that group's value was negligible in the
eyes of white America. Made aliens in their own land, they felt as if
the rest of America was a colonizing army. Their pain and anger
stemmed directly from race-based search and seizure practices,
teaching lasting lessons about the connection between the Fourth
Amendment and human respect.
C. Racial Profiling One-By-One: The Oneonta Case
1. The Nature of Modern Profiling
The modern phenomenon of racial profiling-police selecting a
person to search or seize based significantly on that person's race 81-
is not as obvious or dramatic as the Japanese internment, where an
entire group of people was seized based solely upon their race.
Modern profiling usually happens, however, to one person at a time.
Thus, police may stop a car driven by an African-American male,
conduct an investigation, then release him.31 When police do so
repeatedly, however, they impinge on the free movement of many
thousands of African-Americans and create a perception in that
community that its members are discriminatorily suspected because
their skin color marks them as a criminal class. 83 Modern profiling,
if you look at the constitutionality of the issue, to me, if you round up
115,000, 120,000 people, and you put 'em into enforced incarceration process
without due process of law, without martial law being declared, we're talking
about a constitutional issue. You can't do that. So it becomes, whether you
could get 51 or 50+ percent of the 435 Members of the House of
Representatives and fifty people in the Senate to go along with this kind of
issue. [I]f they can't go along with it, then the Constitution doesn't mean a
damn thing to me. And the way they thre[w] us into the camp[s], they
disregarded the Constitution. So the monkey's on their back also because
they, they wrote Public Law 503, and they banged it through Congress in two
days flat. And that's the real bill that put us into the camp.
Id. (alterations in original).
Professor Margaret Raymond has suggested that the expansion of Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights after World War II was partly a conscious judicial effort to
distinguish the American nation from the totalitarian regimes against which we had so
recently fought. See Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism: Translating the
Guarantees of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1193 (1998). She
argues that this "totalitarian comparison" was often expressly made in the case law.
Id. at 1197, 1198-1225. Perhaps if the courts had also candidly analyzed and rejected
our own flirtations with totalitarian practices, such as the internment, they would also
long ago have developed a more racially-inclusive Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
learning the lessons taught by our modern history.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 12-28.
382. Meeks, Driving While Black, supra note 18, at 11-15 (recounting African-
American Samuel Elijah's automobile being stopped by the police without any
articulable basis).
383. See Lu-in Wang, "Suitable Targets"? Parallels and Connections Between
"Hate" Crimes and "Driving While Black," 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 209 (2001) (on group
perceptions). See generally Meeks, Driving While Black, supra note 18 (describing the
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unlike the internment, also often involves the use of race as
purportedly but one factor among others. A driver may, for example,
be stopped because he fits a drug courier profile, with race being but
one of the factors in the profile. Moreover, because all the
circumstances surrounding the driver's actions are considered, the
State may characterize the stop as based on individualized
suspicion.' Yet the fact remains that the driver probably would not
have been stopped but for his race, and both race and profiles act as
suspicion markers, using very broad generalizations to stigmatize
individual citizens.3 Additionally, modern profiling may be entirely
denied as the motivation for a police action where some other
"objective" ground for the action, such as a defective rear taillight, can
be identified.' Modem profiling is thus often hidden and subtle,
working slowly, yet, in a fashion similar to that wrought by the
Japanese internment, still corroding minority groups' equality of
status and membership in a broader American political community:
2. Oneonta Case Background
A further case study, Brown v. City of Oneonta," helps to clarify
modem profiling's dangers. In Brown, shortly before 2 a.m. on a fall
morning, someone broke into a seventy-seven year-old woman's
house just outside Oneonta and attacked her. The victim could not
identify her assailant's face, but, based on seeing his hand and
forearm, and on the speed of his attack, described him as a young
black male. The victim also told police that, as she and the male
struggled, he cut himself on one of his hands with his knife. A police
canine unit tracked the assailant's scent from the crime scene to the
widespread impact and varied nature of the problem of racial profiling).
384. See, e.g., Taslitz & Paris. Constitutional Criminal Procedure. supra note 25, at
410-13 (summarizing constitutional law on racial profiling specifically and on drug
courier profiling more generally); Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All
Seems Infected that the Infected Spy, as All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye," 65
N.C. L. Rev. 417,420 (1987).
385. See generally Meeks, Driving While Black, supra note 18.
386. See, eg., Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996) (holding that traffic
stops are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, regardless of whether the stop
was in fact motivated by racial stereotyping or racial animus). Whren acknowledges
that suit may be possible for selective enforcement under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 813. The Court, however, has set the standard of proof just to
obtain discovery in such a suit so high as to render recovery unlikely. See Taslitz &
Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 410-13. This high standard
also tends to make police officer "testilying" easy. See Taslitz, Slaves No More!. supra
note 70, at 757-75 ("testilying" and its connection to Whren).
387. See Wang, supra note 383 (profiling). See generally Karst, supra note 125
(arguing that racially discriminatory laws, or those applied in a racially discriminatory
fashion, work to lower minority group social status and to exclude them from equal
membership in the broader American political community).
388. 195 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000).
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7500 student State University of New York College at Oneonta
("SUCO"). SUCO is in the town of Oneonta, a mostly white town of
about 10,000 full-time residents. Fewer than 300 African-Americans
live in the town, and just two percent of SUCO students are black.'
The police promptly requested and obtained from SUCO officials a
list of SUCO's black students. The police tried to find and question
every such SUCO student, an effort producing no suspects. Over the
next few days, the police swept through Oneonta, stopping and
questioning more than 200 non-white persons on the streets,
inspecting their hands for a cut, but finding no suspects. The SUCO
students whose names were on the list and others questioned during
the sweep brought suit against the City of Oneonta, the State of New
York. SUCO and certain SUCO officials, and various police
departments and officers.390
The case has a complex procedural and legal history unhelpful to
understanding the argument of this Article. What matters most is that
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit eventually
rejected claims for damages rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the dictates of the Fourth
Amendment. While the court later reconsidered aspects of that
decision, both the original opinion and the amended one upon
reconsideration shed useful light on how modern courts deal with
profiling.3 91
3. The Original Second Circuit Opinion
a. The Equal Protection Claims
Regarding the equal protection claim, the Second Circuit in its
original opinion concluded that, "plaintiffs' factual premise is
incorrect: they were not questioned solely on the basis of their race.
They were questioned on the altogether legitimate basis of a physical
description given by the victim of a crime."39z In the court's view, no
profile had been used to suggest that the suspect must have been
black. Nor had it been alleged that the defendants had a regular
policy, based upon racial stereotyping, to stop all black Oneonta
residents whenever a violent crime had been reported. Rather,
defendants' facially race-neutral policy was to investigate crimes by
interviewing the victim, getting a description of the victim's assailant,
and seeking out persons matching that description. In this case, said
the court, the description "contained not only race, but also gender
389. Id. at 116.
390. See id.
391. See supra notes 12-34 and accompanying text (collecting and commenting on
the leading academic literature on racial profiling).
392. Brown, 195 F.3d at 119.
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and age, as well as the possibility of a cut on the hand. The
description is not a suspect classification, but rather a legitimate
classification of suspects."3 93
Of course, the court conceded, attempting to question every person
in a general category may have a disparate impact on small minority
groups in towns such as Oneonta. Nevertheless, such an impact may
be justified: "If there are few black residents, for example, it would be
more useful for the police to use race to find a black suspect than a
white one.1394 In any event, the Equal Protection Clause reaches
governmental action with a discriminatory impact only if it is also
proven to have had a discriminatory intent. "' Plaintiffs failed, in the
court's view, to allege discriminatory intent. The court did note that
the police stopped an African-American woman during the sweep,
arguably suggesting that defendants "considered race more strongly
than other parts of the victim's description." ' That one incident was,
however, insufficient to convince the court that the police acted
primarily because of the plaintiff's race: rather, the police "were
responding to a description given in a specific case.""- 7
The court, thus, rejected the description of the sweep as racial
profiling but recognized the "sense of frustration that was doubtlessly
felt by those questioned by the police during this investigation."3'
The court further acknowledged that it was "not unmindful of the
impact of this police action on community relations."' " Indeed, the
court urged law enforcement officials to be "cognizant of the
impressions they leave on a community, lest distrust of law
enforcement undermine its effectiveness."' The court concluded,
however, that this caution was an expression of sound policy, not
constitutional mandate. There was a sharp division between the
responsibilities of the judiciary and the executive, the court declared:
"[O]ur role is not to evaluate whether the police action in question
393. Id.
394. Id. at 120.
395. See id. at 120; Taslitz & Paris. Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 5upra note
25, at 410-13 (summarizing the relevant law). There has been some dispute in the
lower courts and among commentators whether the high standard of proof for
selective prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause. articulated in United
States v. Armstrong. 517 U.S. 456 (1996). in fact governs equal protection claims
arising from alleged racial profiling. See Elizabeth A. Knight & William Kurnik.
Racial Profiling in Law Enforcenent. The Dtfense Perspective on Civil Rights
Litigation, 30 The Brief 16. 19-23 (2001) (summarizing the dispute and the case law).
Recently, the most significant federal appellate profiling opinion, coming from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held that Armstrong indeed
governs racial profiling claims. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police. 251 F.3d 612 (7th
Cir. 2001).






was the appropriate response under the circumstances, but to
determine whether what was done violated the Equal Protection
Clause .... [I]t did not."4 '
b. The Fourth Amendment Claims
The court was only marginally more receptive to the plaintiffs'
Fourth Amendment claims. Under that amendment, a suspect may
only be stopped if the police have reasonable suspicion of his
involvement in criminal activity.4" The amendment applies in the first
place, however, only if the claimed stop was a "seizure."403 A
"seizure" exists if a reasonable person would believe that his freedom
of movement had been restrained.4" A seizure does not occur simply
because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions.05
The court did find that two plaintiffs had been seized: Jean
Cantave, who was driving a car when a police car sounding sirens and
flashing lights pulled Cantave over, ordering him out of the car, and
instructing him to place his hands on top of the car; and Sheryl
Champen, told by the police at a bus station that she could board her
bus only if she first produced some identification. 6
But, the court found no seizure of the other plaintiffs, even those
who had submitted detailed affidavits describing their contacts with
the police.407  It is enlightening to review these no-seizure cases in
detail, starting with Jamel Champen, who, in his affidavit,
alleges that a police officer pointed a spotlight at him and said
"What, are you stupid? Come here. I want to talk to you." He was
then told to show his hands. Despite the alleged rudeness of this
encounter, the district court was correct in determining that this did
401. Id.
402. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (articulating the reasonable suspicion
requirement for stops); Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note
25, at 318-48 (summarizing the law).
403. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 335-
38.
404. Id. A "seizure" also requires that the suspect's movement be restrained by the
application of force or by his submission to a police assertion of authority. See id. at
337-38 (discussing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)). The free-to-leave
test is also modified in situations where it makes no sense. Id. at 336-37 (citing Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (describing one form of a seizure test when officers
board a bus and begin questioning a passenger is whether he would "feel free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter")). None of these
subtleties were of particular significance, however, in the Oneonta case.
405. Id. at 334-35.
406. See Brown, 195 F.3d at 122; see also Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F. 3d 329,
340-41 (2d Cir. 2000) (vacating the original opinion).
407. See Brown, 195 F.3d at 122.
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not amount to a seizure. The encounter was brief in duration and
the police officer only looked at [Jamel] Champen's hands."'
Ricky Brown's case seemed even more invasive of free movement
than that of Jamel Champen. Three officers on the street stopped
Ricky Brown. The court described the encounter:
The police officers questioned him about whether he was a student
and where he had been. They asked for his identification card,
passed it around, and returned it to Brown. At one point, the
officers "formed a circle" around Brown. When Brown asked if he
had permission to leave, they told him he was free to go. One
officer then asked him to come back and asked to see Brown's
hands. Although there were several officers present, none of them
had physical contact with Brown, and the officers explicitly told
Brown that he was free to leave. While it is a closer case than some,
we agree with the district court that no seizure occurred, and affirm
the summary judgment for defendants on Brown's Fourth
Amendment claim.
Having rejected Champen and Brown's claims, it was then easy for
the court to reject Raishawn Morris's claim, alleging that two police
officers encountered him in his dorm lobby and asked to see his
hands. 410
c. Flaws in the Original Opinion
The Brown court's sharp division between equal protection and
Fourth Amendment claims is troubling because it distracts attention
from equality as an important principle in the law of search and
seizure. It also ignores history, in which the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment for the first time applied the Fourth
Amendment to the states, thus forever linking the two amendments
and recreating the Fourth Amendment's meaning in the process. t
Furthermore, lumping all equality claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause limits remedies to cases of
intentional discrimination, yet there is good reason instead for
disparate impact to matter too.412  Of course, the court defined
intentional discrimination so narrowly-apparently meaning that
racial stereotyping must be the sole motivating factor-and made





411. See generally Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 70; see also Taslitz & Paris,
Law on the Street, supra note 60.
412. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 28 (discussing why racially disparate impact alone
can sometimes violate the Fourth Amendment).
413. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 410-
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The court conceded that those the police stopped must have felt at
least "frustration" and that the sweep surely harmed "community
relations," thus also hampering effective law enforcement.41 4  Yet,
because the court ignored the history of search and seizure practices
during slavery and Reconstruction-both being sets of race-based
practices that fostered individual frustration, community distrust, and
communal efforts at evading the law-the court was blind to a sound
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.4 5 Nineteenth century race-
based search and seizure practices are sensibly understood as among
the motivating forces behind ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus, relevant under the Fourth Amendment as
well. 416 The court's vision of a concern for the community's respect as
entirely an executive, not a judicial, function was thus similarly
flawed.4 7
The court's conclusion that the police had "not seized" several of
the plaintiffs, so that the Fourth Amendment did not apply, further
ignored the role of oppressed communities in constitutional reasoning.
12 (summarizing United States Supreme Court case law regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment); Knight & Kurnik, supra note 395, at 21 ("A person cannot become the
target of a police investigation solely on the basis of race. The extent to which race or
national origin may be a factor or taken into account in law enforcement practices
without causing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause is unknown."). A few
district courts have rejected Armstrong's requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate
that similarly situated individuals in a non-protected class were not stopped or
arrested in order even to obtain discovery to support an equal protection claim. See
id. at 19-21; see also Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1066 (N.D. Ill.
1998), affd, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001). But, the one Court of Appeals decision on
the point comes down in favor of applying Armstrong. See Chavez, 251 F.3d at 636-
37. There is also a relatively untested federal statutory theory, under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994), that might recognize a disparate
impact theory in a civil suit. See Knight & Kurnik, supra note 395, at 22. Other
statutory causes of action in civil cases still require proof of intentional discrimination,
see id. at 22 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1983), but imposing challenging causation
requirements. See id. at 23 ("[Fjrom a damage standpoint, if Section 1983 causation
rules are applied, the defense may prevail when it can be shown that the plaintiff
would have been stopped, detained, or arrested even in the absence of racial profiling
on the part of the officer."). Statistical evidence may be helpful in certified class
actions against a police department or municipality to show a custom, pattern, or
practice of discrimination, but face difficult evidentiary hurdles. See id. at 22-23. It is
unclear whether equal protection violations can also be the basis for exclusion of
evidence at a criminal trial. See id. at 21. In any event, the burdens of proving the
elements of civil claims are substantial. See id. at 21-23; See also Trende, supra note
213, at 350-57.
414. Brown, 195 F.3d at 120.
415. See Taslitz, Slaves No More! supra note 70, at 734-56 (providing history of
search and seizure practices under slavery and Reconstruction); Taslitz & Paris, Law
on the Street, supra note 60 (addressing similar point in much greater detail and
discussing the impact of these practices on first slaves, then freedmen).
416. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
417. See generally Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30; Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note
30; Taslitz & Paris, Law on the Street, supra note 60; supra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text (addressing inter-branch responsibilities).
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It is hard to imagine that the "reasonable African-American male"
would not have believed that his freedom of movement had been
restrained by the Oneonta police." Surely if African-American
males are justified in fleeing at the mere sight of the police under
certain circumstances, as I argued concerning the Judge Baer drama,
then they are justified in believing that abusive comments,
encirclement by multiple police officers, and a police insistence on
seeing the males' hands had restrained the males' freedom of
movement.419 Reasonableness inquiries must always involve asking,
"Reasonable from whose perspective?" Choosing the perspective of
those most vulnerable to even well intentioned but nevertheless
oppressive police behavior better protects us all.4 "
The court's characterization of the police as acting based on
individualized suspicion rather than on generalization is also odd. The
Constitution usually mandates assessments of individualized
wrongdoing to avoid citizens being swept up in police investigations
based on membership in a class rather than on specific evidence of the
individual's behavior.4 2' That the police knew that the perpetrator of
this crime was a black male did not change the reality that the
plaintiffs were stopped because of their race and gender alone. In no
case was there any other indicator of suspicion." Though the court
rejected the label, this was profiling of the most blatant sort. To hold
otherwise is to judge reasonableness entirely from the perspective of
the police-were they intentionally engaging in stereotyping-rather
than from the perspective of "the people" aggrieved by police
action.423
418. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 406
(discussing perspective of reasonable African-American male when stopped by
police); Taslitz & Paris, Law on the Street. supra note 60, cf. Forell & Matthews,
supra note 96, at xvii-19 (defending "reasonable woman standard").
419. See supra text accompanying notes 231-75 (addressing flight and Judge Baer's
case).
420. See Taslitz & Paris, Law on the Street, supra note 60 (detailing a defense of
this argument); Forell & Matthews, supra note 96 (detailing defense of similar
argument concerning the "reasonable woman" standard).
421. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000) ("We are
particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized
suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime
control ends.").
422. See supra text accompanying notes 388-90 (summarizing Cit) of Oneonta case
facts).
423. The Fourth Amendment speaks of the right of "the people." and not of a
"person" or "persons," to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S.
Const. amend. IV. My suggestion here is that this language should best be
understood as significant. focusing our attention on how searches and seizures affect
broader political communities as well as individuals. See Taslitz & Paris, Law on the
Street, supra note 60: see also Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30 (defining "the People").
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4. Backtracking Forward: The Amended Opinion
The Second Circuit panel, upon plaintiffs' filing a petition for
rehearing and for rehearing en banc, filed an amended opinion.424
This new opinion did not change the results of the Fourteenth
Amendment claims but did alter the results of the Fourth Amendment
claims. Specifically, the court now concluded that Jamel Champen
and Ricky Brown had been seized, vacating the district court's grant
of summary judgment for defendants on both those claims. The court
thus continued to find insufficient evidence to survive summary
judgment on any claim of intentional racial profiling under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court also continued to ignore both
discriminatory intent and discriminatory effects under the Fourth
Amendment.
The court did conclude, however, that, given the Fourth
Amendment's application, the defendants "would have difficulty
demonstrating reasonable suspicion in this case."4z2 The court recited
precisely the same facts as in its original opinion, but summarily
altered its conclusions on the seizure question.426 The court offered no
explanation for its change of heart, nor did it articulate any reasons
whatsoever for its new conclusions.
It is possible, in a reverse of the Judge Baer situation, that the court
bowed to political pressure, as this case had by the time of the new
decision become a cause celebre in New York State's African-
American community.427 Given that all the Oneonta suspects turned
out to be innocent, the political dynamics were very different from
those facing Judge Baer.
The amended opinion was largely consistent with United States
Supreme Court case law declaring racial animus in searches and
seizures irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment and suggesting a
high standard of proof to recover for racial profiling under the
Fourteenth Amendment.428 The high Court has, however, not yet
424. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329,333 (2d Cir. 2000).
425. Id. at 340.
426. Id. at 340-41.
427. See, e.g., U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Police Practices and Civil Rights in
New York City (2000), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/nypolice/ch5.htm. The commission
seemed to recognize this concern of the black community:
"Although this permissible [at least under the case law] use of race as an
identifying characteristic serves as a necessary and efficient means for police
to narrow their investigative efforts, police often lower their standards of
investigation when a suspect has been described as a minority, thus intruding
upon a greater number of individuals who meet the racial description than if
the suspect had been described as white."
Id. (quoting Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, Section III:
Racial Discrimination on the Beat: Extending the Racial Critique to Police Conduct,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1472, 1505 (1988), as an apt description of the Oneonta case).
428. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that officer's
subjective intent is irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
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addressed whether discriminatory effects alone matter under the
Fourth Amendment. 9  It is unclear whether the Second Circuit's
amended opinion is consistent with the high Court's precedent on
when a "seizure" has occurred, though, in the view of many
commentators, the high Court has been all too-willing to evade
difficult Fourth Amendment questions by readily finding no search or
seizure."'
The amended opinion is a small step in the right direction. But the
opinion still entirely disregards the Black community's concerns about
the role of race in the police action. The opinion indeed reinforces
perceptions of relative judicial indifference to intentional police racial
discrimination or racial stereotyping. Furthermore, the opinion offers
little guidance to future courts and creates an appearance of simply
bowing to political forces because of the opinion's failure to offer any
rationale for the court's new decision, much less a coherent guiding
sense of principles.
A "good" outcome for minority communities (distributive justice)",t
is neither necessary nor sufficient to breed a sense of respect, absent
procedural and retributive justice. -2 The jurisprudence of respect
articulated here would have suggested more convincing reasons for
the court's amended opinion and would have shown a deeper concern
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that even obtaining discovery to support a
racially selective prosecution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment first requires
significant proof both that similarly situated suspects of other races were better
treated and that the suspects were intentionally singled out because of their race);
Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 393-95. 409-12.
But see Knight & Kurnik, supra note 395, at 21 (arguing that in one respect the
amended opinion in Brown did seem to embrace a somewhat more lenient
Fourteenth Amendment standard than in Armstrong, finding it unnecessary for
plaintiffs to plead the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group when
challenging a law or policy containing an express racial classification).
429. See Whren, 517 U.S. 806. I am not suggesting that racially discriminatory
impact should automatically establish a constitutional violation, but I am suggesting
that it should require stricter reasonableness scrutiny. Cf Amar, supra note 180, at 35-
37 (hinting at a similar approach); Konvitz, supra note 70, at 158 (arguing that Fourth
Amendment rights, because they are "fundamental," should always be subjected to a
standard of strict scrutiny).
430. See Cole, No Equal Justice, supra note 158, at 16-34 (critiquing seizure
definition as evading Fourth Amendment's central goals); Taslitz & Paris,
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 334-40 (summarizing case law
defining "seizure").
431. See Alan Calnan, Justice and Tort Law 85-98 (1997) (defining -distributive
justice"); Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30 (re-defining and applying distributive
justice principles to the analysis of Fourth Amendment problems).
432. See Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30 (importance of retributive and
procedural justice for individuals and groups under the Fourth Amendment); Taslitz,
Inadequacies of Civil Society, supra note 110, at 313-35 (retribution as essential to
achieving justice for both individuals and socially salient groups). See generally Tom
R. Tyler et al., Social Justice in a Diverse Society 43-133 (1997) (collecting social
science research on the relative importance to individuals and groups of distributive,
retributive, and procedural justice).
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with minority perspectives. Of course, such a jurisprudence would
have encouraged reader inquiry into racial animus under both
amendments and into discriminatory effects under the Fourth
Amendment. Even if the decision continued to turn on whether a
"seizure" took place, it was incumbent upon the court to define
"seizure" -the circumstances under which the "reasonable person"
does not feel free to leave-in a more respect-enhancing fashion."
It is important too that the Oneonta case proved so difficult for the
Second Circuit despite the case's being an easier one than most
instances of racial profiling. Profiling rarely involves a "sweep" of
many young black males. Rather, profiling is more likely to happen in
a fashion in which it is harder to see a pattern so clearly, for example,
by police stopping one car at a time (most of the stopped cars being
driven by young black males).4m Race-based decisionmaking in such
circumstances is harder to prove and easier to deny. It is also likely to
be less offensive to many whites than is a racial sweep.435
Furthermore, much profiling probably happens when there is
indeed reasonable suspicion to stop apart from race, though
unconscious racial stereotyping or conscious animus may be the real
reasons for the stop.4 6  Because the courts usually ignore racial
animus and avoid inquiry into discriminatory effects being linked to
subconscious bias in searches and seizures, a finding that the Fourth
Amendment applies, but that there was reasonable suspicion for the
stop, will generally lead to the conclusion that the Amendment was
not violated.437
Additionally, most profiling happens in a way that is less obvious to
the public, such as a highway roadside stop where the suspect is
unlikely to be observed by anyone but the police for any significant
433. See, e.g., Cole, No Equal Justice, supra note 158, at 16-34 (arguing seizure
definition should take into account minority group experiences).
434. See Meeks, Driving While Black, supra note 18, at 3-36 (defining and
illustrating racial profiling, especially in automobile stops).
435. This is probably so because stopping one person at a time can more easily be
assumed to have been based on some kind of evidence of individual culpability. But a
sweep of all males of a certain race and age is so blatantly race-based that it is hard to
ignore the deprivation of individualized justice. Cf. Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra
note 31, at 746-58 (addressing human need for individualized justice).
436. The Whren case, indeed, seemed to recognize that individualized suspicion is
generally necessary for an automobile stop, but the presence of racial animus will not
invalidate such a stop under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996); Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note
25, at 404-06 & n.563 (discussing unconscious police officer processes of racial
categorization).
437. See Trende, supra note 213, at 350-54 (summarizing lower court cases viewing
racial profiling as a Fourteenth, not a Fourth Amendment, claim and, even then,
reflecting skepticism about profiling claims); cf Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996) (holding racial animus irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment where there
was probable cause for a traffic stop).
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length of time.43 Damages are usually small, and the commonality
necessary for a class action hard to see or prove." Innocent suspects
therefore rarely seek judicial redress, and even more rarely do so
successfully. Profiling claims are thus most likely to be made by the
apparently guilty in the context of motions to suppress evidence at
criminal trials.4' That is a far less emotionally appealing context than
that in the Oneonta case. While profiling in the abstract may generate
political opposition, that opposition is also less likely to successfully
bring its forces to bear on a run-of-the-mill case, contrary to the
political dynamics at work in Oneonta."' The amended opinion's
reasoning (or lack thereof) and outcome are thus unlikely to benefit
civil plaintiffs or criminal defendants in most instances of racial
profiling.
D. Elian's Storv
The Elain Gonzales case, the last of the tales examined here, raised
a very different issue from the lack of individualized suspicion, racial
or ethnic animus, or racially disparate effects considered in the cases
reviewed thus far. The issue in Elian's case was instead whether it was
"unreasonable" for the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") to raid Elian's uncle's home, with admitted probable cause,
but for the sole purpose of returning the child to his father in a
totalitarian regime. -  The wisdom of issuing a warrant and the
wisdom of the manner in which it was executed involve obvious
Fourth Amendment concerns. It is unlikely that Elian or any other
non-citizen players on American soil in this drama are excluded from
438. See supra note 435 and accompanying text. See generally Meeks. Driving
While Black, supra note 18, at 3-36 (illustrating nature of stops).
439. See, e.g., Trende. supra note 213. at 347-56 (summarizing similar and
additional roadblocks to civil suits for racial profiling under current law). Knight &
Kurnik, supra note 395, at 16-23 (class action and other procedural obstacles to a civil
suit seeking a remedy for racial profiling).
440. Cf Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 70. at 757-61 (explaining ".hy motions
to suppress by criminal suspects are the remedy most likely to vindicate Fourth
Amendment values).
441. On the other hand. the apparent large numbers of run-of-the-mill cases are
starting to receive media attention, because of the sheer magnitude of the likely
problem and the determined efforts of a number of community activists. See supra
notes 18 -20 and accompanying text.
442. At least this is how most of Miami's Cuban-American community seemed
implicitly to view the issue. See hifra text accompanying notes 458-520. The Court has
not recently been receptive to arguments that a Fourth Amendment search or seizure
is unreasonable despite the presence of probable cause. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (finding that humiliating arrest of a driver in front of
her two young frightened children was reasonable given probable cause to believe
that she had committed the fine-only offense of driving without a seat belt); Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding police officer's alleged pretextual reasons
for stopping a car driven by an African-American driver were irrelevant given the
officer's probable cause to believe that the driver had violated the traffic laws).
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the Fourth Amendment's protection because of their citizenship
status alone. But immigration decisions such as whether Elian must
leave or stay in this country may in themselves have Fourth
Amendment implications. 443
I will ultimately conclude that the federal government in the Elian
case acted in an entirely reasonable fashion. But I will reach that
conclusion only after doing my best to see the world through the
Miami Cuban-American community's eyes. It is that task to which I
now turn.
1. The Miami Cuban-American Perspective
a. The Gonzalez Family Versus the INS
On April 22, 2000, every television station in America broadcast the
image of a "burly federal officer, helmeted, goggled, wearing a flak
jacket, battle fatigues and shooter's gloves," holding a gun. The gun
was a German-manufactured submachine gun, "a black, plastic-
shrouded apparition with a bleak little snout.., containing 32 rounds
of what are almost certainly hollow-points, a strange bulge forward
under the muzzle, which is but 15 inches from Elian Gonzalez and
Donato Dalrymple. '" 44
Elian was a Cuban citizen. He and his mother, Elizabeth, along
with twelve other Cuban nationals, left Cuba in a small boat in the
pre-dawn hours of November 22, 1999. The tiny party hoped to flee
what they saw as an oppressive life under the dictatorship of Fidel
Castro."6 On November 23, the boat capsized "in strong winds and
rough seas off the coast of Florida."" 7 Eleven of the fourteen
passengers, including Elizabeth, died. Elian survived.448
Elian was rescued at sea by Florida fishermen. He was taken to a
Miami hospital for medical treatment. While there, his great-uncle,
Lazaro Gonzalez, contacted the INS. INS officials decided that they
would defer returning Elian to Cuba. They "paroled" Elian into
Lazaro's custody.449
Soon thereafter, Lazaro filed an asylum application with the INS on
Elian's behalf. Federal law permits an alien unlawfully in the country,
443. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
444. Stephen Hunter, The Gun Seen Round the World, Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 2000,
at C1.
445. Ines Capdevila, Survivors Urge Citizenship for Elian, The Wash. Times, Jan.
27, 2000, at All.
446. Id. (why they fled); see Hunter, supra note 444 (numbers and persons in the
boat); see also Gonzales ex rel. Gonzales v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11 th Cir. 2000)
(addressing Elian's citizenship).
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like Elian, to apply for "asylum.""45 Asylum is a protection from
return to the alien's home country, because of a justifiable fear that he
will face persecution there.451 Two other asylum petitions were also
filed, the second signed by Elian, the third submitted again by Lazaro
after a state court awarded him temporary custody of Elian.4' - The
three applications, a court later explained:
were substantially identical in content. The applications stated that
Plaintiff [Elian] "is afraid to return to Cuba"... [and has] a well-
founded fear of persecution because many members ... of [his]
family had been persecuted by the Castro government in Cuba. In
particular, according to the applications.... [Elian's] stepfather had
been imprisoned for several months because of opposition to the
Cuban government. Two of [Elian's] great-uncles had been
imprisoned for their political acts... [Elian's] mother had also been
harassed and intimidated by communist authorities in Cuba. The
applications also alleged that, if... [Elian] were returned to Cuba,
he would be used as a propaganda tool for the Castro government
and would be subjected to involuntary indoctrination in the tenets of
communism.453
Elian's father, Juan Gonzales, had a very different view of the
matter. He was interviewed in his Cuban home on December 13 by
INS officials. There, Juan took the position that his son was too
young to make his own decisions. Only Juan, as Elian's father, could
do so. And, Juan wanted Elian back in Cuba promptly.'-
In a later meeting with the INS, Lazaro and Elian's cousin,
Marisleysis Gonzalez, contended that Juan's request to return Elian to
Cuba had been coerced by the Cuban government.455 The INS
Commissioner, however, on January 5, 2000, rejected the asylum
applications: "[S]ix-year-old children lack the capacity to file
personally for asylum against the wishes of their parents," the
Commissioner concluded.456
Elian, by Lazaro as his "next friend," filed a complaint in federal
district court, seeking to compel the INS simply to consider the merits
of the asylum application. The district court rejected this argument
and dismissed the complaint. Elian, through Lazaro, appealed. '
450. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (1994) ("[A]ny alien... may apply for asylum.").
Gonzales, 212 F.3d at 1344 (noting Lazaro's asylum application on Elian's behalf).
451. § 1158(b); see Gonzales, 212 F. 3d at 1344.
452. Gonzales, 212 F. 3d at 1344.
453. Id at 1344-45.
454. Id. at 1345.
455. Id
456. Id.
457. See id. at 1346.
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b. Historic Roots of the Cuban-American Community's Outrage:
Evoking Castro's Denial of Fourth-Amendment-Style Freedoms
By this time, the case had become a cause celebre among Miami's
Cuban-American community.458 To many Americans outside that
community, the case was a tale of attempted reunification of a father
with his son.459 For most of Miami's Cuban-Americans, however, the
issue was whether the state could forcibly seize a child happy in his
uncle's embrace, returning that child to a life of totalitarian
oppression against his will and that of his family.4" Moreover, for
Cuban-Americans, the matter involved not only Elian and his family
but recognition of the larger material and symbolic needs of the exile
community.46'
The exile community is not monolithic, but its members do share
some common experiences and world views.462 Castro's 1959 victory
over dictator Fulgencio Batista triggered three waves of emigration,
one between 1959 and 1961, one between 1961 and 1977, and a third
via the Mariel boatlift in 1980. Tens of thousands have made the
journey since, some in rafts.4 63 Every act of flight had to be done either
surreptitiously or at a time when Castro, for political reasons, opened
the exit gates.164
The first wave to leave feared arrest or imprisonment, perhaps
because it consisted of officials in Batista's police force, army, or
government. Landowners, managers, industrialists, business
employees, and revolutionaries feeling betrayed joined the exodus.465
By 1961, Castro started setting up serious roadblocks to flight:
Airline tickets had to be purchased in dollars. At airports, exiles
were harassed as their papers were processed by mean-spirited
militiamen, who sometimes subjected departing passengers to strip
458. See John Lantigua, Showdown in Miami, Salon.com (Apr. 13, 2000)
[hereinafter Lantigua, Showdown in Miami], at www.salon.com/news/feature/2000/04/
13/showdown/index.html.
459. See Laura Parker & Kevin Johnson, Support Is Strong for Justice but
Americans Frown on Tactics in Elian Raid, USA Today, May 2, 2000, at 13A.
460. See Robert M. Levine & Moises Asis, Cuban Miami 63 (2000) ("The
INS ... said Elian should be sent back to his father .... The reaction in Miami was
spontaneous and angry. Many exiles identified deeply with the mother's desperate
effort to bring her son to the United States .... The child custody impasse
symbolized the anguish of decades of family divisions.").
461. See id.
462. See John Lantigua, Meet Miami's Cuban Moderates, Salon.com (Apr. 7, 2000)
[hereinafter Lantigua, Cuban Moderates], at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2000/
04/07/movement/indexl.html. In the wake of the Elian incident, the moderate, often
younger, members of the community seem to be gaining ground. See Dana Canedy,
Cuban Exile Group Split as Hard-Liners Resign from Board, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
2001, at Al.
463. See Levine & Asis, supra note 460, at 3, 22-46, 59.
464. See id.
465. See id. at 22-23.
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searches. The Cuban press ridiculed the exiles, calling them gusanos
(worms). Young men of army age were detained in Cuba. The
Castro government allowed Cubans whom they did permit to go to
carry only five dollars in cash and a suitcase; their property in Cuba
was immediately confiscated. Nothing stanched the flow of
emigres.
466
The refugees fled a state in which the police exercised enormous
power to invade privacy, take property, and obstruct citizens' free
movement. 7 Indeed, the Cuban constitution expressly declares that
"legally recognized civil liberties can be denied to anyone who
actively opposes the 'decision of the Cuban people to build
socialism."'" The oppressive nature of this government, and the
difficulty of leaving it, have, in the exiles' views, changed little since
1961. The motivations of many in the later waves of exiles were thus,
in this sense, similar to the original refugees'. 6
466. Id. at 33.
467. Professor Cynthia Mabry explains:
Members of Cuba's security forces, led by Raul Castro. Fidel Castro's
brother, control all aspects of Cuban citizens' lives. Thus, Cuban citizens'
daily activities at home, school and work are subject to government and
Communist Party control.
National police harassment is a concern among human rights
advocates who monitor living conditions in Cuba. In its report on conditions
in Cuba, for instance, the United States Department of State declared that
national police used excessive force that caused several deaths.
... [Bilack youths" were disproportionately harassed by police .... Black
Cubans are stopped and asked to reveal their papers even though similarly
dressed white Cubans are not ....
... Cubans ... have less freedom of thought and movement than most
Americans experience. In Cuba, human rights advocates, independent
journalists, demonstrators ... may be detained for long periods of time ....
... Government representatives conduct surveillance of Cuban citizens'
private and family life. Dissidents as well as those who do not openly oppose
the government are subjected to surveillance. International telephone calls
and correspondence are intercepted and monitored. Electronic mail is
censored and access to the Internet is restricted. Citizens are deprived of
access to foreign publications ....
... [C]lergymen who receive permission to enter the country suddenly
may be ejected and forbidden to return to Cuba.
... Likewise. Cubans' foreign travel is restricted. Travel is so hampered
that, in some instances, citizens may not go outside their home provinces.
Mabry, Send the Children Home. supra note 198, at 4345: see also U.S. Dep't of
State, Cuba Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, at 1-18 (1999)
(summarizing Cuban deprivation of Fourth-Amendment-style freedoms).
468. U.S. Dep't of State. 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cuba 6
(2000) (citation omitted): see also C.H.R. Res. 2000/P5. U.N. Comm'n on Human
Rights, 56th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. EICN, 4120001L.11 (2000) (expressing concern
about "the continued violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba").
469. See generally Levine & Asis, supra note 460.
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Although the first wave was largely white and affluent, later waves
encompassed a broader social and economic spectrum.470 Some flight
came about because of spectacular events, like the Pedro Pan Airlift
of December 1980, in which 200 children were "rescued" from
Havana to Miami. Others were enabled to flee by state policy, such as
Castro's temporarily reopening of the gates for the relatives of exiles
in September 1965. Those gates remained partly open until April
1973.47" 1 Men of military age were still barred from emigrating, "as
were people with skills of use to the Castro government, who had to
remain at least until replacements were found and trained.
Sometimes this meant two or three years of forced manual
agricultural labor before visas were granted.
47 2
The most infamous opening was the Mariel boatlift, in which, to
relieve pent-up frustration stemming from a poor economy and the
1970s baby boom, Castro allowed thousands to leave the island. In
1980, Castro announced an airlift to Panama and Costa Rica and
opened the port at Mariel. Over 15,000 Miamians registered forms
requesting permission to bring relatives to the United States from
Cuba.473 Many islanders who never expected to be free to leave were
notified that they were on the list to go, and many headed
immediately for the docks.474 On April 11 of that same year, a Cuban
bus driver crashed his vehicle through Havana's Peruvian embassy
gates, asking for asylum.475 Press coverage of the incident "ignited
waves of protest by Cubans in Miami against Castro's government. 47 6
Castro chose to add to the flight of ordinary citizens' that of groups
more easily denigrated.477 He emptied Cuban jails and mental
hospitals onto the vessels at Mariel. "In some cases, the released
patients and prisoners sailed to the United States under restraints. 4 78
In his May Day speech of that year, Castro reviled the Marielitos as
"the scum of the country-antisocials, homosexuals, drug addicts, and
gamblers, who are welcome to leave Cuba if any country will have
them. 479
Hundreds of boats, many chartered by exiles, left South Florida to
rescue relatives and other escapees. Cuban officials forced some of
these boats to take strangers aboard. Journalists dubbed the boatlift
470. See id. at 39-43.
471. See id. at 40-43.
472. Id. at 43.
473. See id. at 44-45.
474. See id. at 45-46.
475. Id ("Within hours, 10,000 more Cubans had entered the embassy grounds, also
demanding asylum.").
476. Id. at 46.
477. See id.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 47.
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"the Freedom Flotilla."' A total of 125,000 Cubans came to the
United States in this wave.8'
The collapse of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s and the tightening of
the United States embargo against Cuba contributed to its worsening
economic failures. "Now more and more Cubans tried to escape the
island by sea, trusting their lives to decaying boats and crude rafts,
some made of inner tubes."'  Although Castro abruptly opened the
doors again in August 1994, the United States was not always
welcoming of the sheer number of exiles. Tighter United States
immigration laws and the Castro government have not halted entirely
the continued flow of refugees."-
Most Cuban exiles settled in Miami. Within three years of the
Freedom Flotilla, forty-two percent of Miamians were Cuban-
Americans.' Arriving refugees often gathered in tightly knit groups,
promoting their cultural heritage and politically agitating against
Castro.4
It was into this mix that Elian Gonzalez arrived on our shores.
Elian's plight reminded Cuban-Americans of separated families and
the Cuban regime's utter disdain of human rights to property, privacy,
and free movement.4 6 The INS and federal district court's refusal
even to consider a petition seeking to block the return of Elian to such
a regime evoked rage in the Cuban-American community.
c. The Atypical Nature of Cuban-American Attitudes
The rest of America did not understand why Cuban-Americans
would feel such outrage. The majority of Americans wanted Elian to
be reunited with his father in Cuba.4" African-Americans felt this
480. See id. at 47-48
481. See id. at 48-49.
482. Id at 59. This observation has led some human rights activists to complain that
"U.S. embargoes have merely kept average Cubans impoverished while failing to
accomplish their ostensible goal of weakening Fidel Castro's hold on power." William
F. Schulz, In Our Own Best Interest: How Defending Human Rights Benefits Us All
101 (2001).
483. See Levine & Asis, supra note 460, at 62-68.
484. See id. at 68.
485. Id. at 58.
486. See id.; Mabry, Send the Children Home, supra note 198, at 44-46.
487. See Levine & Asis, supra note 460 ("Cuban-American organizations
engineered public protests, including blocking traffic, and simultaneously worked with
state and national politicians to prevent any return by making the boy a U.S.
citizen.").
488. See Max J. Castro, A World of Their Own: The Miami Media Recognizes and
Helps Perpetuate a Separate Reality for Cuban Exiles, Salon.con (Apr. 21, 2000)
[hereinafter Castro, A World of Their Own], at http:/vww.salon.com/nevsffeature
2000/04/21/miami (summarizing data on other groups' views) The author is a
sociologist and senior research associate in the Dante B. Fascell North-South Center
at the University of Miami and a regular op/ed columnist for the Miami Herald.
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even more strongly than whites, with some ninety-two percent of
African-Americans in one poll favoring Elian's return to Cuba,
compared to seventy-six percent of whites holding that view.489
African-American dissension from the Cuban-American view of Elian
may have stemmed partly from the perception that allowing Elian to
stay would reflect discriminatory treatment because many black-
skinned illegal immigrants received no such deference to their
needs.4 "° "African-American feeling grew so bitter that some blacks
were willing to march with whites waving Confederate flags in the
hastily organized... demonstrations that drew several thousand
protestors in the wake of the [later] federal enforcement action to
remove Elian from the Little Havana home [of Lazaro Gonzalez].1 49'
The seeming inability of the Anglo and African-American
communities to understand Cuban-American views fueled further
anger in the latter community. Cuban-Americans felt isolated,
victimized by anti-Cuban racism, humiliated, and besieged. Worse
yet, their voices were stifled by an uncaring judicial system unwilling
to give them their day in court.4 2 So deeply did Elian become an
almost religious symbol of community identity that the Cuban-
American community reacted harshly to its own dissidents, the tiny
minority who sided with the Anglos and the African-Americans in this
matter.493
Max Castro, a Cuban-American reporter for the Miami Herald,
labeled the reaction of his own community "hysteria. '494 The saga, he
said, demonstrated "a tragic tale of two cities" in two entirely
different worlds.495 This schism was most evident in the very different
coverage offered by The Miami Herald and El-Nuevo Herald, the
Spanish-language sister publication. In the Miami Herald, the
resistance of Elian's Miami relatives to returning him to Cuba was "a
sobering tale of defiance of the law. ' 496  EI-Nuevo Herald readers
instead were "treated to a description of mass relief and joy" over
489. See id.
490. Mabry, Send the Children Home, supra note 198, at 66-69 (defending this
perspective).
491. Max J. Castro, After Hurricane Elian: Miami Is a City Asunder Divided by
Race, but the Cuban Exiles' Stranglehold on Local and National Power Has
Unmistakably Eased, Salon.com (June 28, 2000) [hereinafter Castro, Hurricane
Elian], at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2000/06/28/miami.
492. Id.; see also Castro, A World of their Own, supra note 488, Talk of the Day:
Elian! What Do You Think of the Court's Ruling that He Isn't Entitled to Political
Asyhm Hearing? (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter Talk of the Day], at
http://wellengaged.com/engaged/discussion.cgi?c=sstalkofday&f=0&t=142 (collecting
e-mail correspondence, many of which expressed annoyance at Anglo-and-African-
American views of Elian).
493. See Castro, Hurricane Elian, supra note 491; Talk of the Day, supra note 491;
see also Castro, A World of Their Own, supra note 488.
494. Castro, Hurricane Elian, supra note 491.
495. Castro, A World of Their Own, supra note 488.
496. Id.
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what was construed as a reprieve from deportation when the
government initially failed to use force to retrieve ElianY" "Coverage
by Miami's two Spanish-language television stations was relentlessly
sympathetic to those who want[ed] to keep Elian in the United
States." '498 Said Max Castro, "many Cuban-Americans live in a
separate reality when it comes to certain issues."4  Yet, other
Miamians are "even less attuned" than most Americans "to the
Cuban exile view of the world."5"
In that view, Elian, the "angel[,] must not be returned to Satan in
hell, also known as Cuba."' A lawyer associated with the Cuban-
American National Foundation explained: "Cuba is a prison, and if
you desire to return to a prison, you don't get to take your child with
you, no matter how good a father you are.""
Most Cuban-Americans did not accept, however, that Juan indeed
wanted "imprisonment for his son.' 5" In April 2000, the Cuban-
American community awoke to a television report showing a home
video of Elian addressing his father, saying, "I don't want to go back
to Cuba. ... I want to stay here."5 Cuban-American singer Gloria
Estefan spoke for many in her community: "We stand together as a
Cuban-American community and offer the father sanctuary as
well .... He will be safe [from anyone] coming to get this child
because we understand that he is also a victim here."' t'
d. The Community Resists
Elian was in fact not safe from government agents coming to get
him. Lazaro continued to resist turning Elian over to the INS and
entered into negotiations with the Department of Justice." Many of
Lazaro's supporters, fearing government use of force, set up a vigil
outside Lazaro's home. These supporters seemed ready to confront
the INS if its agents appeared to re-take physical custody of Elian."' 7
On April 22, in the middle of the night, while most of the
community slept, that is precisely what happened. The INS struck
quickly and with an impressive show of force. After blitzing into the








504. Lantigua, Showdown in Miami, supra note 458.
505. Id.





photographer, at Lazaro's urging, was in the home awaiting just such a
move. It was he who took the now-infamous picture of the
frightening-looking INS agent seemingly pointing his weapon at
young Elian.5 °9 The agents whisked Elian to a waiting van, and
headed quickly out of the neighborhood before residents had much
chance to react. 10
Protestors blocked Little Havana intersections, destroyed a bus
stop, and built bonfires. Other demonstrators waved the Cuban flag
and blocked a highway heading to Miami International Airport.511
"Clinton and his people will pay for this," screamed one Cuban exile
blocks from Lazaro's house.512 Angela Perez, a Lazaro supporter,
wept. "Both my father and brother were put in prison by the Castro
regime," she said. "Cuban state security would break into our house
that way to search. When I saw that on television it made it all come
back. It's horrible. 513
A U. S. Magistrate Judge had issued a search warrant authorizing a
search of the residence for "THE PERSON OF ELIAN
GONZALEZ, DATE OF BIRTH DECEMBER 6,1993, A NATIVE
AND CITIZEN OF CUBA. '514 As was customary, the magistrate did
not then write an opinion justifying his approval of the warrant. 15
The Department of Justice, however, had issued a press release
explaining that the "authority to recover Elian was based on rule
41(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule
provides warrant authority to recover a person who has been
unlawfully restrained. '516
That justification seemed weak to Cuban-Americans. Rafael
Madan Sr., who joined a demonstration outside the Department of
Justice protesting the seizure, put this succinctly: "[tihey trampled the
Constitution. This is much more than Elian. They're breaking the
Fourth Amendment."5 7  Jay Fernandez, head of Casa Cuba, an
organization of exiles in Northern Virginia, said, "I think that the
Statue of Liberty should be crying today because of the way Elian was
509. See id.
510. See id.
511. See John Lantigua, Raid on Little Havana, Salon.com (Apr. 22, 2000)
[hereinafter Lantigua, Raid], at http://www.salon.comlnews/feature/2000O4/22/elian.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Search Warrant, In re the Search of the Residence of Lazaro Gonzales (Apr.
21, 2000) (on file with author).
515. On common warrant procedures, see Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, supra note 25, at 207-23.
516. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Media Advisory: Federal Search Warrant
in Elian Gonzales Matter (Apr. 23,2000) (on file with author).
517. Donna St. George & Jennifer Lenhart, At Andrews Air Force Base; Personal,
Political Dramas Move to Washington Area; Protestors Follow Elian, His Father,
Miami Relatives, Wash. Post, Apr. 23,2000, at A21.
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taken and for forgetting a woman died to make her son free.""51 Some
sympathizers outside the Cuban-American community, including
some Republican Congressmen and the well-known liberal academic,
Laurence Tribe, also publicly protested the seizure, though most
Americans continued to side with the INS.5 19 Lazaro Gonzalez and
the other Miami relatives of Elian have since sought to air the Cuban-
Americans' view of the Fourth Amendment by filing a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of Elian's seizure.5 -u
e. The Courts Decide
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit now
stood as Lazaro and the Miami Cuban-Americans' last hope for their
voices to be heard before Elian was deported. That hope was dashed
on June 1, 2000, when the appellate court affirmed the federal district
court's dismissal of the asylum petitions."-
The appellate court did pay brief lip service to some aspects of the
community's complaint. The court recognized that Cuba violates
human rights and fundamental freedoms.5"
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that persons living in a
totalitarian state "may" be unable freely to assert their rights and the
rights of others."z The court even conceded that "some reasonable
people" might see a conflict of interest between even a non-coerced
parent living in a totalitarian state and a child forced by that parent to
return to such a lifestyle. 4 But examining the weight to be accorded
such views was simply not, in the court's view, its job. The INS policy
did take some account of whether there was evidence of coercion
directed at a specific parent. "In addition and more important," said
the court, "in no context is the executive branch entitled to more
deference than in the context of foreign affairs."-'-  A per se rule
51& Id.
519. See Elian Joins Dad; Was Raid Right?, Chi. Trib., Apr. 25, 2000, at C3
(quoting House Republican whip Tom Delay, -[t]his is a frightening event, that
American citizens now can expect that the executive branch on their own can decide
on whether to raid a home"); Parker & Johnson, supra note 459 (quoting poll in
which sixty percent of Americans approved of federal agents removing Elian
Gonzales from the Miami home of his relatives but fifty-three percent disapproved of
the raid itself); Laurence H. Tribe, Editorial, Justice Taken Too Far, N.Y. Times, Apr.
25, 2000, at A23 (protesting that the Justice Department obtained the wrong sort of
warrant, violating "well-established constitutional principles of family privacy").
Though Tribe favored Elian's return to Cuba, he wished proper procedures were
followed. Id.
520. See Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting
filing of the suit which raised the Fourth Amendment claim).
521. Id. at 1356.





prohibiting the return of a child to a totalitarian state would implicate
foreign affairs more than any other, more discretionary, rule,
concluded the court, ignoring the possibility that, as Cuban-
Americans saw things, Cuba was unique. 26
Nor was the court willing to explore a more case-specific notion of
the best interests of the child. "This case, at first sight, seems to be
about little more than a child and his father. But, for this Court, the
case is mainly about the separation of powers under our constitutional
system of government .... ,527 Congress, in the asylum laws, left the
details of the asylum application process to the INS. The INS's
chosen policy was thus "the sole prerogative of the executive
branch."5" The INS policy was not unreasonable, the court
concluded, nor was the INS conclusion that Juan Miguel had not been
individually coerced by the Cuban government. Perhaps most
painfully for the Cuban-American community, the court conceded
that Elian would face less freedom in Cuba than in the United States
and that "re-education, communist indoctrination, and political
manipulation of Plaintiff [Elian] for propaganda purposes, upon a
return to Cuba, are not beyond the realm of possibility.'"- 2'
Nevertheless, the court concluded, "[w]e cannot say that the INS had
to treat education and indoctrination as synonymous with
'persecution." 530
f. A Community Alienated
E-mail chat rooms in the Cuban-American community reacted with
outrage. Said one writer: "[I]t is hard for many to see that the Florida
Straits act as a modern-day Berlin Wall for the Cuban people.""' Said
another author: "Elian did not have his day in court.... Up to now,
the only thing that all those judges have done is to negate him (and his
family in Miami) his right to go to court. '532 A third writer explained:
The essence of a totalitarian regime is that coercion is ubiquitous.
Neither the INS nor the courts should have taken Juan Miguel's
statements-particularly those made during interviews when he as
well as members of his family were still in Cuba-at face value. By
denying Elian an asylum hearing, the INS also missed an
526. See id at 1353-54.
527. Id. at 1344.
528. Id. at 1348 n.10. That policy generally required six-year-old children from
Cuba arriving in the United States to act only through their parents in Cuba, absent
special circumstances. See id. at 1349-50. The INS concluded that the mere fact that a
parent lives in a communist-totalitarian state is not a "special circumstance." See id. at
1350.
529. See id. at 1355.
530. Id.
531. Talk of the Day, supra note 492.
532. Id.
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opportunity to educate Americans about life in a totalitarian
society.533
Many in the crowd outside the now-empty Little Havana house
"said they no longer trusted the United States government or the
American judiciary to do what they considered right, and they had not
really expected the l1th Circuit Court of Appeals to grant the child an
asylum hearing."'5 -  The house had become "'a focal point for
frustration and sadness." '535 The general mood of the community was
one of painful resignation. Explained Jose Basulto, leader of the exile
group, Brothers to the Rescue, "I do not expect any violence at this
point," but "[t]his is going to generate deep resentment.-"6
It is arguably unclear whether the current Supreme Court would
accept that the Fourth Amendment even applies to undocumented
aliens like Elian, whom the Court may not see as part of "the people"
protected by the Amendment.3 7 Noted scholars, however, see the
Amendment as unquestionably protecting the Elians of the world.5
Miami's Cuban-American community consists largely of United States
citizens, who are included among "the people" protected by the
Fourth Amendment. 39 These citizens saw Elian's plight as their own.
If the amendment does apply, a decision to compel Elian either to
leave or stay-by limiting his freedom of movement-would itself be
a seizure. The entry into Lazaro's home, and the whisking away of the
young boy, certainly constituted a search of a citizen's home and the
seizure of a non-citizen, Elian. 0 For Miami's Cuban-Americans,
however, the denial of asylum and the search of Lazaro's home to
seize Elian were inseparable: if returning Elian to Cuba was wrong,
forcibly entering Cuban-American homes to further that return was
wrong-indeed unconstitutional -as well. -"1
533. Id.
534. See Sue Ann Pressley. In Little Havana, Mourning; Subdued Crowd Shows Up
at House Where Elian Lived, Wash. Post, June 2. 2000. at A20.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 199 (summarizing the Court's current,
ambiguous views on the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented aliens, while
arguing that they should have such rights). For a contrary view, arguing that the
Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence already clearly protects even
undocumented aliens on United States soil, see supra note 199.
538. See generally id.
539. See Taslitz & Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, at 143-
44 (discussing the various Justices' views on who constitutes "the people" for Fourth
Amendment purposes); supra note 199 (similar, plus discussion of the contending
views on "peoplehood" and the Fourth Amendment among leading scholars).
540. See Tribe. supra note 519 (arguing that the Elian raid involved both an
unreasonable "search" of a home and an unreasonable "seizure" of a person).
541. See supra text accompanying notes 531-36.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
g. Fostering Disrespect
Elian illustrates that the Fourth Amendment is not only about the
individuals involved. The entire Cuban-American community was
affected. The impact on Cuban-Americans was profound, ultimately
leaving them feeling betrayed and further isolated from the broader
American mainstream.
Their frustration was magnified by the courts' apparent insistence
on deference to the Executive branch. To Miami's Cuban-American
community, this was a brutal seizure of a child and an invasion of the
sanctity of Lazaro's home without adequate justification. The seizure
was instead done for evil reasons: to return the child to the hands of a
tyrant. The Executive was motivated by politics, not reason, in the
community's view, and the courts are expected to intervene to protect
individual freedoms in precisely such circumstances. The evidence on
which the Executive relied-interviews with Elian and his father-was
also weak evidence of voluntariness, in the Cuban-American view.
Neither the Executive, nor the court, nor the general American public
had sufficient or authentic experience to empathize with the Cuban-
Americans' plight. The Cuban-Americans saw the quality and
quantity of the justifying evidence through very different eyes. What
was unique about them, they believe, was ignored, while their voices
were silenced.
But, there are other sides to this story-of efforts made to hear
Cuban-American perspectives, of the special competency of the
Executive to make these decisions, and of an overriding constitutional
and cultural commitment to keeping parents and children together-
to which I turn next.
2. An Alternative Perspective: Republican Political Morality and
Insult Unjustified
I have presented at some length the Cuban-American perspective
on Elian as best as I am able. I believe that, given the life experience
of refugees from Castro's totalitarian regime, the Cuban-American
reaction was understandable. It was also intractable. Nothing short of
a decision effectively severing Elian's father's parental connection to
his child would have satisfied Miami's Cuban-Americans.
Yet, the United States government did nothing that can fairly be
understood in our political regime as being insulting to Elian or to
Miami's Cuban-Americans. Elian's Miami relatives were acting in
clear violation of United States law by refusing to turn Elian over to
the INS.542 The INS had individualized probable cause concerning the
thing that was most relevant-the illegal possession of Elian in
Lazaro's home by a family and a community from which there was
542. See Mabry, Send the Children Home, supra note 198, at 33, 36.
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every reason to believe resistance to INS efforts to re-take Elian was
likely. None of this was done because of any belief or message that
the federal government viewed Cuban-Americans as definitionally
unfit to raise children or to raise Elian. Nor was the decision done in
a fashion discriminating against Cuban-Americans, who were
arguably treated better under the immigration laws in this instance
than were other racial or ethnic groups.13 Indeed, no one in the
government rested its decision even on a belief that Lazaro and
Marisleysis were individually unfit as caretakers, though others have
argued that this was so.' Furthermore, the Clinton Administration
made vigorous efforts to hear and address Cuban-American concerns
over the course of seven months of negotiation. 5  Contrary to the
Japanese-American internment, the decision here was, as the courts
held, solely under the auspices of the Executive branch.' Perhaps
most importantly, the decision was made because of a deeply held
American cultural and legal commitment, endorsed by international
law, to the sanctity of the family."
The Executive's decision regarding returning Elian to his father is
thus best understood as a reaffirmation of human worth, rooted in
ideas of parental autonomy and the centrality of the parent-child bond
to the flourishing of human personality.-" Miami's Cuban-Americans
understandably felt insulted, but that is a cost that had to be accepted
given their intransigence and an emotion that principles of political
morality required be invalidated. Had the INS not executed its
543. See id. at 66-67 ("[Llighter-skinned people, like Cuban and Chinese
immigrants, receive favor in the United States .... Although many Cubans have
African [ancestors], they are considered Hispanic rather than African. As such, they
are viewed as the 'cream of their [I societ[y]' and 'special favorites of the United
States' upon their arrival." (quoting respectively Immigration and Race 10-11 (Gerald
D. Jaynes ed., 2000); Joyce A. Hughes & Linda R. Crane, Haitians: Seeking Refuge in
the United States, 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 747, 780 (1993) [hereinafter Haitians Seeking
Refuge])); Immigration and Race, supra. at 17 (contrasting Cubans to "Caribbean
immigrants with African ancestry [who] appear to have much greater difficulty
achieving socioeconomic incorporation into American society than do their white
counterparts"); see also Haitians Seeking Reftge, supra, at 765 (noting that as a result
of a series of executive orders, Haitians-who are largely of African descent-who
have not reached the United States shore are returned to Haiti). Elian, of course, was
not summarily returned to Cuba.
544. See Mabry, Send the Children Home. supra note 198, at 31, 36 (describing
Marisleysis as emotionally unstable and Lazaro as irresponsible-quitting his job
when Elian entered the scene and displaying an explosive temper); Manny Garcia,
Lazaro v. U.S., Miami Herald, Apr. 16, 2000 (citing description of Lazaro as
"[c]ranked up on adrenaline, applause and shots of Cuban coffee" and noting that
Lazaro had four prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol),
http://wwv.rose-hulman.edu/-delaova/elian/lazarovsus.htm.
545. See Mabry, Send the Children Home, supra note 198, at 6-7 (describing these
negotiations).
546. See infra text accompanying notes 550-92.
547. See infra Part II.D. 2.b.
548. See infra Part II.D. 2.b.
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warrant to search for and seize Elian, it would instead have sent the
message that the American commitment to human dignity is an empty
one.
549
a. Deference to the Executive and Its Efforts to Address Cuban-
American Concerns
Congress has plenary power in immigration matters and has
549. The rule of law requires that the state equally protect individual rights,
especially those rights that American political culture deems "natural" and
"inalienable." See S. Jonathan Bass, Blessed Are the Peacemakers: Martin Luther
King, Jr., Eight White Religious Leaders, and the "Letter From Birmingham Jail"
124-25 (2001) (according to Martin Luther King, Jr., a just law is rooted in natural
law, the result of open democratic practice, avoids human separation, and must be
obeyed because law and order existed to establish justice for all citizens, something
ignored by the "'devious methods' used to prevent blacks from registering to vote").
Though a detailed discussion of the rule of law and the right to civil disobedience is
beyond this Article's scope, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s classic analysis of these
questions is enlightening. King believed that unjust laws should be disobeyed. See id.
at 124-25. However, he also said:
I hope you are able to see the distinction I am trying to point out. In no
sense do I advocate evading or defying the law, as would the rabid
segregationist. That would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust law
must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I
submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust
and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the
conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the
highest respect for law.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in Bass, supra, at 245 (I have
deleted language from earlier versions of the letter and Bass's textual markings).
It is unclear what law the Miami Cuban-Americans meant to protest. Indeed, there is
nothing in their rhetoric to suggest that they believed that the immigration laws or the
laws governing search and seizure were themselves unjust. At best, they can be
understood as saying that the application of those laws to Elian and the Gonzales
family was unjust. King certainly would have recognized the unjust application of a
just law as an appropriate ground for nonviolent direct action. See Bass, supra, at
124-25.
But the mere fact that Miami's Cuban-Americans disagreed with the
application of these laws does not render them unjust. There was, for example, no
evidence that the immigration laws were passed by an undemocratic Congress that
worked to exclude Cuban-Americans from deliberation. The Cuban-American
community's views about the application of these laws were also obviously
considered. Furthermore, the application here was rooted in concern for the natural,
inalienable right of a fit parent to raise his son. See infra Part II.D.2.b. Elian's seizure
aimed at human connection, not separation. Additionally, as the heated rhetoric and
the angry crowd surrounding Lazaro's home showed, the law-violators were not
acting "lovingly." Nor is it clear that they meant to accept imprisonment for their
actions, and to do so "willingly." Under these circumstances, civil disobedience was
unjustified. Had the state not acted to protect Juan Miguel's parental rights because
of his ethnicity, his political beliefs, or the government's fear of the crowd, the state
would be acting more like the violent segregationists, or at least the complicitous
indifferent moderates of whom King complained. For a general background on civil
disobedience, see Henry David Thoreau, Walden, and, Civil Disobedience (Paul
Lauter ed., 2000) (including articles on civil disobedience by eighteen well-known
social activists, philosophers, and religious leaders).
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appropriately statutorily delegated authority to enforce immigration
laws to the Attorney General of the United States, who in turn
authorized the INS to administer those laws 5" Justice Felix
Frankfurter captured the plenary power doctrine's essence in 1952:
"[W]hether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether
they may have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or
anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress." '' The high
Court has repeatedly stated that "'over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the
admission of aliens. 552 The Court's cases "have long recognized the
power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control." '553 One major justification for the doctrine is
that "delicate foreign policy issues [are] appropriately resolved by a
political branch of government."- -" By similar reasoning, the Court
has expressed a willingness not to second-guess Executive Branch
immigration decisions, given that Branch's constitutional authority to
conduct foreign policy.55
550. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103. 1551 (2000): Gonzalez ar rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F.
Supp. 2d 1167, 1191 (S.D. Fla.), affd, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000): U.S. Dep't of
Justice Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Immigration Law and Procedure, Basic
Law Manual 9 (Special Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Basic Law Manual]. I am not
arguing that the plenary power and related doctrines discussed here are either
necessarily applicable in all respects to Elian's case or are wise. See generally
Aleinikoff, supra note 199 (extended attack on the plenary power doctrine and the
frequent constitutional privileging of citizens over non-citizens who are exposed to
federal action). I am simply not interested in those questions. Rather, my point is
that the logic of judicial deference to the Executive in matters of immigration and
foreign policy made sense in Elian's particular case. Even more importantly, that
deference was consistent with our modem constitutional culture. Accordingly, the
deferential actions of the courts and the active efforts of the Executive in Elian's case
are best understood as sending messages about the need for a unified federal voice on
foreign policy questions but not about the worth of Cuban-Americans or Cubans
resident in America, relative to other groups. Therefore, the judicial and Executive
actions in the case cannot support a finding that the searches and seizures involved
were "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
551. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580. 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
552. Fiallo ex rel. Rodriguez v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 799-800 (1977) (quoting
Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909), and holding that
Congress may constitutionally distinguish alien children seeking preference for
admission based on their natural mother's being legally in this country from those
relying on their natural father's legal residency status); see also Kleindienst v.
Mandell, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70, 766 n.6 (1972) (explaining that Congress may
constitutionally grant the Attorney General discretion to deny visas to aliens
advocating Communism): Galvan v. Press. 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954) (Congress can
permit deportation of aliens because of past Communist Party membership).
553. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (citations omitted).
554. Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the -recutive Branch's Asylum
Decisions, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 279,306.
555. Id. at 306-07.
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Indeed, separate and apart from the plenary power doctrine and
immigration law, the Court has deferred to the Executive Branch in
the area of foreign policy since the New Deal . 5 6 Legal historian G.
Edward White credits Justice Sutherland's opinion in the seminal
Curtiss-Wright5 57 case with first articulating the bases of modern
doctrines of deference to the Executive in foreign policy. 8 White
summarized a critical part of the opinion's rationale as follows:
In the foreign affairs realm most broad delegations of power to the
national executive branch, or broad encroachments by that branch
into the residuum powers, were constitutionally unproblematic.
This was because most exercises in foreign relations policymaking
by the national government rested not on constitutional
enumerations but on inherent powers of sovereignty that were not
subject to constitutional constraints at all. The distinction between
internal and external affairs, and the existence of inherent national
powers in the latter realm, were vital, clarifying jurisprudential
concepts.5
Furthermore, Justice Sutherland stressed that the President alone
negotiated treaties, and it might cause the country serious
embarrassment and frustrate delicate discussions if secrets had to be
556. See G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal 67 (2000). The
plenary power doctrine and the related deference to the Executive in foreign affairs
are often said to stem back much further in time, to The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889). See Johnson, supra note 554, at 304-06. There, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which had sharply limited Chinese
immigration into the United States. Justice Field flatly declared that if Congress
"considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not
assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security.., its determination is
conclusive upon the judiciary." Chinese Exchtsion, 130 U.S. at 606. The rationale for
this deference was that:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise, at
any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the
country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any
one.... If there be any just ground of complaint.., it must be made to the
political department of our government, which is alone competent to act
upon the subject.
Id. at 609. Professor G. Edward White agrees that The Chinese Exchsion Case and
other early cases played an incremental role in the "dominance of the principle of
national executive discretion in foreign affairs." White, supra, at 90. But, only during
the New Deal did "the momentum of the transformation process... take on a life of
its own." Id. at 91. It is important to stress that White does not see the timing of this
transformation in foreign affairs jurisprudence to be causally connected to the New
Deal. See id. at 91-93.
557. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
558. See White, supra note 556, at 69-93; see id. at 68-69 ("[I]n a series of cases,
stretching from 1936 [the date of the Curtiss-Wright decision] to 1945 ... the Supreme
Court revisited the starting assumptions of the orthodox regime ... [and
with].., related commentary... transform[ed] ... American constitutional foreign
relations jurisprudence to a form largely resembling its current state.").
559. Id. at 73.
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revealed to Congress. Moreover, Congress had, in Sutherland's view,
engaged in a longstanding practice of deference to the Executive in
the realm of foreign affairs.5" Whatever the wisdom of Sutherland's
precise reasoning, he properly recognized, as does the contemporary
Court, that in a wide range of foreign policymaking, "the complex and
dangerous world of twentieth-century international relations required
flexible, unencumbered decisionmaking by foreign relations
specialists.""56
The Elian Gonzales case had numerous foreign policy implications.
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, to which the
United States is a signatory, requires children who are wrongly
removed or retained from their parents to be promptly returned to
them, absent a few exceptions herein applicable.51- Furthermore, a
refusal to return Elian to his father might create a dangerous
precedent that could affect the fate of American citizens.- American
parents are now seeking to regain custody of approximately 1100
children who were abducted to foreign lands, including Germany and
Lebanon."M Strict adherence to the principle that children taken from
their homelands should be returned at their parents' request was
necessary to maintain American credibility in these negotiations.
Additionally, Castro's own heated response to the Elian situation had
implications for America's future relationship with Cuba, and for
America's credibility regarding its Cuba policies in the eyes of the rest
of the world."
Even if it is conceded, however, that whether Elian remained in the
United States was primarily an Executive Branch decision, did that
include the Executive's forcibly searching and entering a United
States' resident's home to seize Elian? The answer is "yes."
Importantly, the search was done pursuant to a warrant issued by the
Judicial Branch.566 There was unquestionably probable cause to
believe that Elian was being illegally held in the home of Lazaro
Gonzales. Though the existence of probable cause should not
necessarily end the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis,5'7
unless undue force was used, that further balancing should be, and
560. See id. at 73-74.
561. Id at 93.
562. See 42 U.S.C.. § 11601 (1994); Mabry, Send the Children Home, supra note
198, at 49 (discussing this Act).
563. See Mabry, Send the Children Home. supra note 198 at 49-50.
564. See id.
565. See ic- at 49-51.
566. See supra text accompanying notes 514-16.
567. The Supreme Court has suggested that the presence of probable cause is
almost always all that the Constitution requires. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (upholding custodial arrest for fine-only offense of driving
without a seatbelt); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that
officer's motives were irrelevant where there was probable cause for a stop). I have,
however, argued otherwise. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30.
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properly was, entrusted to the Executive in Elian's case. This is so
because such further balancing necessarily implicated political
judgments and foreign affairs.
Moreover, the Executive's primacy in foreign affairs even extends
to many decisions "to which the constitutional strictures governing
domestic issues did not apply."5" Specifically in the area of
immigration, Congress (and, by delegation and extension, the
Executive) may often make rules constitutionally unacceptable in
other contexts.569 In any event, the Executive's decision that foreign
policy and other concerns required Elian's return to his father would
have been meaningless without the authority to obtain a search
warrant based on probable cause.
That does not mean that the Executive's authority was literally
unlimited. In the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case,57 ° to which the current
plenary power doctrine's roots are often (if somewhat misleadingly)
traced,571 the Court said that congressional authority was limited "by
the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice
which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations." '572
Recently, the United States Supreme Court relied on this language in
Zadvydas v. Davis.573 There, the Court in the habeas corpus setting
faced the question of whether the INS had authority to indefinitely
civilly detain resident aliens with criminal records who were ordered
deported to countries that refused to have them. To avoid
constitutional problems with the ambiguous authorizing statute, the
Court read into the statute a reasonableness requirement. If
detention exceeded a period reasonably necessary to secure removal,
the detention must end, though release may be subject to certain
conditions. The Court emphasized that it was not addressing more
difficult situations, such as terrorist threats, where extended detention
might be necessary. The Court remanded both aliens' cases for
proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that due process, like
many other constitutional protections, begins once an alien has
entered our borders. Here, there were no serious foreign policy
justifications for extended detention. Yet, such detention was a grave
infringement on an alien's liberty interests. The Court recognized,
furthermore, that the Executive Branch has greater immigration-
related expertise, and that there is a need for the Nation to "'speak
568. See White, supra note 556, at 93. But see supra note 199 (discussing contrary
views).
569. See Johnson, supra note 554 at 306-07.
570. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
571. See supra note 556.
572. Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 604.
573. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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with one voice"'5 74 in immigration matters. But, in the context of the
"Great Writ" (Federal habeas corpus), courts could take account of
these concerns without "abdicating their legal responsibility to review
the lawfulness of an alien's continued detention."15 To accord the
Executive some deference even in this area, however, the Court
created a presumption that an alien must be released if detained more
than six months, where he provides good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.576 But, the presumption may be rebutted by
government evidence sufficient to rebut the alien's showing."r
The Elian case is sharply distinguishable. There, unlike in
Zadvydas, there were significant foreign policy implications in the
INS's actions. Furthermore, no invasion of liberty as extreme as the
possibility of permanent civil commitment was involved. The invasion
of someone's home by the state, especially with a substantial show of
force, and even if for a brief time, is, of course, significant. However,
Lazaro was afforded every opportunity to avoid that outcome during
the many months of negotiation. When the raid finally happened, it
was swift and no one was injured. " Moreover, the raid was not done
for the purpose of the United States government limiting free
movement, but rather to protect fundamental American principles of
parental autonomy and family unity.
Importantly, Lazaro and the Miami Cuban-Americans had ample
opportunity for their voices to be heard. For example, when Lazaro's
attorneys claimed that Juan Miguel Gonzalez (Elian's father) was not
free to express his true desires because of Cuban-government
censorship, INS officials flew to Cuba and met with Juan Miguel. "No
Cuban official was present." 9 "To further thwart possible attempts
at eavesdropping at the meeting, some communications were
conducted in writing."- ° INS officials concluded, from Juan Miguel's
demeanor and writings, that he actually wanted his son to return to
Cuba.58'
This did not persuade Lazaro. On January 5, INS officials gave
Lazaro nine days to reunite Elian with his father. By April 6, more
than three months later, the INS was still conducting "extended
discussions with the Gonzales family."' i On April 6, when Elian's
father arrived in the United States, Lazaro refused to let father and
son see one another for ten days, permitting only two phone calls. He
574. Id. at 700.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 701.
577. Id.
578. See supra text accompanying notes 508-10.
579. Mabry, Send the Children Home, supra note 198, at 7.
580. Id. at 7-8.
581. Id. at 8.
582 Id. at 9 (internal quotations omitted).
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also had six-year-old Elian say in a video that he did not want to
return to Cuba. 3 Marisleysis Gonzalez, Elian's twenty-six-year old
cousin, declared herself Elian's "surrogate mother."584
Meanwhile, Attorney General Janet Reno engaged in extended
negotiations with the Gonzalez family. 85  These negotiations
continued until seconds before the now unavoidable raid. 86 Lazaro
and Marisleysis continued, in one commentator's words, to
"scheme... to prevent Mr. [Juan Miguel] Gonzalez-Quintana from
reclaiming physical custody of his son. ' '5 7 Janet Reno described her
frustration with the Gonzalez family's tactics: "Every step of the way
the Miami relatives kept moving the goal posts and raising more
hurdles .... After negotiating through the night [before Elian was
seized], I informed the parties that time had run out. At that moment,
I gave the go-ahead [for taking Elian]. ' 58
All this happened in an atmosphere of Cuban-American protests,
constant media coverage, and behind-the-scenes politicking.8 9
Lazaro, Marisleysis, and their supporters sought to portray any INS
decision to enter Lazaro's home to return Elian to his father as
complicity in Castro's totalitarian regime.519 It is implausible to
believe that the Clinton Administration had not heard and carefully
considered the Miami Cuban-Americans' arguments, especially given
Democratic Party fears that the whole incident would haunt them in
Florida in the upcoming Presidential election.5 9 Furthermore, Lazaro
had filed repeated petitions to the courts, who considered but
ultimately rejected claims that unusual aspects of this case required
departure from the usual principles of deference to the legislature.59
Under such circumstances, none of the principles of a respect-based
jurisprudence can fairly be said to have been violated.
583. Id. at 31-32; see also 60 Minutes: Elian's Father Speaks on 60 Minutes (CBS
television broadcast, Apr. 19, 2000). The separation and video led Juan Miguel to
accuse Lazaro of abusing Elian by "turning him against his father." Id.
584. Mabry, Send the Children Home, supra note 198, at 34.
585. See id. at 9.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 36.
588. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Statement Regarding
the Removal of Elian Gonzales (Apr. 22, 2000) (on file with the author).
589. See supra text accompanying notes 494-513.
590. See supra text accompanying notes 494-520.
591. See John Broder & Elaine Sciolino, How Gonzalez Case Took a Wild Swing,
Toronto Star, Apr. 1, 2000, at NE 16 ("[T]he administration's position has hardened,
reflecting its interpretation of immigration law and its desire to resolve the matter
quickly to avoid lasting political damage to President Bill Clinton and Gore.").
592. See supra text accompanying notes 520-30.
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b. America's Fundamental Commitment to Parental Autonomy and
Family Unity
American courts recognize a fundamental right of parents to raise
their children as they see fit. Indeed, in liberal legal theory, it is
considered one of the most important of inalienable rights."9 3 "The
philosophical origins of th[e] doctrine lie in liberalism's respect for the
individual adult and his (or her) right to be free from governmental
intrusions."5 ' The Wisconsin Supreme Court's classic statement of
the doctrine in 1922 declared that:
[a] natural affection between the parent and offspring, though it may
be naught but a refined animal instinct and stronger from the parent
down than the child up, has always been recognized as an inherent,
natural right, for the protection of which, just as much as for the
protection of the rights of the individual to life, liberty, and pursuit
of happiness, our government is formed. 95
This fundamental substantive due process liberty interest of the
parents "in the care, custody, and control of their children" has
repeatedly been recognized by the Court.916 Just recently, Justice
O'Connor, in Troxel v. Granville,"97 in which the Court rejected
paternal grandparents' efforts to obtain visitation rights, described this
particular "liberty interest... [as] perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. " '  O'Connor
elaborated:
[m]ore than 75 years ago... we again held that the "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to
"establish a home and bring up children" and to "control the
593. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Fixing Columbine: The Challenge for American
Liberalism 99-100 (2002) [hereinafter Coleman, Fixing Columbine].
594. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise- Multicultural Sensitivity
and Americanization, 47 Duke Li. 717. 764 n.211 (1998) [hereinafter Seattle
Compromise].
595. Lacher v. Venus, 188 N.W. 613, 617 (Wis. 1922): see also Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584,602 (1979).
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization's concepts
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.
Our cases have consistently followed that course, our constitutional system
long ago rejected any notion that a child is "the mere creature of the State"
and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally "have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional
obligations."
Id. (quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925).
596. Coleman, Fixing Columbine, supra note 593, at 100-07.
597. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
598. Id. at 65. Although no single rationale in Troxel garnered a majority, and
three Justices dissented, the Court was unanimous in its view that "the custodial
parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the
state, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child." hL at 95 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (noting that this "beginning point.., commands general, perhaps
unanimous, agreement in our separate opinions" in this case).
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education of their own."... [SubsequentlyJ we held that the
"liberty of parents and guardians" includes the right "to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control." . .. [Later
still, we emphasized that) "[it is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder." 5
99
The importance of these rights in a liberal polity like the United
States is well-illustrated by the infamous story of the Mortara family,
"nineteenth-century Italian Jews ensnared by the power of the Papal
States."6°
In 1853, the Mortara's approximately one-year-old son, Edgardo,
contracted a serious illness. Unbeknownst to his Jewish parents, their
fourteen-year-old Christian domestic servant, Anna Morisi, fearing
that Edgardo would die, sprinkled water on his brow, saying, "I
baptize you in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy
Ghost. ' ' "u The Catholic Church had repeatedly forbidden such
clandestine baptisms of Jewish children.' If such a baptism
happened, however, it was not invalidated by its clandestine nature or
by the parents' lack of consent.603
Edgardo recovered, Anna initially ignoring the incident.614  But
during later years, Anna mentioned what happened to a friend.
Gossip sparked by that friend eventually brought the story to the
attention of Father Pier Gaetano Feletti, Bologna's inquisitor. Father
Feletti believed that the baptism was valid, making Edgardo a
Catholic. Accordingly, he was determined that Edgardo not be raised
in a Jewish home. 5
On June 23, 1858, a papal police officer, accompanied by several
other of the Pope's carabinieri, knocked at the Mortaras' door,
demanding entry. Marshal Lucidi questioned them about their
children's names, and then declared, "Your son Edgardo has been
baptized, and I have been ordered to take him with me. ''61 6 Edgardo
was seized and, despite subsequent lengthy legal proceedings, was
599. Id. at 65-66 (citations omitted).
600. Steven Lubet, Nothing but the Truth: Why Trial Lawyers Don't, Can't, and
Shouldn't Have to Tell the Whole Truth 27 (2001). I have relied substantially on
Lubet's telling of the Mortara story, including my use of quotes from the participants.
601. Id. at 28.
602. Id. at 29.
603. See id. at 28-29. The Mortaras, of course, argued otherwise, but their pleas
were ultimately rejected. See id. at 31-41. The intricacies of nineteenth-century Papal
law need not be recounted, however, for they are not relevant to the point I want to
make here. For a more detailed treatment of the Mortara case, see David I. Kertzer,
The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara (1997).
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never returned.0 7 Indeed, he was eventually "adopted" by Pope Pius
IX himself, becoming Father Pio Edgardo and preaching throughout
Europe.60
8
Diplomatic pressure to return Edgardo to his parents was intense.
"Jews had already been emancipated in much of Western Europe,"
and the continuing submission of some states to Papal authority "was
widely viewed as an anachronism."6' Furthermore, -[tihe Church had
no particular animus toward the Mortaras," did not consciously wish
to torment them or the Jewish community, and did not make it a
practice to deprive Jewish parents of their children. '"" Moreover, the
Church followed what it considered to be scrupulously fair and
thorough procedures, interrogating the house servant about her
baptism procedure and internally debating both her truthfulness and
the mandates of Canon Law for over six months, and only then seizing
Edgardo. t" These procedures seemed to stem from genuine concern
about doing the right thing rather than from overt bias against the
Mortaras. Nevertheless, Pope Pius IX resisted both international
pressure and the efforts made by the Mortaras to retrieve their child
via Papal law.1 2
The Church's motivation, though intertwined with stereotypes
about Jews, centered on protecting Edgardo's best interest:'"
Children converted over their parents' objections would necessarily
be tempted to revert to Judaism, a mortal sin. Thus, it was better not
to baptize them in the first place. But this did not mean that the
baptism was a nullity. In fact, the logical conclusion was that such
children had to be removed as much as possible from the corrupting
influence of their parents. 614
Apart from concern for Edgardo's soul, the church worried about
his body. Reversion to Judaism would be apostasy, a capital crime."is
Moreover, Christians believed that Jews would "rather murder their
own children than see them grow up to be Catholic." '
607. Id Two other well-known cases occurred in the nineteenth century, one in
1844 in Modena and one in Reggio in 1814. Despite the uproar over the Mortara
case, including another particularly infamous uproar occurring in Rome in 1864,
clandestine baptism continued. Id. at 49 n.2.
608. Id. at 28.
609. Id. at 29; see generally Jacob Katz, Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background
of Jewish Emancipation, 1770-1870 (1973) (tracing the history of Jewish
Emancipation).
610. See Lubet, supra note 600, at 37.
611. See id. at 30-31.
612. See id. at 37.
613. See id at 36-37.
614. Id. at 35. A similar statement of the Mortara case is implied under the
heading Mortara Case, in 12 Encyclopedia Judaica 354-55 (1972).
615. Lubet, supra note 600, at 37.
616. Id. at 37-38. The Church had promised to return Edgardo to his parents if
they and all their other children converted to Christianity. hL at 5U n.10. Perhaps this
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Furthermore, the Catholic Church portrayed Edgardo as happy to
leave his parents, reportedly showing immediate interest in
Christianity and fearing return to his parents, who might torture and
ruin him.617 The newspaper, Civilita Catolica, opined that "[i]t would
be inhuman cruelty to .... [grant the Mortaras' request], especially
when the son has the insight to see the danger himself, and himself
begs for protection against it."61 Brevi cenni declared, "[b]etween the
two competing authorities-that of God and that of the parents-
God's must prevail, for was He not the author of the natural rights
that parents enjoyed? '" 619
The Mortara case has modernly been widely condemned.60 Yet
there is little doubt that the Pope, his agents, and "even the Inquisitor,
were impelled in their actions by both the law and their good
intentions.""62  It is fear of just such events that has led American
courts to declare that "parents should be the ones to choose whether
to expose their children to certain people or ideas. ' 622  Attorney
General Janet Reno later encapsulated this idea thus: "[I]t is not our
place to punish a father for his political beliefs or for where he wants
to raise his child. Indeed, if we were to start judging parents on the
basis of their political beliefs, we would change the concept of family
for the rest of time." 623
In Elian's case, private parties rather than the Church-as-State,
sought to separate Elian from his surviving parent.624 Those private
parties (Miami's Cuban-Americans) understood, however, that state
action, likely in the form of a court order, would be necessary to make
that separation stand.6' Furthermore, the basis of the dispute seemed
to be over politics rather than religion. In most other ways, however,
the parallels between the Mortara and Elian cases are striking.
Lazaro, his family, and their Miami supporters all maintained that
they sought to keep Elian from his father for Elian's own good. Fidel
Castro was Satan-on-Earth, and returning Elian to Juan Miguel in
is why they were later derided for their "'blind Judaic obstinacy."' Id. (citation
omitted).
617. See id. at 38-39.
618. Id. at 39 (first alteration in original).
619. Id. at 36.
620. See id. at 38.
621. Id.
622. Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285,289 (N.D. 1999) (citation omitted).
623. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Attorney General Janet
Reno (Apr. 7, 2000) (on file with the author).
624. American family law often recognizes a presumption that the surviving parent
should obtain custody of the child unless the parent is unfit. See, e.g., Ex parte D.J.,
645 So. 2d 303 (Ala. 1994); Tailor v. Becker, 708 A.2d 626, 627-28 (Del. 1998);
Peterson v. Riley, 597 N.E.2d 995, 997-98 (Ind. 1992); see also In re Michael B., 604
N.E.2d 122, 128 (N.Y. 1992) (unless he is unfit, the biological parent's right to custody
is superior to the rights of all others).
625. See supra text accompanying note 457.
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Cuba, therefore, condemned Elian to Hell. Having tasted freedom in
the United States, letting Elian return to the land of communist
ideology was a sort of apostasy, a rejection of the sacred beliefs of the
Cuban-American community that Elian had joined. That Elian did
not originally choose to join did not matter. He was irrevocably a
member and obviously now wanted to stay one, as he himself declared
on videotape.' Returning him would also expose him to physical
danger. He would live in poverty, be persecuted for his membership
in a family of dissidents, and be exposed to a father who, they alleged
(without substantiation) would beat him.62 For Lazaro and Miami's
Cuban-American community, Cuban-Americanism was a secular
religion seeking to protect its own from its infidel secular-religious
competitor: Castro-style Communism.
Taken in its best light, therefore, the Miami Cuban-American
position was that political ideology trumps the parental bond.
However reprehensible Cuban Communist Party ideology may be to
most Americans, a liberal state cannot tolerate severing the parental
bond for that reason. Parents must be free to choose their own
political beliefs without fear that some government will then steal
their child. Parents must also be free (within very broad limits)6 to
raise their children as they see fit, promoting the autonomy and
diversity that liberal states so value.69 It is true that Castro might
penalize both his subjects' political ideology and their "undue"
parental autonomy in raising their children. But, two wrongs do not
make a right. The United States must not become Castro in the
process of fighting him.6'
The Department of Justice's May 11, 2000, statement just after oral
arguments before the Eleventh Circuit in the Elian case expressed the
true message of the government's action:
[T]he bond between parent and child is recognized not only in our
own constitutional order, but in the international community.
626. See supra text accompanying notes 488-505 (reviewing the Cuban-American
community's continuing reaction to the Elian case); see also Mabry, Send the
Children Home, supra note 198, at 31-32 (describing the videotape of Elian in which
he stated that he did not want to return to Cuba).
627. See Mabry, Send the Children Home, supra note 198, at 32-33, 4142, 48, 57-
58.
628. See Coleman, Fixing Columbine, supra note 593, at 102 ("However, for those
individuals who agree with the relatively few and specific restrictions that are imposed
by virtue of the abuse and neglect laws ... parental autonomy is otherwise virtually
unlimited").
629. See supra text accompanying notes 593-600. On the importance of parents
raising informed, independent, autonomous children in a liberal state, see generally
Gillian Brown, The Consent of the Governed: The Lockean Legacy in Early
American Culture (2001).
630. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil § 146 (Ri. Hollingdale trans.,
Penguin Books 1990) (1886) ("He who fights with monsters should look to it that he
himself does not become a monster.").
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Nothing in the text of the Immigration and Nationality Act-the law
that governed the Commission's decision-suggests that Congress
intended to depart from these principles in immigration matters.
... We will now await the Court's decision in this matter and
hope that the special bond that exists between Juan Miguel
Gonzalez and his son will be upheld.631
c. Taking Stock
My argument that the "true" meaning of the government's seizure
of Elian was to express respect for Juan Miguel's equal humanity as a
father, who is, therefore, entitled to care for his son, may seem to
smack of majoritarianism. After all, Miami's Cuban-American
community perceived a very different message, one of political
exclusion and diminishment.
But, I did not argue for the view that I have because it was the
overwhelming attitude among the American people. Rather, I argued
that in this instance majority conceptions are the closest to the ideals
embodied in the Fourth Amendment as mutated by the Fourteenth.
The evidence is that state actors intended only to vindicate the rights
of the biological father, rights at the core of the American system of
government. This was not an instance in which minority perspectives
should be honored.632 Moreover, the state still gave the Cuban-
Americans a voice, acted only on solid individualized evidence of
Lazaro's wrongdoing, and displayed no evidence of ethnic-based
decision making or stereotyping. Indeed, the INS sought to protect
Elian's growing bond with the Miami branch of the Gonzalez family
without compromising his connection to his father. Thus, in a letter to
Lazaro, the INS Commissioner stated that he "would be happy to
facilitate continuing contact between Elian, his father, and your
family. If Elian and his immediate family wished to apply for tourist
visas at some point in the future, the Consular Section at the U.S.
Interest Section in Havana would, of course, consider them very
favorably." '633 Indeed, the INS also offered Lazaro the opportunity to
escort Elian back to Cuba.6 ' In sum, the Executive engaged in
months of good faith negotiation, expanded investigation at the
631. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement by the Department of Justice
Following Oral Arguments in the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals on the Elian
Gonzalez Case (May 11, 2000) (on file with author).
632. See Taslitz, Respect, supra note 30, at 19-20 (on hyper-sensitive groups).
633. Letter from Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate Commissioner for Field
Operations, INS, to Lazaro Gonzalez 2 (July 5,2000) (on file with author).
634. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS Decision in the Elian Gonzalez Case
(Jan. 5, 2000) (on file with author).
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Gonzalez's requests, made repeated efforts at compromise to avoid
the necessity of a search warrant and a seizure, and ultimately resisted
the Gonzalez's most extreme position only to protect the over-riding
values of liberal autonomy and of the bond of love between a father
and son.63s A respect-based jurisprudence requires no more.
CONCLUSION
The four stories recounted here suggest the themes that would be
embodied in a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of respect. In three
of these instances-only excluding Elian-police failed adequately to
individualize justice. It is impossible to reason without using some
generalizations. There is therefore no sharp distinction between
individualized and generalized assessments. There is rather a
continuum from judgments largely driven by generalizations to those
largely driven by individual circumstances.-' In each of these tales,
the decisionmakers leaned too heavily toward the generalization end
of the spectrum. "Anyone fleeing the police admits his guilt," "[a]ll
Japanese-Americans are disloyal saboteurs," and "[a]ll young black
men in Oneonta are to be suspected" of a violent crime were the sorts
of judgments at work. These judgments may further be challenged
not only because of their degree of individualization but also because
of their shaky normative foundations. All three ignored minority
perspectives on reality, and two (the internment and Oneonta cases)
relied primarily on explicitly race-based judgments, choices
inconsistent wvith constitutional equality values. -'
In all four cases, decisionmakers were at least perceived to be
ignoring, or at least minimizing, group justice. The treatment of each
of the individuals involved-Elian, Carol Bayless, the internees, and
the Oneonta students-had broad implications for the salient social
groups to which they belonged, respectively, Cuban-Americans; poor,
inner city African-Americans; Japanese-Americans; and African-
American males in higher education. The procedures followed
arguably had the effect of reducing these groups' social status and
increasing their sense of isolation from the broader American political
community. The Oneonta court, at least in its first opinion, candidly
recognized these dangers but sadly saw addressing them as outside the
purview of constitutional law. The courts in the Elian Gonzales case,
on the other hand, wisely and necessarily sidestepped these issues.
The trial court in the Bayless case and the United States Supreme
Court in the internment case ultimately either ignored the problems
635. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 157. at 24-25.
636. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 31, at 746-58.
637. Cf id. (republican equality values justify hate crimes legislation); see also
Taslitz, Rape and Culture, supra note 142, at 134-51 (discussing how constitutional
expressive and equality values are involved where substantive and procedural rape
laws effectively silence rape victims voices).
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or denied their existence in the cases before them. The result in each
case has been angry, alienated sub-communities, a more balkanized
American community, and, in all but the Elian case, a reduced respect
for the rule of law.
In most of the cases, the decisionmakers also ignored minority
voices. "Reasonableness" was viewed as an empirically determinable,
perspective-less truth to be "discovered." No prevailing
decisionmaker recognized that truths may differ for different groups,
or at least that each may have a different perspective on, or perhaps
see a different portion of, the one "truth." The trial judge's second
opinion in the Bayless case, and the United States Supreme Court's
opinions in the internment case, respectively ignored African-
American attitudes toward the police and Japanese-American
attitudes toward, and experiences in, the American polity. The
Oneonta court recognized that its initial actions would breed
community resentment but never explored why that would be so, nor
defined the community, nor weighed its perspectives against counter-
views. This divisive suppression of minority voices undermined
expressive and equality values central to a republican polity.68
Crowding out those dissenting voices also hampered the ability of a
diverse citizenry to monitor police overreaching. Had those voices
been heard and seriously considered, the actions of the police and the
military in, for example, sweeping up young black males and rounding
up Japanese-Americans might have more quickly been viewed in a
different light. The colorblind aspirations used to justify this sort of
reasoning must go. A racially and ethnically conscious jurisprudence
would do a better job of unifying the American community and
deterring police misconduct. The unification claim may seem
counterintuitive to some, for example, to opponents of affirmative
action, who argue that it is divisive because it "takes jobs away" from
whites and gives them to "less qualified" minorities.6 9 Without
commenting on the wisdom of this position, it is important to note
that the voice concerns expressed here are very different. Hearing
minority voices does not mean silencing the majority. Moreover, a
jurisprudence protective of the most vulnerable among us will be even
more protective of the rest of us. 4°
Each of these tales also highlighted the point that the Fourth
Amendment binds all three branches of government. The legislative
and executive branches might see themselves as constitutionally
bound to a higher standard than the courts. Certainly legislative and
executive policy decisions can often affect more people more quickly
638. See Forell & Matthews, supra note 96, at xvii-19.
639. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, III & Mar J. Matsuda, We Won't Go
Back: Making the Case for Affirmative Action (1997) (summarizing and refuting
similar arguments against affirmative action).
640. See Forell & Matthews, supra note 96, at xvii-19.
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than can judicial action.6"1 Legislatures and chief executives also have
more resources at their disposal than do judges. But, the judiciary's
special role is to enforce some agreed-upon minimum of constitutional
protection.62 It cannot serve that role if it unduly defers to the other
branches, especially to the executive branch, which is the only branch
actually carrying out searches and seizures. Political pressures, racial
and ethnic prejudice, and competitive efforts to ferret out crime may
often prod the executive toward an increasingly narrow vision of the
Fourth Amendment. 3 In the Elian and internment cases, the courts
expressly deferred to executive judgments, an unwise move in the first
instance but not the second. In Carol Bayless's case, the court, by in
effect largely viewing events through the officers' eyes, again deferred
to the executive.' The original court opinion in the Oneonta case did
so as well by too easily finding the Fourth Amendment inapplicable,
thus leaving the police to act as they pleased. 5
These stories also stress the importance of decision makers relying
on both an adequate quality and quantity of evidence to justify
invasive state conduct. Carol Bayless's fate was determined by the
court's willingness to find "reasonable suspicion" on no more
evidence than flight from police in a poor black community. That was
a paltry quantity of evidence of doubtful reliability, especially when
viewed from the very different African-American perspective on the
meaning of flight.6'
The Japanese-American internees were, of course, rounded up on
no more evidence than their race and ethnicity. '7 That was
considered ample evidence of their disloyalty and dangerousness. The
police sweep in Oneonta similarly relied only on race and gender,
inadequate indicia of suspicion."s A jurisprudence of respect requires
far more.
All four stories also illustrate the importance of the interests in
privacy, property, and freedom of movement that the Fourth
Amendment protects.6 9 The INS agents in the Elian situation
impinged upon all three interests by forcing their way into Elian's
caretaker's home in the dead of night. They were justified in doing so,
but Lazaro and the Cuban-American community nevertheless viewed
641. See Taslitz, Rape and Culture, supra note 142, at 148-51 (defending the
"legislative constitution"); Taslitz. Slaves No More!, supra note 70, at 776-79
(illustrating why some Fourth Amendment problems are best handled by the
legislature).
642. See generally Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, supra note 45.
643. See supra Parts I.A., II.A.
644. See supra text accompanying notes 237-49.
645. See supra Part II.C.
646. See supra Part II.A.
647. See supra text accompanying notes 286-308.
648. See supra text accompanying notes 388-91.
649. The social functions served by Fourth Amendment protection of each of these
interests are addressed in detail in Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 30.
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the action as an invasion of sacred space. Additionally, most
Americans view their cars as mini-homes on wheels, important
symbols of autonomy and achievement, as well as necessities in a
public-transportation poor world.650 Yet, Carol Bayless's car was
summarily halted and searched, an invasion whose power would be
clearer were she found to be among the many innocent citizens in
similar circumstances.65 The Japanese internees, who were indeed
innocent of any crime, lost their homes, cars, and most other
possessions to spend years incarcerated in open human zoos, with
little privacy protection for family life.6" The Oneonta students
suffered the humiliation of being caught up on the street, probably
while going to class, shopping, or seeing friends, in a "sweep" for
black males. 3
The emotional power of these invasions of privacy, property, and
free movement is magnified, because the invasions are perceived as
group, as well as individual, harms. 6 4 Those group harms stem partly
from the messages sent by these state actions: your group is not
valued, not sufficiently "one of us," to merit our protection.5"
Ignoring the disrespect inherent in some police conduct is done at the
polity's peril.
Nevertheless, while dissenting views on Fourth Amendment issues
must be heard with a receptive ear, that does not mean that the
dissenters should always prevail. In Elian's case, there were strong
reasons to defer to the Executive's judgment to reunite Elian with his
father in Cuba: foreign affairs concerns were implicated; many
Cuban-Americans acted in defiance of the rule of law; and our
constitutional culture had long given heavy weight to keeping parents
with their children. There was an important and sad emotional cost
paid in the Cuban-American community's perception of exclusion and
insult. But, in this case, those perceptions were unjustified. The
Executive's repeated good faith efforts at listening and negotiating,
combined with the factors just noted above, establish that the only fair
meaning to be given to the government's actions was that it sought to
vindicate parental autonomy without insulting the Cuban-American
community's value or its understandable outrage and pain.
A jurisprudence of respect does not, therefore, become a
jurisprudence of minority rule. But it does replace current
jurisprudence with a greater willingness to listen to varied voices, an
650. See Harris, Car Wars, supra note 99, at 576-78.
651. See supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
652. See supra text accompanying notes 359-61.
653. See supra text accompanying notes 388-90.
654. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
655. See supra text accompanying notes 125 ("The status of being human
requires.., honoring.., our right to belong."), 138 ("Unfitting treatment turns on
the meaning given to human action.").
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expanded sense of the social costs as well as the social benefits of
search and seizure, and an overriding commitment to honoring the
equal humanity of all the American people."
656. This Article was first written before our nation declared a War on Terrorism
when hijackers crashed two planes into the World Trade Center towers, killing
thousands of people, on September 11. 2002. See Tasiitz. Twenty-First Century, supra
note 48, at 157-58 (describing the events of September 11 and their significance). The
jurisprudence of respect articulated here has relevance to many of the changes in
American life in the wake of September 11. For example, alleged racial profiling of
persons "appearing to be" Arab or Arab-American (as if such ethnicity can readily be
detected by sight) has increased. See David A. Harris. Racial Profiling Now: "Just
Common Sense" in the Fight Against Terror?, - Crim. Just. _ (forthcoming Summer
2002) (describing racial profiling of Middle Easterners as suspected terrorists after the
World Trade Center collapse). Talk of "individualized justice," "voice." and
significant evidentiary constraints on police conduct may seem foolishly utopian and
naive in a world of potential mass destruction and terror. I have chose not to address
in any detail here the implications of the War on Terrorism for a jurisprudence of
respect because that would merit its own article-length treatment. Nevertheless, I
note that appearances of any inconsistency between respect, full governmental
conduct and citizen safety are misleading. To the contrary, the approach urged here
is more, not less, likely to protect American citizens' lives than does the current
approach. See id. at 13-19 (profiling of Middle Easterners reduces the attention paid
to the behavioral clues that are better predictors of danger, diverts resources from
more focused and effective policing methods, encourages a community distrust that
cuts police off from their best sources of reliable information, underestimates terrorist
sophistication, and otherwise has effects "opposite of what we might think" so that
"our anti-terrorism cause will be set back, not advanced"); Taslitz, Twenty-First
Century, supra note 48, at 157-63 (suggesting ways to minimize the invasion of civil
liberties by new anti-terrorism surveillance technologies while maximizing public
safety).
Notes & Observations
